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Abstract 
Some estimates suggest that as much as 70% of cancer is preventable by disease 
modification alone (Peto 1991). Disease prevention via behavioural change is a 
challenging endeavour. There is widespread recognition that for behaviour to be 
better understood there is a need to understand the context in which it occurs, 
and the beliefs that underpin it. Lay epidemiology illustrates the sophistication 
of belief formation. The arrival at a coronary candidate provides according to 
Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith (1991), a cultural mechanism that aids the 
estimation of risk as observed from known cases in the family and wider society. 
Consequently,  the  estimate  provides  the potential  motivation for  behavioural 
choices. Other studies that followed the original model of lay epidemiology have 
similarly described the coronary candidate (Preston 1997; Emslie, Hunt & Watt 
2001a; Frich, Malterud & Fugelli 2007; Weiner 2009) and suggest that the lay 
public have an understanding of the risk profile for Coronary Heart Disease. 
This  study  aimed  to  explore  the  utility  of  the  elements  held  within  lay 
epidemiology in cancer beliefs. Do the lay public recognise a ‘cancer candidate’? 
Method:  A  series  of  31  in-depth  semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted 
between  November  2007  and  October  2008.  Interviews  took  place  in  two 
communities in Glasgow, Scotland – one affluent, one deprived. The sample was 
drawn  from  a  number  of  community  organisations  and  leisure  clubs  in  the 
communities to facilitate accessing an ‘ordinary’ view. Cancer sufferers were 
excluded  from  the  study.  A  topic  guide  was  used  to  ensure  consistency 
throughout  interviews  and  focused  on  participants’  experience  of  cancer. 
Although the study did not adhere to a strict grounded theory approach, the 
analytic method of constant comparative analysis was followed.  
Findings:  The  complexity  of  the  scheme  described  by  Davison,  where  a  wide 
range of sources of knowledge to inform beliefs resonated. Sophisticated and 
complex  explanatory  models  of  cancer  were  described.  Cancer  inhabited  an 
important cultural position and was most commonly associated with fear and 
dread. Possible aetiological explanations included behavioural, environmental, 
biological and psychological factors. Smoking was the most widely recognised 
risk factor. Knowledge of other risk factors for individual cancers was patchy.  3 
Candidacy therefore was not as unequivocal for cancer. Many ‘anomalous cases’ 
(those without obvious explanation) were proffered. Ultimately the randomness 
of cancer was emphasised.  
 
Conclusion:  Cancer is  a  more complex  disease  than  CHD,  both  culturally  and 
biomedically and this is reflected in the beliefs voiced by participants in this 
study. This complexity is a barrier to the adoption of a cancer candidate.  4 
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Definitions 
The following abbreviations are used throughout the thesis: 
BMI         Body Mass Index 
CHD        Coronary Heart Disease 
 
 
  
1. Introduction & Background 
When Geoffrey Rose (1985) stated that everyone ‘is a high risk individual for this 
mass disease’, he was referring to Cardiovascular Disease. This could equally 
apply to cancer early in the 21
st Century. The latest World Health Organisation 
figures show that cancer continues to represent a considerable global disease 
burden. Each year 12 million new cancers are diagnosed and 7.9 million people 
die of the disease, representing a total of one in every eight worldwide deaths
1. 
Current estimates suggest that three in five of the UK population will suffer from 
some form of cancer over their lifetime and in Scotland 15,000 people die of 
cancer  each  year.  Despite  a  number  of  reviews  of  cancer  care  since  the 
publication of the Calman-Hine report in 1995, the overarching policy objectives 
have  remained  unchanged;  a  reduction  in  incidence  and  an  improvement  in 
survival.  Survival has improved significantly as a result of improvements in early 
detection and the enhancement of existing cancer services. More of a challenge 
to  policy  is  a  reduction  in  incidence,  which  requires  primary  prevention  via 
behavioural  change,  arguably  cancer’s  holy-grail.  Together  environment  and 
behaviour account for 90-95% of all cancers and estimates suggest that 70% of 
cancer is preventable through behavioural modification alone (Peto 2001).  
In Scotland though the overall incidence of cancer in men reduced by 4% in 2008, 
it rose in women in equal part during the same period
2. Most of the improvement 
in  incidence  among  males  is  the  result  of  the  reductions  in  lung  cancer. 
Incidence in other sites is however rising, as is lung cancer in women. Gender is 
not the only social determinant of cancer status. Cancer incidence and mortality 
is greater and survival is poorer among the most deprived across industrialised 
countries (Coleman et al 2004; Faggiano et al 1997; Shack et al 2007). Although 
survival  is  closely  associated  with  stage  at  presentation,  evidence  that  those 
from deprived communities present with more advanced disease is inconsistent 
(Brewster  et  al  2001).  Social  patterns  are  perhaps  unsurprisingly  apparent  in 
behaviour as well as incidence and survival. Across a range of measures, those in 
the  least  affluent  communities  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  the  unhealthy 
behaviours associated with cancer. An estimated 10 million people over 16 in the 
                                         
1 http://www.who.int/cancer/   accessed 26/10/10 
2 http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/183.html Chapter 1    12 
UK smoke regularly. On average 22% of men smoke in the UK. When this figure is 
broken down it shows that 16% of men in the most affluent communities smoke 
compared  to  27%  of  in  the  least  affluent
3.  Scotland  has  higher  than  average 
smoking rates when compared to the rest of the UK, though this has reduced 
from 29% in 1999 to 25% in 2008. However smoking in areas of deprivation is 
consistently higher than elsewhere, with 42% of current smokers living in the 15% 
of most deprived areas
4.  The numbers of those classed as obese in Scotland has 
been steadily rising since 1995. Obesity, once the preserve of the wealthy, is 
now associated with deprivation. As deprivation increases so does obesity, and 
the trend is particularly strong among women
5. Related to this, consumption of 
fruit  and  vegetables  is  1.5  times  higher  among  affluent  groups  (James  et  al 
1997). It would appear that those in deprived communities are most resistant to 
life-style  change  and  the  adoption  of  healthy  behaviours.  Moreover,  research 
shows that cancer risk behaviours are adopted and established at a relatively 
young age. Those from more deprived communities were more likely to have 
tried smoking, to eat a high fat diet and be overweight (Wardle et el 2003). 
1.1 Promoting Health 
All of this risky behaviour occurs in a climate where more and more information 
about health and healthy behaviours is available. The dominant policy discourse 
is now firmly in the realm of individual responsibility (Davison & Davey Smith 
1995)  and  closely  follows  the  biomedical  model.  Health  promotion  urges 
individuals to ‘choose’ healthy living and healthy lifestyles. The assumption is 
that awareness and knowledge provide the basis for that choice. Individuals are 
aware of healthy and unhealthy behaviours and many, particularly those in the 
most  deprived  communities,  simply  make  the  ‘wrong’  choice.  This  is  often 
assumed  to  be  both  irrational  and  fatalistic  (Balshem  1991)  because  a  linear 
causal relationship between knowledge and behaviour is expected.  
Many psychological theories have been developed that aim to explain behaviour 
and  ultimately  facilitate  behavioural  change.  Wallaston  (1976)  developed  the 
                                         
3 http://info.cancerresearchuk.org/cancerstats/types/lung/smoking/#cancer accessed 26/10/10 
4 http://info.cancerresearchuk.org/cancerstats/types/lung/smoking/#cancer accessed 26/10/10 
5 http://www.scotpho.org.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.asp?lID=4048&sID=3489 accessed 
26/10/10 Chapter 1    13 
Health Locus of Control concept which proposed that those who felt most in 
control  of  their  own  health  are  more  likely  to  take  steps  to  change  their 
behaviour. The hypothesis follows that encouraging individuals to augment their 
sense of control will result in the adoption of healthier behaviours. Although two 
large studies (Friis et al 2003; Steptoe and Wardle 2001) found that high levels of 
internal control were predictors of ‘good’ behaviour, findings on the whole have 
been inconsistent (Lyons & Chamberlain 2006). Bandurra (1977) introduced the 
notion  of  self-efficacy  into  predictive  models  and  focused  on  an  individual’s 
perception  of  ability  and  achievement.  In  short,  behavioural  change  is  more 
likely to be achieved if there is an inherent belief that the outcome will be 
positive  and  that  it  is  within  the  realms  of  capability.  To  stop  smoking  an 
individual must not only want to but also believe that they are able to do it. 
Self-efficacy is also integral to Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour. The 
Theory of Planned Behaviour developed from the Theory of Reasoned Action, 
which  had  intention  at  its  heart  but  took  cognisance  of  social  norms  and 
attitudes. It has been widely used in health research (Armitage & Conner 2001; 
Webb & Sheeran 2006) and is a well supported concept, though Stainton-Rogers 
(1991) criticised the model for being trivial. Attitudes and behaviours are also 
vital to the Health Belief Model. It introduces the idea of personal susceptibility 
to disease, perceived disease severity and the consequences of engaging in the 
behaviour.  It also looks specifically at the presence of triggers or cues to action. 
Holm  and  colleagues  (1999)  found  strong  associations  between  those  who 
attended  for  mammography  and  the  belief  that  cancer  screening  was  a 
worthwhile activity but it has been thought to be weak in predicting behaviour 
(McCord 1997; Lyons & Chamberlain 2006). In addressing the criticism that such 
models  are  static,  Prochaska  and  Di  Clemente  (1983)  introduce  stage  models 
which accept that beliefs will change during the lifecourse and offer a circular 
rather  than  linear  approach.  All  of  these  models  have  met  with  criticism, 
generally for being too simplistic (Ogden 2008). Stainton-Rogers (1991) argued 
that behaviours do not occur in such a formulaic manner, but more importantly 
the theories fail to consider the social context.  
1.2 Incorporating the social 
Although social measures, like sanitation and housing, were known to have clear 
health benefits and succeeded in improving the nation’s health, it is medicine Chapter 1    14 
that has dominated the public health agenda. Yet, the validity of its dominance 
has been questioned, especially since biomedicine fails to explain social patterns 
in the experience and causes of ill health (Calnan 1987). This is not the only 
criticism levelled at biomedicine. Much of medical sociology, from functionalism 
(Parsons 1951) to critical theorists (Illich 1976; Navarro 1977), has examined the 
role  of  medicine in  the everyday  lives of the  individual  and,  ultimately  both 
draw distinctions between the ‘professional’ and the ‘patient’. Though it now 
seems rather old-fashioned not to consider the lay perspective it has not always 
been widely accepted that understanding lay views about health can add much 
to the understanding of lay beliefs and behaviour (Friedson 1970). Popay and 
Williams (1996) go as far as to suggest that ignoring the lay voice is foolhardy, 
particularly  as  it  can  offer  untold  insights  into  the  experience  of  health  and 
illness.  
Shaw  (2002)  however  urged  caution  when  dealing  with  the  lay  voice  and 
questions  how  ‘lay’  such  voices  really  are.  Shaw  took  what  he  called  ‘the 
Helsinki study’ (Kangas 2001), which looked at illness narratives of depressed 
patients, as his starting point, and asked if anyone in modern society can be 
truly  ‘lay’.  He  suggested  that  the  distinction  between  ‘lay’  and  ‘expert’  has 
outgrown its usefulness. He cited many examples of research that demonstrated 
that  when  looking  for  meaning  about  illness,  patients  in  reality  often  adopt 
professional  explanations.  Moreover,  policy  explicitly  encourages  the  ‘expert 
patient’ (Department of Health 2001). Shaw quoted Kangas’ study, which despite 
referring  to  depression  in this  instance  could  equally  apply  across  the  illness 
spectrum: 
“Lay  perceptions  of  depression  are  made  of  bits  and  pieces  taken 
from  many  sources,  reflecting  the  fact  that  individual,  social  and 
cultural  contextualization  of  depression  takes  place  in  an  era  of 
increasing  reflexive  practices  .  ..  Lay  theories,  perceptions  and 
explanations. . . are constructed and negotiated in an increasingly 
plural  and  complex  environment  of  knowledge”.  (Kangas,  2001:  89 
cited in Shaw (2002)) 
This complexity does not suggest that ‘lay’ experiences should not be explored. 
Rather Shaw suggested that any exploration be mindful of the growing overlap 
between  lay  and  expert  knowledge  and  be  sceptical  of  claims  that  the  two 
inhabit entirely different spheres.  Chapter 1    15 
The  similarities  between  the  ‘lay’  and  expert  positions  are  highlighted  by 
Davison and colleagues’ work on lay epidemiology (Davison, Frankel and Davey 
Smith  1991).  The  lay  epidemiology  model  suggests  the  lay  public  draws  on 
knowledge  and experience  to  develop  a  sophisticated  system  of  beliefs  that, 
while  mindful  of  health  education  messages,  are  set  within  the  context  of 
experience  and,  are  evidence  based.  This  evidence  may  be  gathered  from 
family, community, or societal events and each event will impact on beliefs to 
varying degrees. The model offered an insight into why some individuals may be 
resistant  to  change  behaviours  that  may  make  them  susceptible  to,  in  this 
instance coronary heart disease (CHD). Could the model be of equal value when 
considering other diseases, particularly those that are strongly associated with 
known risk factors and countless health promotion efforts?  
This  thesis  aims  to  explore  the  utility  of  the  lay  epidemiology  model  in  the 
context  of  cancer  beliefs.  The  thesis  has  four  main  sections.  The  beginning 
section  concentrates  on  the  literature,  by  first  reviewing  studies  of  health 
beliefs from which lay epidemiology is drawn, before going on to outline lay 
epidemiology  more  closely.  The  second  part  of  the  literature  review  takes 
cancer as its focus and looks not only at general cancer awareness but also more 
broadly at the cultural position of cancer in our society. This first sections ends 
with a number of questions that the study sought to answer. The second shorter 
section  turns  to  methods,  and  in  two  chapters,  outlines  the  broader 
methodological  considerations  of  the  study  before  going  on  to  detail  the 
research  design  and  process.  The  data  findings  are  then  presented  in  four 
chapters.  Chapter  7  introduces  the  sample,  before  going  on  to  describe  the 
participants experience of cancer in Chapter 8. The meaning and understanding 
that participants’ have derived from that experience is outlined in Chapter 9 and 
finally  in  Chapter  10  the  findings  are  explored  in  the  context  of  lay 
epidemiology. Throughout the data findings chapters other relevant research is 
considered and included. The final sections in Chapters 11 and 12 discuss the 
findings, in light of the research questions, summarise the study and reach some 
conclusions about the usefulness of the lay epidemiology model when exploring 
cancer beliefs.   
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Literature Review Introduction 
This literature review has three aims. First, it aims to provide a context for the 
thesis  by  outlining  the  wider  literature  on  health  beliefs.  Next,  to  explore 
thoroughly the concept of lay epidemiology, and finally, to detail what is known 
about cancer among the lay population.  The literature review will be separated 
into  two  chapters.  The  first  will  focus  on  health  beliefs,  including  lay 
epidemiology, and the second on cancer.   
Both ‘health beliefs’ and ‘cancer’ are represented by large literatures. It would 
be impossible to present either in their entirety, and so it is important to outline 
what literature will be reflected on in the following chapters.  
2.1.1 What literature is included? 
Tackling  subjects  with  potentially  limitless  amounts  of  research  means  that 
setting early parameters is crucial. Studies of the lay experience of health have 
a long and varied history and have changed the way in which we think about the 
illness experience (Lawton 2003). Those that centre on the health beliefs of ‘lay’ 
public are less common. Early studies that simply teased out definitions have 
now given rise to a wealth of literature that considers beliefs among various 
social,  demographic  and  ethnographic  groupings.  Such  studies  have  further 
developed  to  describe  and  interpret  the  beliefs  of  various  disease-specific 
constituencies. Despite such variety the majority of this work has its origins in a 
number of key health belief texts. Their inclusion in this thesis is based on the 
acknowledgement that these works are important forerunners of much of the 
health belief literature that has followed.  
Hughner  and  Kleine  (2004)  recently  conducted  a  review  of  health  beliefs 
literature published between 1983 and 2003 and present a synthesis of the data 
from the 28 included studies. Many of the studies included are dealt with in 
detail  within  this  chapter because  of their  significance  in  the  field  of  study. 
Hughner and Kleine present 18 different health themes that they then combined 
to give four key areas. These concentrate on definitions, causal explanations, Chapter 2    17 
external factors impinging on health, and the place of health in people’s lives. 
They  conclude  that  much  of  the  work  that  has  sought  to  define  health  has 
concentrated on illness rather than health. They also suggested that lay theories 
of health often do not match professional views, so for example lay groups value 
‘not lying down to’ illness. People attribute responsibility for illness events to 
fate or luck and this is common throughout lay studies of health. Health too was 
judged to be taken for granted rather than something to be aimed for.  
Like health beliefs, cancer and beliefs about cancer are represented by a wide 
literature. The area that is loosely termed psycho-oncology has looked closely at 
beliefs about cancer, but the focus has tended to be on cancer patients. The 
extent to which such studies truly access the ‘lay’ voice is questionable. As Shaw 
(2002) asserts, patients become, over the course of their illness, experts.  In 
addition, there are numerous studies that explore very specific aspects of cancer 
beliefs,  for  example  beliefs  about  screening,  or  symptom  awareness.  The 
literature reviewed here will therefore be confined to studies relating to beliefs 
about  cancer  among  the  lay  public.  Unless  especially  relevant,  the  views  of 
patients and their carers will not be reviewed.  
2.1.2 Search Strategy  
Each element of this review required its own discrete literature search. Medical 
sociology  readers  were  used  as  the  starting  point  to  locate important  health 
beliefs  texts.  Citation  searches  were  widely  used  and  frequently  cited  texts 
were  considered.  By  focusing  solely  on  lay  epidemiology,  the  thesis  has  an 
arguably narrow remit, which negates the conventional approach to literature 
searching  that  values  ‘inclusivity’.  Besides,  a  search  for  the  term  ‘lay 
epidemiology, yields little. Again, citation searches addressed this gap. A more 
traditional approach to searching was adopted for the cancer beliefs element of 
the  review.  Electronic  databases  including  MEDLINE,  CINAHL  and  Web  of 
Knowledge were searched using the terms cancer*, know*, aware*, belief*, lay 
and  public.  The  main  inclusion  criteria  were  studies  that  considered  beliefs 
about cancer among non-patients and studies that focused on cancer generally. 
Those studies that primarily considered awareness and beliefs about screening 
were not included.  Chapter 2    18 
The remainder of this chapter will deal with health beliefs. It will first introduce 
a number of seminal texts that provide the historical and theoretical background 
for  lay  epidemiology  before  going  on  to  give  an  in-depth  account  of  lay 
epidemiology.   
2.2 The theoretical context: unearthing beliefs about 
health.  
Many  of the  early  studies  that  introduced  lay  beliefs  about  health  are  to  be 
found in social anthropology. The first ethnographies are attributed to Rivers 
(1924) and later Clements (1932) and Ackerknecht (1942). These analyses tended 
to describe health beliefs in non-western cultures. They focused on irrational 
‘primitive’  beliefs  and  are  now  considered  to  be,  at  best,  patronising.  The 
paternalistic  offerings  from  social  anthropology  soon  gave  way  to  less 
disparaging ‘systems theories’, which proposed that views about health mirrored 
overall cultural belief systems (Dunn 1968). The dominance of the biomedical 
model has meant that similar analyses of western health beliefs were largely 
absent. The assumption being that scientific explanations obviate the need to 
explore  lay  beliefs  of  health.  As  such,  the  lay  voice  was  almost  entirely 
neglected. Lupton (1994) traced the history of lay beliefs and noted that many 
of  the  early  offerings  relied  heavily  on  professional/scientific  accounts.  She 
suggested  that  the  shift  from  pre-Enlightenment  beliefs  about  health  and 
disease,  where  religion  and  morality  were  integral,  to  the  scientific  post-
Enlightenment  model  rendered  lay  beliefs  meaningless.  The  body  became 
viewed  as  a  series  of  mechanistic  parts  that  could  be  treated  and  cured  in 
isolation. This marked the beginning of biomedicine’s hegemony. A further 300 
years  passed  before  the  gaze  began  to  readjust  to  incorporate  non-scientific 
models.  
2.2.1 Lay beliefs 
As has already been detailed, studies that consider lay beliefs about health have 
borrowed  heavily  from  social  anthropology.  The  emphasis  on  the  ‘otherness’ 
apparent  in  beliefs  about  health  in  non-Western  or  ‘primitive’  societies  has 
spilled  into  studies  of  lay  views  in  contemporary  western  societies.  As  Bury 
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‘correct’ and lay ‘beliefs’ are inherently ‘wrong’. In this context terminology 
becomes important, for example early labelling of beliefs as ‘folk’ tended to 
emphasise the discord between lay and professional viewpoints. The contention 
being that ‘belief’ is secondary to ‘knowledge’. Irrespective of the semantics it 
is clear that much can be gained from giving the ‘lay’ perspective recognition. 
Popay and Williams (1996) argued that the recognition of lay knowledge can be 
advantageous in many ways. First, they cite Hilary Graham’s (1987) influential 
work  on  smoking  patterns  among  young  women  living  in  areas  of  social 
disadvantage that highlighted the importance of understanding health behaviour 
in the context of peoples’ lives. They also demonstrated that there have been 
instances  where  lay  knowledge  has  prompted  the  scientific  community  to 
reassess their knowledge. Links between poor health and environmental factors, 
housing  conditions  and  work  hazards  are  all  given  as  examples  of  occasions 
where  lay  knowledge  informed  scientific  knowledge  rather  than  vice  versa. 
Despite their pleas for parity between lay and scientific knowledge, Popay and 
Williams equally stressed their inherent differentness: 
“For  the  most  part,  however  sophisticated  and  sociologically 
illuminating  the  knowledge  expressed  in  lay  beliefs  may  be,  it 
remains disorganised and ad hoc, posing little if any direct challenge 
to the medical profession. However much these beliefs are part of a 
shared  culture  and  society,  they  are  expressions  of  personal 
experiences which remain outside the world of science and politics”. 
(Popay and Williams pg 118 cited in Challenging medicine Gabe (ed)) 
It is this spirit that is evoked in this thesis. Using the term lay beliefs throughout 
should not detract from their value.  
2.2.2 Describing lay beliefs. 
Lay beliefs are now widely researched. Data that allow better understanding of 
the health beliefs of various socio-cultural groups are widely available, as are 
narrowly focused disease specific areas. It is a vast literature. Yet, while new 
insights  are  offered  into  the  nuances  of  belief,  the  majority  of  current  lay 
beliefs work owes much to a number of early, seminal studies. The following 
section details a series of important qualitative health belief studies. While they 
have been instrumental in improving an understanding of many aspects of health Chapter 2    20 
beliefs,  they  have  been  included  here because  they  say  something  about  lay 
notions of causality, or lay aetiology, which is central to lay epidemiology.  
Claudine Herzlich’s (1973) work concentrated on the social representations of 
health.  She  carried  out  a  study  of  health  beliefs  among  80  middle-class 
individuals, most living in Paris but also some in Normandy. Herzlich believed 
that the views expressed by her respondents demonstrated that their thoughts 
on health were quite distinct from those of professionals. Her findings show that 
health was judged in three different but often overlapping ways. First, health as 
a ‘vacuum’ wherein health is essentially seen as the absence of disease that only 
becomes apparent during periods of illness. Second, health as a ‘reserve’, where 
health is inherent but can be added to or augmented and ultimately used to 
fight illness. Finally, ‘equilibrium’, described as a higher state of ideal health 
that is threatened by ways of life. She questioned her respondents about where 
health ‘came from’. Respondents placed health in two separate categories; the 
endogenous,  or  that  which  could  be  found  inside  an  individual  and  the 
exogenous, found outside the individual. Yet it was the exogenous, represented 
as the ‘way of life’ that posed the greatest threat to health. City-living, and 
living in Paris in particular, exposed its inhabitants to a series of health threats 
borne out of the fast pace of life, pollution, germs and modernity in general. 
The impact on health was both physical and emotional:  
“The constant commotion isn’t made to make people ordinary, they 
are  difficult,  nervous,  tired,  that’s  the  truth  about  modern  life”. 
(Herzlich 1973 cited in Bury & Gabe 2004 pg28) 
Conversely country-dwellers were not subject to the same strains and as such 
had  an  altogether  healthier  way  of  life.  City  living  meant  many  more 
opportunities to pass germs not so apparent in the country. The respondents 
identified three major diseases that were judged to be directly associated with 
modern life: cancer, mental ill health, and heart disease. These are the diseases 
which, according to Herzlich, were ‘at the heart of individual preoccupations’ 
and took on a ‘special significance’. As one respondent said of cancer: 
“Cancer, I rather associate with current allergies, with very modern 
allergic diseases, with the physical and nervous strain we undergo in 
cities, and then in breathing in the present-day atmosphere in cities” 
(Herzlich 1973 cited in Bury & Gabe 2004 pg29) Chapter 2    21 
Although there was recognition that the endogenous aspect of health contained 
inherent susceptibility to some diseases, a ‘good’ constitution could effectively 
guarantee health. Individuals were thought to possess protective traits. Herzlich 
captures the moral dimension integral to explanations of health.  While illness is 
bad,  health  is  good  and  health  is  to  be  found  within  the  individual.  Battle 
metaphors were utilised, suggesting that individuals are inherently strong and 
can fight the dangers associated with modern ways of life.  
As noted earlier, part of the discourse in health beliefs has concerned itself with 
differences or indeed similarities between ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ views of health. 
Snow’s (1974) study of health beliefs among Tucson residents demonstrated the 
dissimilarity  of  views  between  interviewees  and  biomedicine.  Respondents’ 
emphasis was on environmental and supernatural forces as the roots of disease 
and achieving ‘balance’ was seen as the key to good health. Snow’s findings are 
interesting, yet they present ‘illness’ as a whole and do not draw distinctions 
between the aetiology of different illnesses or diseases. For example, there are 
no  clear  statements  about  causes  of  minor  illnesses,  like  the  common  cold, 
although the inference is that voodoo or black magic may be reserved for more 
serious conditions. Conversely Helman’s (1978) study that presents ‘folk’ models 
of belief among general practice patients in the UK shows similarities between 
doctor and patient accounts. Both groups draw distinctions between colds and 
fevers  and  their  respective  aetiologies.  Like  Snow,  Helman  found  that  the 
common cold was believed to be the result of environmental factors, like the 
weather. Fevers were thought to be the result of ‘germs’, a term borrowed from 
biomedicine. Helman concluded that biomedical concepts are easily integrated 
into ‘folk’ models and that doctors engage in collusion with patients to maintain 
the folk model. Both Helman and Snow’s work offered interesting descriptions of 
beliefs but attempt neither to interpret nor explain them.  
A more in-depth account is offered by Cornwell (1984) in her influential work in 
east London in the late 1970s.  In an exploration of lay health beliefs among a 
working class community she highlighted the difference between ‘public’ and 
‘private’  accounts  of  health  and  illness.  Public  accounts  provide  what  the 
respondents  believe  are  ‘the  right  answers’.  Cornwell  suggested  that  the 
findings from her interviews show that in public accounts individuals tend to rely 
heavily  on  the  medical  model  for  explanation.  This  was  less  pronounced  in Chapter 2    22 
private accounts, which were more biographical and convoluted. According to 
Cornwell, her respondents presented causation of illness on three distinct, but 
interrelated, dimensions. First, illness was either internal or external, second, it 
was avoidable or unavoidable and finally an individual was either to blame or 
blameless  in  becoming  ill.  Despite  illness  being  seen  as  avoidable,  Cornwell 
noted  respondents’  reluctance  to  apportion  blame.  Yet,  public  accounts  of 
health  and  illness  were  littered  with  moral  judgements,  particularly  about 
attitudes to work and how effectively disease or illness was borne by individuals. 
Private  accounts  for  Cornwell  were  more  biographical  in  nature  and  often 
involved  the  retelling  of  narratives  which  held  intricate  causal  explanations 
within them.  
“The concept of the causal process was dynamic rather than static, 
with many factors interacting – acting and reacting upon each other – 
and with illness as the eventual outcome.”  (Cornwell 198:149)  
Respondents’  reluctance  to  blame  individuals  for  illness  was  coupled  with 
scepticism about the relationship between behaviour and illness. For example, 
few  respondents  accepted  the  link  between  smoking  and  lung  cancer.  Most 
respondents knew individuals for whom smoking did not feature as a factor in 
their premature death or who had smoked and survived. Rather than lifestyle, 
individuals attracted blame when they were seen to dwell on problems, or failed 
to ‘get on with life’. Overall the aim was to be seen as a survivor rather than a 
victim. Cornwell proposed that views about health were simply a feature of the 
wider belief system in the community or their ‘hard -earned lives’.  
Mildred Blaxter (1979, 1982, 1983, 1990) has been a prolific commentator on 
health beliefs. Blaxter (1979) Blaxter and Patterson (1982) and Blaxter (1983) 
presented  findings  from  a  study  carried  out  with two  generations  of  working 
class women in a Scottish city. The study demonstrated the wide-ranging and 
complex  nature  of  aetiological  theories.  The  study  did  not  set  out  to  look 
specifically at any particular aspect of health and illness, instead the women 
were asked to discuss issues about health and illness that were important to 
them. Blaxter noted: 
Typically,  these  women  had  a  very  stoical,  puritanical  and  at  the 
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weakness, ‘lying down to it’, being functionally unfit, giving in to 
diseases. (pg Blaxter 1983:60)   
As with Cornwell’s work, Blaxter uncovered the strength of the moral dimension 
inherent  in  thoughts  about  illness.  Obviously  health  was  seen  as  something 
positive and Blaxter believed that the respondents may have provided accounts 
that lessened the extent of illness in their lives. For both generations the most 
important response to illness was ‘not lying down to it’. This cohort routinely 
described illness in what Blaxter called moral and spiritual, rather than physical, 
terms.  The  preoccupation  with  the  moral  dimension  of  health  does  have  an 
important consequence. If some degree of ill health is inescapable, then the role 
of fatalism or ‘bad luck’ is augmented. The women in Blaxter’s study mentioned 
a  wide  range  of  diseases,  and  a  cause  was  ascribed  to  the  most  of  those 
mentioned.  The  most  common  causes  were  infections,  heredity,  and  family 
susceptibility, together with environmental factors such as living and working 
conditions.  Blaxter  noted  that  family  susceptibility  and  heredity  were  given 
more credibility in lay theories than they are in medicine and the respondents 
supposed connections between disease patterns that were common in families. 
Other aetiological  theories  were  based  on  the  idea  that  stresses  and  strains, 
both physical and emotional, could ‘bring on’ disease. Many thought that disease 
could result in further disease, for example, a common cold could easily become 
pneumonia, if not carefully monitored. This is what Blaxter called a secondary 
event. Only with common diseases, like the cold or flu did Blaxter’s respondents 
implicate  individual  behaviour  as  a  cause  of  disease.  Blaxter,  like  Cornwell, 
found that respondents were loath to incriminate individual behaviour. Often, 
respondents cited the natural constraints of poverty and the influence that this 
had on their own and their children’s health. Yet, they were keen to stress that 
both rich and poor could be similarly afflicted by disease.   
There  are  additional  Scottish  studies  of  health  beliefs  that  have  particular 
resonance  here.  Mullen’s  (1994)  study  of  religion  and  health  beliefs  among 
middle-aged men in Glasgow found that many of his respondents thought that 
some diseases, like cancer, were ‘in you’ and were therefore fatalistic about 
one’s  ability  to  avoid  them.  Similarly  ‘constitutions’  were  marked  out  as 
important,  though  some  thought  it  was  possible  to  improve  or  bolster  one’s 
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Edinburgh, Backett  (1992a  1992b)  sought  to  explore  beliefs  about health and 
lifestyle in families that were in a strong position to be healthy; in terms of 
social and material advantage. Consistent with studies on health beliefs, Backett 
found  that  health  was  seen  as  multidimensional  and  that  fate  was  included 
alongside  scientific  explanations.  As  Crawford  (1984)  established,  Backett’s 
families were eager to illustrate their good behaviours, and to demonstrate that 
they  knew  what  healthy  behaviour  was.  Yet,  on  closer  consideration  the 
imagined often did not match the reality. Few followed the healthy regimen that 
they thought was morally incumbent upon them. Thus, Backett concluded that 
with the increased amount of information available on health, awareness had 
changed but behaviour had not necessarily followed. Central to the discussions 
were ideas about balance, which was necessary for health, in all areas of life. 
Backett, Davison and Mullen (1994) brought together data from three separate 
studies that focused on health beliefs. They concluded that moderation, which is 
assumed vital for a healthy lifestyle, was the common feature across studies. 
There was a general resistance to a strict regime in any area of life and often 
participants talked about ‘trading’ good and bad behaviours.  
In  a  further  attempt  to  better  understand  beliefs  about  health,  a  series  of 
studies by Pill and Stott (1982a, 1982b, 1985), asked a group of young mothers 
about the preventability of illness. They drew on the original concept of health 
locus  of  control  (Wallaston  1976)  to  develop  a  tool  that  measured  health 
behaviours. In terms of aetiology, a range of explanations were offered including 
heredity,  personal  susceptibility,  environment,  germs,  lifestyle  factors  and 
personality. In the initial exploratory study approximately 20% of all informants 
denied  any  personal  responsibility  for  health.  Echoing  other  locus  of  control 
work,  they  found  that  informants  could  be  separated  into  two  key  groups. 
‘Lifestylists, or those that saw individual responsibility for health, and ‘fatalists’ 
who believed that health and illness were largely out with the control of the 
individual.  What  was  unique  about  their  findings  was  that  the  two  were  not 
mutually exclusive: 
“Most  people  appear  to  be  quite  capable  of  holding  a  number  of 
apparently contradictory general theories of causation at the same 
time which are brought forward in various combinations depending on 
the situation and the nature of the questions asked”. (Pill & Stott 
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Both lifestylists and fatalists believed that individuals had some responsibility for 
their  own  health  but,  while  lifestylists  believed  this  was  the  result  of 
behavioural  choice,  fatalists  understood  this  as  the  impact  of  worry, 
hypochondria, and dwelling on illness. Pill and Stott also found that views were 
socially patterned and those with even a marginally higher level of education 
were more likely to be ‘lifestylists’.  
Calnan’s  (1987)  study  considered  the  relationship  between  social  class  and 
health and compared the views of women in social class I and II  with those in 
social class IV and V. Questions were about a series of health related beliefs and 
concepts, but of most relevance to this review are their beliefs about causality. 
Stress  and  obesity  were  key  factors in the  origin  of  CHD  in  both  social  class 
groups, and although other explanations like smoking and drinking were offered 
by both groups they prioritised them differently. Calnan reported that cancer 
stood out as the feared disease and that the ‘logic in lay models was difficult to 
disentangle’. Cancer was attributed to a number of factors, and popular among 
middle  class  women  were  ideas  of  heredity  and  biological  predisposition.  He 
continued that  these  were  distinct  from  ideas  held  by  working  class  women, 
which he described in the following excerpt: 
“The  working-class  women’s  accounts,  while  also  characterised  by 
doubt and uncertainty, identified a different type of theory about 
cancer causation to the one adopted by the middle class groups. The 
most popular theory adopted specifically by this group implied that 
cancer was in everybody or in some people and only needed to be 
triggered off.” (Calnan 1987:65) 
The impression that cancer is a dormant feature present in some or all of us is 
an interesting one. However, though Calnan was keen to make the distinction 
between the class groups, it might be argued that the ideas of predisposition 
and  something  ‘in’  everybody  are  essentially  the  same  but  articulated 
differently.  
The review of these above provides a brief overview of some of the key texts in 
the origins of health belief literature. They show that individual beliefs about 
health are derived not only from experience but also from biomedical concepts 
that are incorporated easily into explanations. Though Herzlich suggested that 
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the  evocation  of  the  importance  of  germs  is  testimony  to  the  salience  of 
biomedicine. Herlizch’s idea of health as a ‘reserve’ is common in many of the 
reviewed  studies.  For  many,  health  is  an  inherent  abstract  concept  that  is 
thought about only in response to a specific health-related problem. It is only in 
these circumstances that thoughts turn to health and illness and the search for 
explanation begins. Ascertaining the reasons for poor health or illness events and 
the extent to which the sufferer is to blame are arrived at in response to the 
event. Common in the studies is the notion of naturally occurring differences, or 
inherent  constitutions,  between  individuals.  Illnesses  too  have  inherent 
differences. Participants across studies categorise illness into those that can be 
avoided and those that cannot. A constant seam runs through the studies that 
highlight the moral expectations placed on the ill, who must not ‘lie down’ to 
illness.  Yet  parallel  to  this  the  studies  also  report  a  reluctance  to  apportion 
blame to individual disease sufferers (unless the disease was thought avoidable). 
Although  these  studies  are  now  historical  they  do  show  that  lay  views  are 
complex and sophisticated. They perhaps reflect the context in which they were 
undertaken.  For  many  of  those interviewed  illness  primarily  meant  infection. 
The studies took place in an era before the, now dominant, narrative relating to 
prevention  took  hold.  The  avoidance  of  illness  via  abstention  from  risky 
behaviour now places the responsibility firmly with the individual.  
2.2.3 Explaining Health Beliefs 
While the reviewed studies are illuminating they do not aid our understanding of 
the process involved in constructing beliefs. Kleinman (1980) describes what he 
terms  explanatory  models,  which  are  activated  during  episodes  of  individual 
illness. Crucially these are separate from generic beliefs that are ever-present. 
Explanatory models allow individuals to account for, and make sense of, poor 
health by giving details of what they might expect to happen within one illness 
episode. These expectations are culturally created and allow individuals to share 
experiences,  so  for  example  the  experience  of  the  common  cold  is  well-
established culturally. Chrisman (1989) refers to these as ‘cultural templates’, 
which supply individuals with an understanding of what they are experiencing. 
Chrisman suggested that people look within their ‘repertoire’ of health beliefs 
and  find  culturally  recognised  descriptions  of  their  illness  experience.  The 
information that makes up the repertoire is derived from a variety of sources, Chapter 2    27 
both personal and cultural (although arguably the two cannot be separated). The 
result is a specific idiosyncratic belief system: 
“The  illness  belief  repertoire  is  partially  representative  of  beliefs 
that  constitute  popular  health  culture.  Any  repertoire’s  specific 
configuration is the consequence of a person’s life experiences: his or 
her  exposure  to  a  limited  number  of  the  widely  ranging  beliefs 
contained within popular health culture.” (Chrisman 1989:14) 
Young’s (1980; 1982) conception of prototypes similarly offered an insight into 
how  beliefs  about  health  are  formulated.  Prototypes  are  based  on  personal 
experiences  and  memories  that  provide  clues  to  current  events  and  can  be 
shared by small groups of people, like family and friends.  
The ideas put forward by Kleinman, Chrisman and Young may be thought of as a 
starting  point  for  Davison  and  colleagues  work  on  lay  epidemiology  (Davison, 
Frankel & Davey Smith 1991)
  6. The next section of the review will focus solely 
on lay epidemiology, and its constituent components of candidacy, anomalies 
and the prevention paradox.  
2.3 Lay epidemiology 
The lay epidemiology model was introduced in a series of papers beginning with 
the influential Lay epidemiology and the prevention paradox: the implications 
of coronary candidacy for health education (Davison, Smith & Frankel 1991). In 
formulating the model they drew on data generated from a series of in-depth 
interviews with 180 adults in three geographical locations in South Wales. The 
interviews were part of a study that aimed to consider the impact of health 
promotion  programmes,  and  in  particular  how  ordinary  people  talked  about 
heart  disease  and  its  causes.  The  localities  had  recently  been the  target  for 
‘Heartbeat  Wales’,  an  education  campaign  on  CHD,  and  while  the  authors 
supposed  that  the  study  population  was  likely  to  be  typical  of  any  adult 
population in the United Kingdom, they did concede that the recent attention on 
                                         
6 The paper cited here by Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith (1991) first introduced lay 
epidemiology. For ease of reading this paper and work will be referred to simply as ‘Davison’ in 
the body of the text. The team produced a series of papers that used findings from this study. 
These papers will be cited in full.  
 Chapter 2    28 
CHD may have elevated the condition in the minds of the sample population. In 
its broadest sense, lay epidemiology:  
“refers  to  a  scheme  in  which  individuals  interpret  health  risks 
through the routine observation and discussion of cases of illness and 
death in personal networks and in the public arena, as well as formal 
and informal evidence arising from other sources, such as television 
and magazines”  (Frankel, Davison & Davey-Smith 1991:428) 
This information is combined to build an explanatory model for Coronary Heart 
Disease  (CHD).  Such an  approach, it  was asserted,  was  akin to  the  approach 
found in mainstream epidemiology. Further, they concluded that not only was 
this method of theory building analogous to a scientific model but the detail of 
the beliefs also echoed biomedicine. Lay beliefs expressed by the Welsh cohort 
about  the  causality  of  CHD  were  littered  with  explanations  borrowed  from 
contemporary health promotion. Davison suggested that the ‘common currency’ 
among  the  lay  community  and  health  promoters  alike  was  that  CHD  was 
preventable through behaviour modification. What the lay epidemiology model 
provided was a formula that allowed the general public to estimate the risk of 
CHD in oneself and others. It was this estimation of risk of CHD that Davison 
termed ‘coronary candidacy’, the concept at the heart of lay epidemiology.  
2.3.1 Coronary Candidacy 
Coronary candidacy was described by Davison as a ‘cultural mechanism’ which 
contained a series of widely and easily recognisable concepts associated with 
CHD. Together, these provided an explanatory framework for the identification 
of  those  thought  to  be  most  or  indeed  least  likely  to  suffer  ‘heart  trouble’. 
Candidacy demonstrated how health beliefs were operationalised:  
“Through  its  use  (candidacy),  generalised  information  which  is 
derived from an aggregation of many cases is returned to the realm 
of the individual.  It is a mechanism that helps individuals to assess 
personal risks, obtain reassuring affirmation of predictability (thus 
mapping unpredictability) devise appropriate strategies of personal 
behaviour and go some way towards explaining events which, by their 
very nature, are deeply distressing. In the cultural edifice which our 
society  has  erected  to  make  sense  of  coronary  disease  and  death, 
candidacy  is  a  central  pillar.”(Davison,  Frankel  and  Davey  Smith 
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Candidacy, Davison found, was used in different ways.  The first, most powerful, 
and the most easily evoked, was the retrospective explanation of illness events 
and deaths in others. The commonsense view of why a CHD event had happened: 
“Mind  you,  he  was  always  a  bugger  for  his  fry  ups  and  his  cream 
cakes, so he had to be well up for it, like” (Davison Frankel and Davey 
Smith 1991:8) 
“Of course, it was in the family, so it was to be expected really” 
(Davison Frankel and Davey Smith 1991:8) 
Candidacy was also used to predict future illness, again in others: 
“looks as if they might keel over at any point” (Davison Frankel and 
Davey Smith 1991:9) 
“I didn’t like to say anymore cos she looked like she could have a 
heart attack any minute” (Davison Frankel and Davey Smith 1991:9) 
“He’ll have a heart attack if he isn’t careful” (Davison Frankel and 
Davey Smith 1991:9) 
Though some respondents also discussed personal candidacy, both in relation to 
past  and  future  events,  Davison  believed  that  candidacy  tended  to  be  most 
salient when commenting on the health of others.  
These examples from Davison’s interviewees are familiar. They represent the 
everyday language used to discuss heart disease and they offer valid reflections 
on  the  manner  of  talk  around  CHD.  They  also  hint  at  how  candidates  are 
identified. Davison claimed that individuals sought three types of information 
when  judging  candidacy:  physical  characteristics,  social  information  and 
personal information. Yet, it was not always necessary to access all three types 
of information. Obesity, or physical stature, is central to causal explanations and 
Davison  noted  that  the  individual’s  ‘build’  was  invariably  mentioned  in  any 
discussion  of  a  CHD  event.  Sometimes,  particularly  in  extreme  cases,  only 
physical signs were required to confirm candidacy.  Body-mass was the visual 
representation of CHD, and allowed speedy judgements of candidacy to be made 
-  even  about  strangers.  In  such  cases  just  one  factor  was  enough  to  define 
candidacy and no further information was needed. Judgements about body-mass 
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individual thought to be only slightly overweight experienced a CHD event, their 
candidacy, by virtue of their weight, was confirmed. Equally, if an individual was 
not  overweight,  this  was  also  central  to  the  discussion  but  prompted  the 
beginning  of  speculation  about  alternative  explanations.  At  this  point  other 
aetiological factors deemed important for CHD were considered. Most common 
amongst them were a lack of physical fitness, family history, occupation, and 
sometimes, for this particular population, geography. When information about 
behaviours  or  risk  factors  was  available,  this  too  was  inserted  into  the 
explanatory  model.  Davison  demonstrated  that  a  personal  explanatory  model 
was attached to each individual CHD experience. Potentially complex links were 
made between risks. For example, worriers or those under stress were thought 
to be more susceptible to CHD. In turn worriers were more likely to smoke to 
counteract their worry, thus augmenting their candidacy because smoking is also 
a behaviour associated with CHD. As Davison noted:   
 “This  type  of  linkage  tends  to  give  each  individual  an  organic 
wholeness  and  a  personal  character”  (Davison,  Frankel  and  Davey 
Smith 1991:13)  
According  to  Davison,  candidacy  was  ‘wide’.  Candidacy  comprised  of  such  a 
range  of  behaviours  and  characteristics  that  ultimately  anyone  could  be  a 
candidate.  They  illustrated  this  by  showing  that  individuals  located  at  the 
extremes  of  a  behavioural  spectrum  could  equally  be  candidates.  Those  who 
engaged in no physical exercise and those who take ‘too much’ exercise, are 
both  thought  to  be  at  risk  of  CHD,  as  are  manual  labourers  and  high-flying 
executives by virtue of work stress.  
2.3.2 Anomalous Deaths and Unwarranted Survivors   
As well as the strength of the candidacy concept in providing an explanation for 
CHD events, a crucial element of candidacy, according to Davison, is that the lay 
epidemiologist  is  keenly  aware  of  its  fallibility.  Despite  its  width,  many  CHD 
events occur in those who do not fit any candidacy profile. Hence, phrases like 
‘the  last  person  you’d  expect’  were  used,  which  represented  a  violation  of 
candidacy. Likewise, not all candidates develop illnesses. This led Davison to 
stress that candidacy is simply a reflection of risk, and consolidates the public 
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“  even  though  most  of  our  informants  have  professed  the  opinion 
that heart disease is to some extent preventable or postponable the 
idea that it could happen to anyone (at any time) is omnipresent” 
(Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith 1991:14) 
In  the  absence  of  adequate  aetiological  explanations  luck  and/or  chance  are 
arrived at as explantions. Unpredictability is seen as nothing more than bad luck. 
Candidacy can only provide a simple classification for heart illness episodes. The 
recognised fallibility of candidacy is operationalised through the identification of 
what the authors referred to as ‘unwarranted survivors’ and ‘anomalous deaths’. 
That is those individuals who meet the risk profile yet do not experience any 
illness  events  and  those  who  do  not  meet  any  aspect  of  the  recognised  risk 
profile and succumb to illness, respectively:  
“The popular idea of the classic coronary candidate and the common 
observation  that  candidates  and  victims  are  not  co-extensive 
categories,  both  owe  their  existence  to  this  interplay  between 
publicly  communicated  scientific  information  and  the  operation  of 
Lay Epidemiology” (Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith 1992:678) 
Running throughout Davison’s work is a commentary on the implications of lay 
epidemiology  for  health  education.  His  team  conjectured  that  the  failure  of 
individuals to follow healthy lifestyle advice, despite being aware of the risks, 
may be attributed to lay epidemiology rather than the widespread supposition 
that ignorance or even fatalism are to blame ( Frankel, Davison & Smith 1991). 
They called for a better understanding of the context in which behaviour occurs 
rather than relying on the, often denigrating, responses found in much health 
education. They suggest that the health concerns of the lay public are more 
aligned with conventional epidemiology than health promotion. The importance 
of  the  familial  element  in  CHD,  for  instance,  is  strongly  recognised  by  lay 
epidemiology but rarely raised in health promotion material.  
“That popular beliefs systems are closer in spirit to the questioning 
traditions of epidemiology than to the certainties of health education 
has important implications for health education.”( Frankel, Davison & 
Smith 1991:428) 
For  the  lay  epidemiologist,  lifestyle  factors,  they  propose,  are  basically 
inconclusive. Via simple observations individuals see that behaviour modification 
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response to the egg scares of 1988 as an illustrative case study (Frankel, Davison 
& Smith 1991). The almost immediate threat of the poisonous properties of eggs 
dramatically and instantaneously altered behaviour, yet the advice relating to 
the  links  between  eggs  and  heightened  cholesterol  had  little  impact.  Such 
behaviour patterns are rational, rather than fatalistic, as much health promotion 
supposes.  
2.3.3 The prevention paradox 
Davison’s formulation of lay epidemiology went beyond the simple description of 
an abstract concept. As already stated Davison’s team offered lay epidemiology 
as a possible explanation for the failure of health promotion throughout their 
work.  They  utilised  Rose’s  ‘prevention  paradox’  and  considered  some  of  the 
implications of candidacy for health education.  
Rose  (1985)  originally  outlined  the  problematic  nature  of  health  promotion 
activities that focused on the population instead of the individual. He asserted 
that the approaches pose different questions of causality. The first ‘why does 
this  happen?’  is  asked  of  a  population.  The  second  focuses  on  the  individual 
case; ‘Why did this happen to this person at this time?’ Though Rose encouraged 
his students to ask both questions, the decision to settle on either method has 
significant  implications  for  preventive  health  strategies.  An  individual  focus 
requires the identification of those in ‘high risk’ groups, possibly via screening 
programmes. Though such a method is likely to be effective, at its core is a 
problem. According to Rose, the ability to ‘predict future disease is usually very 
weak’  because  at  risk  individuals  often  remain  healthy  and  vice  versa.  The 
alternative then is to adopt a population approach and ‘to lower the mean level 
of  risk  factors,  to  shift  the  whole  distribution  of  exposure  in  a  favourable 
direction’  (Rose  1985:37).  Rose  concluded  that  this  most  radical  approach 
presents the challenge of the ‘prevention paradox’. Population measures do just 
that, they impact at the level of population. Therefore many people have to opt 
to make behavioural change in order for one individual to benefit. Nevertheless, 
the  strategy  of  health  education  must  be  to  raise  the  awareness  of  risky 
behaviours among the general population rather than targeting those who are 
most at risk. If CHD is used as an example, most CHD deaths occur in the mid-
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have had a heart attack in any case. Yet, informing individuals that, statistically, 
they  would  be  unlikely  to  benefit  from  behavioural  change,  is  clearly 
problematic and challenges the success of the approach.  
Lay epidemiologists, Davison suggested, recognise the prevention paradox. Heart 
attacks continue to happen in those that were not at risk and those at risk will 
continue  to  avoid  heart  attacks.  Individuals  are  reminded  of  the  prevention 
paradox  by  observing  anomalous  deaths  and  unwarranted  survivors.  This  key 
component  of  lay  epidemiology,  Davison  suggested,  has  been  overlooked  by 
health promoters. He used the example of advice given about saturated fat. The 
general population believe that all saturated fat is bad for all people. The result 
is  a  lower  risk  threshold  across  the  population  and  individuals  who  never 
previously saw themselves as at risk now do so. Moreover, a universal lowering 
of the risk threshold means that there are greater observable numbers of people 
surviving risky behaviour. Although the numbers of those who were not at risk 
are  reduced,  their  profile  becomes  heightened.  All  of  this  consolidates  the 
fallibility of candidacy, and calls into question the entire notion of ‘risk’ among 
the  general  population.  The  population  approach  moved  Davison  to  accuse 
health educators as ‘propagating half-truths’ that continue to be delivered with 
‘zeal’. Yet, Davison conceded that highlighting the prevention paradox within 
health promotion material would threaten its raison d’être.  
Hunt  and  Emslie  (2001)  in  their  commentary  on  lay  epidemiology  and  the 
prevention paradox challenged Davison’s original assertions. While they broadly 
agreed  with  Davison’s  model  and  in  particular  supported  the  strength  of  the 
candidacy concept, they were keen to emphasise the differences between the 
two strands of epidemiology. First, they proposed that it is the individual, and 
not the collective, that ultimately concerns the lay epidemiologist. They based 
this on the premise that although illnesses and deaths at a population level can 
be observed, the level of detail available is insufficient for the events to be truly 
meaningful: 
“However,  we  could  contend  that  events  within  the  family  are 
particularly  salient  in  deconstructing  candidacy.  Thus,  if  a  family 
member  is  an  unwarranted  survivor  or  more  particularly  an 
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acceptance  of  well-established  epidemiological  facts  about  risk 
factors for major disease.” (Hunt & Emslie 2001:445) 
So  it  is  the  close  experience,  according  to  Hunt  and  Emslie  that  shapes 
understanding of health and risk. They go further and, using a research analogy 
suggested that the lay epidemiologist, in monitoring family events, is more akin 
to a qualitative researcher: 
“The emphasis is not on isolating risk factors, but on contextualising, 
qualifying  or  even  rejecting  previously  accepted  risk  factors  or 
aetiological  theories  in  the  face  of  contrary  personal  experience.”  
(Hunt & Emslie 2001 pg. 445) 
Additionally,  they  highlighted  a  difference  in  the  way  in  which  inexplicable 
events  are  dealt  with.  Within  formal  epidemiology  hypotheses  change  slowly 
across decades to accommodate previously unfathomable occurrences. Such a 
process is unlikely to satisfy the lay epidemiologist, whose need to make sense 
of an incongruous family event is ‘more immediate and compelling’. Hunt and 
Emslie concluded by supporting moves towards acknowledging the inherent value 
in  lay  knowledge  and  its  potential  for  augmenting  understanding  of  risk 
estimation.  
2.3.4 Lay Epidemiology and fatalism  
In a further paper that also utilised data from the South Wales study Davison and 
colleagues  turned  their  attention  to  an  analysis  of  fatalism  and  lay 
epidemiology. Davison previously asserted that the ‘common currency’ among 
the lay public and health educators was that CHD was largely avoidable through 
behavioural change. Fatalism has often been proposed as a reason for failure to 
adopt  healthy  behaviours  and affect  such change (Pill  &  Stott 1987).  Though 
fatalism  has  been  used  as  a  wholly  pejorative  label  signifying  ignorance  and 
irrationality, it has also more loosely represented the perception that health lies 
out  with  the  control  of  the  individual.  It  is  the  latter  interpretation,  where 
health  can  be  neither  controlled  nor  predicted,  that  Davison  and  colleagues 
supposed challenged health education.  
The logical corollary to candidacy’s failure to correctly predict all CHD events is 
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three factors that they could not influence, that nevertheless impacted on their 
health. These were inherited personal characteristics, the social environment, 
and  the  physical  environment.  The  social  environment  included  occupational 
hazards and socio-economic status. Davison suggested a further fourth field, luck 
or chance, which is not a discreet entity but rather is ‘a process or mechanism 
governing  the  first  three’  (Davison,  Frankel  and  Davey  Smith  1992).  Davison 
proposed  that  lifestyle  ‘choices’  cannot  be  separated  from  any  of  the  three 
uncontrollable  fields.  Individuals  are  unable  to  compartmentalise  discreet 
categories  because  choices  are  rarely  made  in  isolation.  Instead  choices  are 
made in the context of broader social, cultural and economic factors. Integral to 
all of these explanations of health and choice were luck and fate. Often these 
probabilistic notions were intertwined with religious ideas and metaphors that 
evoked  time,  for  example,  when  ‘it’s  your  time’,  or  what  Davison  called 
‘missile’ analogies and gambling and gaming metaphors, like ‘luck of the draw’. 
Davison concluded with a plea to for health education to be cognisant of the 
general  public’s  acknowledgement  that  prediction  is  weak  because  of  the 
perceived powerful influence of ‘fate’:  
 
“The  fact  remains,  however  that  within  the  general  statistical 
tendencies that can be observed within populations, there lies a more 
chaotic distribution of illness and death. Some fat smokers really do 
live till advanced old age, and some svelt joggers really do ‘fall down 
dead’”. (Davison, Frankel & Davey-Smith 1992:683) 
Similarly, Frankel, Davison and Davey Smith (1991) used the example of heredity 
and  risk  associated  with  CHD  to  illustrate  the  problematic  nature  of  modern 
health promotion. Both epidemiology and lay epidemiological perspectives place 
emphasis on the importance of family history as a risk factor, yet this is not 
found  in  educational  material.  Neither  is  the  widely  acknowledged  social 
patterning of health experience: 
“That popular belief systems are closer in spirit to the questioning 
traditions of epidemiology than to the certainties of health education 
has important implications for health education” (Frankel, Davison & 
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2.4 The scope of lay epidemiology 
Davison’s original article has been cited frequently. Armstrong’s (2003) audit of 
papers published in the first 25 years of the Sociology of Health and Illness found 
it to be the second most cited paper in the history of the journal, having been 
cited  99  times.  It  continues  to  be  widely  cited  having  been  referenced  300 
times
7. Though lay epidemiology has clearly been influential, the concept has 
rarely been built on or developed. Only a handful of studies, which will now be 
reviewed, have taken lay epidemiology as their starting point.  
Data  generated  from  interviews  in  the  West  of  Scotland  Twenty-07  study 
provided the opportunity for some of Davison’s original findings to be tested 
(Hunt, et al 2000). The study sought to examine relationships between family 
history, smoking status, other health promoting behaviours and candidacy. They 
found that around 40% of respondents believed that they had a family history of 
illness and within that heart disease was the most commonly cited. The number 
of relatives who had had heart disease was a significant predictor of perceived 
family history. Candidacy for heart disease was also strongly linked to perceived 
family history. Lifestyle and stress were thought to be an important cause of 
heart  disease  by  those  with  and  without  a  perceived  family  history.  Though 
those  with  a  perceived  family  history  of  heart  disease,  however,  were  more 
likely  to  think  lifestyle  factors  ‘very  important’  in  explaining  heart  disease. 
Similarly both groups thought that following a healthy lifestyle was ‘particularly’ 
important for those with a family history of heart disease. Few, in either group, 
endorsed the ‘fatalistic’ elements included in the surveys. They found that those 
that perceived themselves to be at high risk of heart disease were less likely to 
smoke.  
Clarke, Clotty and Pearson (1997) considered lay epidemiology in the context of 
cholesterol  testing.  Individuals  who  had  been  informed  that  they  had  raised 
serum  cholesterol  levels  were  interviewed  twice  –  after  the  initial  test,  and 
again  three  months  later  after  a  second  cholesterol  test.  In  the  intervening 
period  cholesterol  levels  had  dropped  significantly.  Interview  data  suggested 
that though participants did have ideas about candidacy, these were personal 
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and not uniform throughout the group. The only common predictor of candidacy 
was  being  overweight.  Anomalous  candidates  who  did  not  fit  the  picture, 
particularly  by  being  skinny,  were  thought  to  be  unfairly  afflicted  with  high 
cholesterol. Interestingly, Clarke and colleagues asked participants to comment 
on their personal behaviours. Most of those interviewed believed that the result 
of their second test was not an accurate reflection of their behaviour between 
tests. Not only were some disappointed that their behavioural changes had not 
made a greater impact on their cholesterol levels but others acknowledged that 
they had made few changes yet had good results. They concluded that far from 
being  irrational  or  fatalistic  in  their  beliefs  about  behavioural  change, 
participants produced rational reasons for their choices: 
“….. what I haven’t had proved to me – is that sacrifice in 20 years 
time going to prevent me from having a heart attack? If I knew it 
was, then alright, then I could make the sacrifice, but when it is so 
unsure  as  to  whether  it  is  going  to  do  it,  why  should  I  make  the 
sacrifice” (Clarke, Crotty and Pearson 1997:219) 
Lawlor et al (2003) suggested that lay epidemiology may account for the failure 
of smoking cessation programmes in deprived communities. The authors noted 
that although there has been a marked reduction in the overall smoking rate in 
the UK and the USA, this has not been consistent across all social classes. By 
1999 only 13% of men in social class I smoked, compared with 44% in social class 
V. Further, they demonstrated that while the health benefits have been obvious 
for those in Social Class I, they are less so for social class V; not until 1991 did 
the all cause mortality of men in social class V fall to the level that men in social 
class I enjoyed in 1931. They suggested that improvements in overall health are 
required  as  catalysts  for  the  adoption  of  health  promoting  behaviours,  like 
smoking cessation. Indeed they proposed that if the daily lives of men in social 
class V are more hazardous (as can be seen by the high level of mortality from 
accidents), then smoking poses no immediate threat: 
“The hazardous environments faced by individuals from lower social 
classes affect their likelihood of quitting smoking not only because 
dealing  with  such  circumstances  takes  precedence  over  smoking 
cessation but because within these environments smoking is often an 
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The  authors  concluded  that  smoking  cessation  must  have  easily  observable 
benefits,  and  via  the  mechanisms  provided  in  lay  epidemiology,  this  has  not 
occurred for those in social class V. The operation of lay epidemiology therefore 
accounts for the relative failure of smoking cessation programmes amongst the 
most deprived. Similarly, in their commentary on sun exposure and health risks 
Ness  et  al  (1999)  proposed  that  from  a  lay  epidemiological  perspective  sun 
exposure offers more benefits than harm. The numbers of people dying from skin 
cancer are relatively low and they claimed that there are some diseases, like 
cardiovascular disease, mental health and dermatological conditions that benefit 
directly from sun exposure. They cautioned against the reduction of vitamin D 
exposure  which  potentially  has  adverse  effects.  They  concluded  that  lay 
epidemiology is ‘ahead of medical thinking’ and ask that more definitive data on 
the risks associated with sun exposure is presented. This position is questioned 
by  evidence  from  Australia.  Australia  has  the  highest  level  of  skin  cancer 
incidence  in  the  world  and  Sinclair  &  Foley  (2009)  suggested  that  campaigns 
around  safe  sun  messages  have  been  successful  in  reducing  the  overall 
melanoma incidence. Arguably what has been achieved in Australia is a cultural 
shift  in attitude towards  sun  exposure.  Such  a change,  Rose  believed,  would 
reduce  the  effect  of  the  prevention  paradox.  Miller  (2005)  used  the  lay 
epidemiology model to explain the behaviour of injecting drug users (IDUs) in 
Australia. He found that his respondents’ risky behaviour was justified by the 
landscape  of  drug  use  and  illness  in  one  particular  community,  rather  than 
mainstream health education. This chimes in, not only with Davison’s finding 
about  the  influence  of  community  observations  but  also,  given  the  size  of 
Miller’s population, Hunt and Emslie’s (2001) commentary that emphasised the 
importance of ‘family’ experience in defining beliefs.  
Such studies prompted Allmark and Tod’s (2006) to question ‘How should public 
health  professionals  engage  with  lay  epidemiology?’  Here  they  set  out  the 
ethical  arguments  around  public  health’s  engagement  with  lay  epidemiology. 
While they acknowledged the power of the prevention paradox, they supported 
the need for public health messages that are ‘meaningful’. They questioned the 
ethics of public health challenging what may be seen as core cultural values in 
communities, but accept that in state-funded health services such challenges 
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in lay epidemiology, public health may have more success. Similarly Watterson 
(1994) and Bury (1994) in earlier papers called for health educators to take more 
notice of lay epidemiology. Bury (1994) referred to public responses to health 
promotion  as  largely  a  ‘black  box’.  He  looked  to  health  beliefs  literature 
generally and lay epidemiology more specifically to demystify these notoriously 
complex relationships. Both authors suggested that if the unpredictable nature 
of  health  and  illness  is  at  least  acknowledged  by  health  promotion  this  may 
engender greater public confidence in preventive strategies.  
Many of the papers that have cited Davison’s original work focus broadly on lay 
understandings  of  CHD.  For  example,  Smith  et  al  (1999)  conducted  a  large 
quantitative survey of Australian residents that was designed to ascertain the 
estimated preventability of a number of common conditions including skin and 
lung cancer, CHD, and diabetes. While Davison claimed that people commonly 
believed  that  CHD  was  preventable,  only  a  small  number  of  respondents  in 
Smith’s survey concurred. Instead most (44%) thought that CHD was sometimes 
preventable.  Of  all  the  diseases  surveyed  diabetes  was  thought  least 
preventable.  They  concluded  that  individuals  generally  under-rated  the 
preventability of conditions. Preston (1997) in an ethnographic study of CHD-risk 
families echoed Davison’s work. According to Preston, the families had a clear 
view  of  what  a  coronary  candidate  ‘looked  like’  and  when  people  who  had 
suffered  CHD  did  not  fit  the  ideal  type  it  caused  ‘conflict’  in  their  belief 
systems. Preston demonstrated that families opted into only those health-giving 
behaviours that fitted into already established lifestyles, rather than adopting an 
entire  regime  change.  Again  the  importance  of  luck  and  fate  in  risk  models 
emerged  from  Preston’s  data.  Wiles  (1998)  was  primarily  concerned  with 
rehabilitation  following  a  heart  attack  and  found  that  participants  had  fixed 
notions of coronary candidates and described many anomalous CHD deaths. This 
led participants to conclude that their recovery would be governed by fate and 
luck  rather  than  lifestyle  modification.  In  a  west  of  Scotland  study  that 
considered perceptions of family history and CHD, Emslie and colleagues found, 
as  is  consistent  with  the  other  studies,  that  respondents  described  an 
explanatory model of CHD that included a range of behavioural, lifestyle and 
hereditary  factors  (Emslie,  Hunt  &  Watt  2001a).  Unlike  other  studies, 
respondents in this study introduced structural factors which may be explained Chapter 2    40 
by the prevalence of socio-economic disadvantage in the west of Scotland. Both 
the unpredictability and speed of heart disease was noted. Heart attacks were 
therefore regarded as a quick, and relatively painless, death. These views were 
often discussed in the context of other family illness experiences that were slow 
and painful, like lung cancer. Heart disease and heart attacks in old age were 
viewed positively. Drawing on data from the same study, Emslie, Hunt and Watt 
(2001b) questioned the omission of gender in Davison’s original analysis. They 
argued that  masculinity  is  central  to  coronary  candidacy  and  that  anomalous 
deaths and unwarranted survivors too, are a wholly masculine concept. This led 
them to conclude that the language used is misrepresentative. When Davison 
used the term CHD, this actually referred to ‘heart attacks’, rather than the 
chronic morbidity which is more commonly associated with women. They also 
questioned the connection between candidacy and age. In the original model of 
candidacy, Davison paid little attention to age, and claimed that ‘after the age 
of  about  40,  candidacy  seems  to  increase  with  age’.  Emslie  and  colleagues 
argued  more  attention  be  given  to  the  importance  of  age  in  the  candidacy 
model. Older people dying of CHD were thought to have died of old age more 
than CHD, thus negating the need to consider candidacy. A further paper from 
the same team (McConnachie et al 2001) considered the presence of ‘anomalous 
deaths’  and  ‘unwarranted  survivors’  in  a  west  of  Scotland  cohort.  They 
examined visible risk factors – smoking and BMI, together with less visible risk 
factors like blood pressure, cholesterol, social class and deprivation. They found 
that visible risk factors were useful predictors of death from CHD. Those who 
may  be  regarded  as  unwarranted  survivors  had  fewer  non-visible  risk  factors 
than their counterparts. Similarly those judged to have an anomalous death had 
a higher non-visible risk profile than others in the low risk group. This echoed 
Marteau  et  al’s  finding  that  the  lay  epidemiologist  is  more  likely  to  rely  on 
visible risk factors than non-visible factors like cholesterol, primarily of course, 
because they can only access visible risk factors (Marteau et al 1995). Another 
study  that  aimed  to  redress  the  gender  imbalance  in  the  study  of  CHD  was 
carried out by Ruston and Clayton (2002). They interviewed women at high risk 
of CHD who they found arrived at ways of working a lower personal risk into 
their estimation. This was done by simply assuming that men were at greater 
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women  rarely  feature  in  qualitative  studies  of  CHD  but  they  were  routinely 
excluded from large quantitative explanations.  
In a study concerned with the development of an intervention aimed at changing 
health behaviours, Angus et al (2005) questioned high risk individuals about their 
risk  of  CHD.  They  found  that  mechanisms  similar  to  the  lay  epidemiological 
model were employed by focus group respondents to estimate risk.  Interestingly 
Angus cited many studies including Davison’s work and that of Emslie, Hunt & 
Watt (2001b) that illustrated a wide variety of terms to describe CHD, including 
a ‘dicky-ticker’. Davison reported that often CHD and the attendant high risk 
behaviour  was  often  discussed  in  humorous  tones.  Yet,  Angus  portrayed  a 
different picture of talk about CHD, referring to it as a ‘sneaky’ disease, with 
participants emphasising the unpredictable nature of CHD. This type of language 
is more usually associated with talk about cancer (Lupton 1994), which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
Frich et al’s (2007) study focused on portrayals of candidacy amongst a high risk 
cohort  suffering  from  familial  hypercholesterolemia  in  Oslo.  They  found  that 
even amongst this high risk group, traditional images of candidacy were strong 
and  settled  on  older  men  who  engage  in  high  risk  behaviours.  They  shared 
Emslie’s assertion that candidacy is an exclusively masculine concept and for 
that reason many female participants frequently found the reality of their own 
risk difficult to accept. Younger participants who had few cardiac events in their 
family situation were most likely to reject candidacy and think instead that CHD 
could happen to anyone. Many were keen to make distinctions between those 
who could and could not be held responsible for their own risk status, and often 
sought to distance themselves from traditional candidates. Commenting on the 
morality of typical candidates’ behaviour provided this distance. As with most of 
the studies already reviewed the uncontrollable factors - fate and luck - were 
emphasised,  which  extended  to  those  thought  lucky  enough  to  have  strong 
constitutions.  While  this  study  obviously  focused  on  a  high  risk  group,  their 
familial link was only one among many factors considered when arriving at their 
personal risk assessment. In an almost identical study in the UK, Weiner (2009) 
also found that participants offered biomedical as well as genetic explanations 
of  familial-hypercholesterolaemia.  As  with  the  Norwegian  cohort,  Weiner’s 
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‘ordinary cholesterol’. Weiner noted though that participants offered examples 
of modifying their behaviour in an attempt to reduce their overall risk. This, 
Weiner  argued  allowed  them  to  remain  morally  intact:  they  were  taking 
responsibility  for  their  own  health.  Weiner  found  that  the  idea  of  Davison’s 
‘coronary candidate’ was tenacious amongst this high risk group and like Frich’s 
found  that  heredity  was  only  one  element  in  the  candidacy  profile.  Weiner 
proposed that despite Emslie, Hunt and Watt’s (2001b) contention that gender 
was largely missing in lay accounts of CHD, women involved in her study allied 
themselves to the typical male candidate type. 
2.5 Lay epidemiology & Cancer  
Few studies consider cancer and lay epidemiology. Salant and Gehlert’s (2008) 
study  looked  specifically  at  breast  cancer  and  took  lay  epidemiology  as  its 
starting  point.  The  focus  group  study  with  African-American  communities  in 
Chicago set out to explore respondents’ meaning and understanding of breast 
cancer.  Respondents  yearned  for  more  simplicity,  for  pesticide-free  food, 
pollution-free environments and settled on the idea that old-fashioned living was 
largely  risk  free.  Aetiological  explanations,  therefore,  focused  on  ‘modern’ 
living. They found that stigma and fear continued to be associated with breast 
cancer,  and  especially  the  ‘risk  of  knowing’,  which  might  explain  women’s 
reluctance to engage in screening programmes. Ignorance provided protection. 
Related  to  this  was  the  belief  that  stress  could  cause  cancer  and  the  worry 
connected  with  ‘dwelling’  on  cancer  was  itself  a  risk  factor.  Breast  cancer 
candidacy  was  based  on  a  number  of  behaviours  like  smoking  and  drug  and 
alcohol  use,  as  well  as  hereditary  factors  and  age.  Like  Clarke,  Crotty  and 
Pearson  (1997)  Salant  and  Gehler  found  a  personal,  rather  than  collective, 
model of breast cancer candidacy. Personal risk estimations rarely featured in 
everyday thoughts and it was not ‘unless it hits home’ that it enters reality. The 
study concluded that ‘community’ beliefs dominated explanations of causality: 
“Through  shared  experiences  of  disadvantage  and  perceptions  of 
competing  disease  risks,  community-level  understandings  of  breast 
cancer risk helped to explain the absence or invisibility of the breast 
cancer  ‘candidate’  from  everyday  risk  perceptions.”  (Salant  & 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with beliefs about health. Details of a series of studies 
were outlined and collectively they demonstrate the sophistication of lay views 
of  health.    The  studies  have  important  commonalities.  There  are  significant 
moral  undertones  present  in  many  of  the  views  expressed  and  often  this 
manifests itself in a reluctance to ‘blame’ individuals for their illness. Related to 
this  is  scepticism  around  the  preventability  of  diseases.  Such  studies  though 
must  be  located in  their historical  context  and it  could  be argued  that they 
emerged at a time when the concentration on risk and preventability in health 
promotion was not well established. Lay epidemiology however emerged from a 
somewhat different cultural and political climate where the emphasis was firmly 
placed  on  individual  responsibility  for  health.  Davison’s  model  described  the 
framework used by ordinary individuals when arriving at beliefs about health 
generally, and perceptions of risk for coronary heart disease, more specifically. 
Davison and colleagues’ work in South Wales uncovered an easily recognisable 
coronary candidate. Mainstream risk factors were integral to coronary candidacy 
but crucially the model had well recognised short-comings. The consequence of 
this, Davison proposed, was scepticism around the avoidance or preventability of 
CHD.  Although  lay  epidemiology  has  been  influential  it  is  arguably  under-
developed. Those few studies that have drawn directly on Davison’s work have 
found an enduring image of coronary candidacy. These studies also highlight the 
moral  discourse  entrenched  within  views  about  health.  Some  of  those  that 
focused on high-risk populations because of genetic predispositions, concluded 
that participants wanted to distance themselves from personal responsibility and 
were keen to stress the culpability of others. This represents a shift from the 
earlier  health  beliefs  studies  where  participants  generally  shied  away  from 
apportioning blame. A small number of studies have explored lay epidemiology’s 
relevance  in  other  disease  categories.  Only  one  study  considered  lay 
epidemiology in the context of cancer (Salant & Gehlert 2008). Candidacy for 
breast cancer was not as salient as coronary candidacy. The next chapter will 
explore lay understandings of cancer more closely.  
 
3. Understanding Cancer  
3.1 Introduction  
Psychosocial  oncology  is  represented  by  a  large,  inter-related  and,  often 
unwieldy,  literature.  Each  stage  of  what  is  commonly  termed,  the  cancer 
journey, has been explored and the experience of patients and their carers well 
documented. Cancer-related interventions too, like screening programmes and 
palliative  care,  have  been  given  frequent  attention.  Studies  that  attempt  to 
ascertain knowledge of, and awareness about, cancer are also included in this 
broad genre. These commonly concentrate on understanding of risk factors and 
recognition of symptoms. In addition, many studies can be found that present 
the nuances of experience and beliefs about cancer amongst various social and 
demographic groups.  
Given the abundance of material, the challenge for this thesis was pinpointing 
those areas of literature that were of most relevance. Essentially this section of 
the review must establish two things. First, what do lay people know and think 
about cancer? Second, what is the cultural position of cancer in modern 21st 
century  society?  As  the  previous  chapter  outlined,  lay  epidemiology  is 
fundamentally about the recognition of risk both in oneself and others. With this 
in mind the literature under review here will focus on awareness and knowledge 
of ‘risk’ in relation to cancer. It must be noted that there will be some degree of 
overlap  with  awareness  of  risks  and  symptoms  and  such  studies  will  not  be 
excluded.  Those  that  focus  solely  on  awareness  and  knowledge  of  cancer 
symptoms, without dealing with risk or causation, will not be reviewed, for a 
recent  example  see  Robb  et  al  (2009).  Other  literatures  that  were  judged 
irrelevant were those that had screening, and similar preventive behaviours, as 
their main focus. Further, as has been previously specified, this study has looked 
at cancer as a generic disease rather than the more usual site-specific approach 
but studies that were concerned with particular cancer sites are included.  
This chapter will therefore be divided in two. The first sections from 3.2-3.6 will 
look at what people know about cancer, and include cancer awareness, cancer 
risk  and  cancer  ethnograpghies.  The  focus  will  be  on  the  biomedical Chapter 3    45 
understanding of cancer. The second section 3.7-3.10 will look at the cultural 
position inhabited by cancer, providing an insight into the social understanding 
of cancer and the media representation of cancer. Together the sections will 
give a picture of what cancer means.  
3.2 Cancer Risk Factors 
Cancer is a complex disease and the multisite nature of the disease means that 
there are a number of known risk factors. There are also a series of reported risk 
factors, for instance, mobile phone use, that are questioned. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to provide a detailed breakdown of risks per cancer site and 
a review of the evidence regarding individual risk factors. However, it is helpful 
to be aware of the information available to the lay public about cancer risk 
factors.  To  this  end,  the  information  available  from  Cancer  Research  UK,  is 
presented. Cancer Research UK is the country’s largest and most widely known 
cancer  charity.  The  charity  has  a  website  that  provides  a  great  deal  of 
information about cancer to the public, patients and professionals alike. Table 1 
gives detail of the risk factors, according to Cancer Research UK, that have been 
linked with cancer. Some are well-established, others are, more controversial 
Table 1 Cancer Risk Factors * 
  Behavioural  Biological   Environmental  Psychological 
Smoking  Asbestos   
Sun-exposure 
Virus 
Radon   
Obesity & Dietary Factors  Shift work   
Low levels of physical activity 
Age 
HRT   
Alcohol  X-rays   
Established 
Sexual Activity 
Hormones 
 
         
Cosmetics & hair dyes  Stress 
Cancer clusters  Trauma 
Pollution 
Plastic bottles 
Powerlines 
Mobile phones 
Air travel 
Reported     
Pesticides 
 
* The information in this table can be found on Cancer Research UK’s website.  www.cancerresearchuk.orgChapter 3    47 
 
3.3 What do the public know about cancer? 
3.3.1 Historical Perspectives 
The American Cancer Society carried out its first survey of cancer awareness 
among  the  public  in  1948.  Since  then,  in  the  numerous  studies  that  have 
followed, the main focus has tended to be the public’s knowledge and awareness 
of warning signs or symptoms of cancer, though some do include more general 
questions  about  cancer  incidence  and  risk  factors.  For  instance,  Horn  and 
Waingrow (1964) provided an overview of the American Cancer Society’s cancer 
awareness  survey  and  chart  changes  in  responses  to  surveys  over  three  time 
periods 1948, 1955 and 1962. They showed that over the 14 year period fewer 
people believed that cancer was contagious, more people would be willing to 
work next to someone who had cancer, and more thought that someone could 
have  cancer  but  not  know  it.  Interestingly,  one  of  the  aims  of  the  public 
education campaigns was to discourage the association between cancer and old 
age (now an accepted association) and the authors concluded that awareness in 
this area too was improving. Cartwright and Martin (1958), in a study intended to 
assess  awareness  of  tuberculosis,  offered  an  interesting  insight  into  popular 
views of cancer aetiology. In series of interviews with adults in Edinburgh they 
found that the most frequently reported cause of cancer was trauma via a knock 
or a bruise, followed by smoking, environmental factors like pollution, heredity 
and finally stress. They found that younger interviewees were more likely to opt 
for  smoking and  environmental causes,  while  those in older age  groups  were 
more likely to mention physical trauma. In a more recent, but admittedly dated 
study, Luther, Price and Rose (1982) presented data from the first ‘random digit 
dialling’ questionnaire in the United States that attempted to gauge levels of 
cancer awareness amongst the US public. They found that almost three quarters 
of respondents believed that smoking was the most likely cause, followed by 
food and drink, pollution, chemicals and sun exposure.  
3.3.2 Awareness in the information age 
In  the  context  of  psychosocial  oncology  as  a  whole,  relatively  little  research 
examines or explores the general public’s view of cancer. A number of large 
population  based  cross-sectional  questionnaire  studies  have  been  carried  out  Chapter 3    48 
that provide details of what the general public believe to be risk factors for 
cancer. Breslow and colleagues (1997) accessed views of 12,000 members of the 
general public in the United States and they concluded that knowledge of cancer 
risk factors was poor. Respondents were unable to make connections between 
cancer  and  increasing  age,  between  bowel  cancer  and  dietary  factors,  and 
between sexual activity and cervical cancer. In a similar, smaller study of UK 
adults, Wardle et al (2001) asked respondents to identify risk factors for cancer 
from a prescribed list. The list included established causes, like smoking, dietary 
factors, viruses and infections and those labelled ‘mythic’ or ‘distracter’ items 
like stress, pollution and living near power lines. The strongest association was 
made between smoking and lung cancer, and smoking was identified as a risk 
factor for all cancers. Most were aware of the links between number of sexual 
partners and cervical cancer risk. Neither family history nor age were considered 
important  risk  factors.  Amongst  the  mythic  causes,  stress  was  the  most 
frequently  selected  risk  factor,  particularly  for  breast cancer.  Food  additives 
and  pollution  were  thought  to  be  significant  in  bowel  and  lung  cancer 
respectively. They also found that awareness was socially patterned and both 
women and those with higher levels of education were more likely to correctly 
identify risk factors. The authors concluded that although few respondents had 
selected mythic causes, adults in the UK had a poor awareness of cancer risk 
factors.  
A similar methodology was employed to provide baseline information for Cancer 
Research  UK’s  education  programme  in  2004  (Redeker  et  al  2009).  As  with 
Wardle et al’s study, questionnaire respondents were offered both established 
and mythic risk factors. The findings were similar. The link between smoking and 
cancer was almost universally accepted. Three-quarters of respondents in this 
study were aware of the association between sun exposure and skin cancer. Both 
alcohol  consumption  and  obesity  were  selected  as  risk  factors  by  a  third  of 
respondents. Stress was again the most common mythic risk factor and ‘living 
near power lines’ too was endorsed. Common misconceptions also featured in 
Stein  et  al’s  telephone  survey  (Stein  et  al  2007)  which  calculated  a  health 
literacy  score  for  respondents.  Literacy,  and  therefore  awareness,  was 
patterned according to socio-demographic variables. Lower awareness was found 
among  men,  older  adults,  non-whites  and  those  on  low  incomes.  Adlard  and Chapter 3    49 
Hume’s (2003) study in UK general practice however found that questionnaire 
respondents  were  likely  to  opt  for  known  risk  factors  like  smoking,  diet  and 
alcohol, rather than misconceptions like vitamin tablets and power cables. As 
well as smoking and infections, stress was also widely identified as a risk factor 
in  a  Japanese  population  study  (Inoue  et  al  2006)  where  family  history  and 
genetics were also thought to be important. The significance of family history as 
a risk factor for breast cancer was also identified in an Australian study that 
looked at a series of common cancers (Reeder & Trevena 2003). More than half 
the respondents failed to name any risk factors for breast cancer and the vast 
majority were not aware of any of the risks associated with prostate cancer. 
Respondents were clear though about the risks attached to both smoking and sun 
exposure. Makris et al (1994) in a large quantitative study of University students 
in Greece found that awareness of risk factors and causality was poor across 
cancers. One study (Murray & McMillan 1993) that aimed to look specifically at 
gender  differences  in  beliefs  about  cancer  found  that  cancer  was  the  most 
feared disease generally, though women were more fearful than men.  A factor 
analysis  found  that  most  saw  stress,  health  behaviour  and  environment  as 
important  causal  factors,  though  gender  differences  in  perceived  causality 
emerged – men were more likely to believe that cancer was caused by behaviour 
and women by heredity. Conversely, Thomas & Fick (1993) found that men were 
more pessimistic about cancer detection and outcomes than women. Fatalistic 
attitudes  were  found  to  be  widespread  across  the  American  population  by 
Niederdeppe & Levy (2007), with around half their respondents believing that “it 
seems like almost everything causes cancer”. They found that such beliefs were 
concentrated among those less educated and that whites were more likely to be 
fatalistic than those from other minority-ethnic groups. Those who engaged in 
positive health behaviours were less likely to be fatalistic. 
The  above  studies  show  that  awareness  of  cancer  risks  is  at  the  same  time 
erratic  and  relatively  predictable.  It  comes  as  little  surprise  that,  without 
exception,  smoking  was  selected  as  a  significant  risk  factor  by  almost  all 
respondents  across  most  studies.  The  identification  of  other  risks  is  readily 
explained by local idiosyncrasies. Infection in Japan or sun exposure in Australia 
reflects the higher incidence of gastric cancers and melanoma and in each of 
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the cancer-site, risks and prevention. Given the lack of publicity prostate cancer 
receives,  it  is  unsurprising  that  80%  of  respondents  failed  to  name  any  risk 
factors  (Reeder  &  Trevena  2003).  Knowledge  reflects  readily  available 
information.  Concentration  on  environmental  or  genetic  risk  factors  in 
individuals’ models indicate mass media fixation with these areas. One paper 
(Stein et al 2007) was critical of the media’s unnecessary concentration on the 
importance  of  pollution  and  recommends  investment  in  smoking  cessation 
programmes.  
The  studies  hint  at  a  tendency  for  respondents  to  accept  false  causal 
relationships between ‘mythic’ factors and cancer (Breslow et al 1997, Wardle 
et  al  2001,  Redeker et  al  2009).  Such conclusions  lead  to  calls  for  improved 
information  but  perhaps  the  value  of  including  such  falsehoods  requires 
consideration. Methodologically, questionnaires fail to capture reasoning and a 
greater understanding is needed of why stress is so widely regarded as a risk 
factor  for  cancer.  Moreover,  one  might  argue  that  the  very  inclusion  of 
misconceptions  in  questionnaires  exacerbates  misunderstandings.  Providing 
prescribed  lists  of  risks  may  simply  prompt  endorsement  and  Waller  and 
colleagues  (Waller,  McCaffrey  and  Wardle  2004)  found  extremely  poor 
unprompted recall of warning signs and risks for breast and bowel cancer and 
when prompts were offered levels of awareness improved greatly Their study 
leads them to conclude that studies of awareness that provide a tick-box format 
may be overestimating knowledge and awareness.  
3.3.3 Site-specific knowledge 
More common than studies that aim to gauge general awareness about cancer 
are those that have adopted a site-specific approach to cancer awareness. Both 
breast  and  colorectal  cancer  are  frequently  considered.  Oral,  skin, 
gynaecological, and urological have been surveyed less frequently. Few studies 
have looked specifically at lung cancer despite its impact on mortality.  
Studies that reported awareness of breast cancer show that perceptions of risk 
are  poorly  understood  (Ibrahim  1991;  Paul  et  al  1999;  Grunfeld  et  al  2002; 
McMenamin et al 2005; Linsell et al 2008). Assessments of lifetime risk were 
wildly underestimated: almost a third of respondents thought that their risk was Chapter 3    51 
one in a thousand (Grunfeld et al 2002) and another study found that half of all 
respondents judged their lifetime risk as one in a hundred (Linsell et all 2008). 
Other studies reported the over-estimation of risk (Paul et al 1999; Wilcox & 
Stefanick 1999; McMenamin et al 2005). Knowledge about risk factors is equally 
poor.  In  particular  the  association  between  older  age  and  breast  cancer  is 
recognised  rarely.  Most  women  believe  that  breast  cancer  is  a  disease  that 
affects younger women. There is some evidence that the over-estimation of risk 
has  increased  since  the  1980s  (Paul  et  al  1999).  Understanding  of  life-style 
factors in relation to breast cancer is both limited and erratic across countries 
(Peacey et al 2006). Stress is commonly thought to be a risk factor (Payne 1991). 
Risks  for  colorectal  cancers  include  age,  family  history  and  lifestyle  factors. 
Awareness of these links is variable. In a European comparison, Keighley and 
colleagues (2004) found that neither age nor family histories were recognised 
risk  factors.  Although  diet  was  reasonably  well  recognised,  few  made 
connections between physical inactivity and colorectal cancer. An earlier British 
study  (McCaffrey,  Wardle  and  Waller  2003)  reported  that  the  majority  of 
participants could name no risk factors for colorectal cancer and awareness of 
the importance of age, family history or diet was extremely poor.  
Studies that have considered public awareness of oral cancer have found that 
only a little over half of the sample were aware of the very existence of oral 
cancer  (Warnakulasuriya  et  al  1999;  Horrowitz,  Canto  &  Child  2002).  More 
recently overall awareness has improved and there is widespread recognition of 
the connection between smoking and oral cancer, though the evidence about the 
impact  of  information  on  high  risk  groups  is  mixed  (Lowry  &  Craven  1999; 
Humphris,  Freeman  and  Clarke  2004).  Understanding  of  the  links  between 
alcohol and oral cancer is less well appreciated (Lawoyin et al 2003; West et al 
2006; Elango et al 2009). Smoking is a well-established risk factor for both lung 
and oral cancer but recognition of its role in other cancers is weak. Neider et al 
(2006) in a study of bladder and renal cancer found that just under a third of 
respondents correctly identified the association between smoking and urological 
cancers  compared  with  98%  who  made  the  links  between  smoking  and  lung 
cancer. More recent data suggested that awareness of such links has improved 
slightly  (Anastasiou  et  al  2010).  Fitzpatrick  et  al’s  study  of  prostate  cancer 
(Fitzpatrick  et  al  2009),  found  that  awareness  of  risks,  like  age  and  family Chapter 3    52 
history were good but respondents were less sure about the role of behavioural 
factors. Again they reported startling misconceptions, for example 10% of the 
non-patient  sample  believed  that  prostate  cancer  affected  men  and  women 
equally. The international study also found variation by country, for example, 
28% of German men believed that they could reduce prostate cancer risk by not 
carrying  their  mobile  phone  in  their  pocket.  The  authors  concluded  that 
awareness  had  improved  since  their  previous  study  (Schulman,  Kirby  & 
Fitzpatrick 2003) but that overall personal risk perception was poor. 
Gynaecological cancers fare little better. A series of studies have shown that the 
initial failure to make links between sexual activity, HPV and cervical cancer has 
improved (Buga 1998; Pitts and Clarke 2002; Waller, McCaffrey & Wardle 2004; 
Marlow,  Waller  &  Wardle  2007).  The  recent  introduction  of  the  HPV  vaccine 
provided an opportunity for the discussion of the sexual transmission of the virus 
and successfully raised awareness of the risks associated with HPV and cervical 
cancer  (Gerend  &  Magliore  2008).  Ovarian  cancer  is  less  researched  and 
consequentially less understood, though knowledge is improved with experience 
via a friend or relative (Lockwood-Rayermann et al 2009). Although the risks of 
sun exposure are well established in some countries (Reeder & Trevena 2003) 
they remain poorly understood in the USA (ADA 1995) and the UK (Hiom 2006). 
Sun exposure in the UK is believed to be harmless and the appetite for sun-bed 
use remains buoyant and the risks under-appreciated (Amir et al 2000).  
The  startling  omissions  amongst  these  site-specific  studies  are  studies  that 
consider  lung  cancer.  Though  it  may  be  argued  that  the  almost  universal 
recognition of the links between lung cancer and smoking negate the need for 
such studies.  
Overall, investigating the knowledge and awareness of risk factors for cancer 
amongst the lay public is a neglected activity. Any review of the available data 
demonstrates that if information is provided awareness increases. It might be 
assumed that levels of awareness had improved dramatically since the original 
American Cancer Society surveys but when considered more closely, the picture 
is  more  complex.  Improving  awareness  has  not  been  a  steady  and  equitable 
process.  Some  cancers  have  fared  better  (or  worse,  depending  on  your  view 
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embraced more readily than others. For example, Barrat et al (1997) found that 
awareness of mammography as a detection tool for breast cancer had more than 
doubled  in  the  eight  years  between  1988  and  1996  but  that  respondents 
possessed  a  scant  understanding  of  risk.  The  responsibility  for  levels  of 
awareness and variation in knowledge can be at least partly attributed to media 
coverage. Much has been written about the predominance of breast cancer in 
the mass media (Gottlieb 2001). Yet, those areas where less is known or certain 
about risks within the scientific community are unlikely to be fully grasped by 
the lay public. The emergence of the importance of genetics for certain cancers 
has impacted on understanding and awareness. This is something that will be 
returned to in the coming sections on risk, the cultural position of cancer and 
the  overall  treatment  of  cancer  in  the  media.  For  instance,  around  half  the 
women surveyed endorsed a link between family history and ovarian cancer but 
genetics explain only 10–15% of cancers (Lockwood-Rayermann et al 2009).  
The studies reviewed thus far illustrate changes in awareness over time. Clearly 
publicity has an impact The early studies from the American Cancer Society were 
keen to encourage a move away from the supposition that cancer was a disease 
that simply affected older people. The challenge facing health educators today, 
particularly with breast cancer is to re-establish age as a significant risk factor.  
3.3.4 Variations in cancer awareness 
Many of the studies reviewed have reported different levels of awareness based 
on  socio-demographic  variables  like  education,  socio-economic  status  and 
gender.  Those  with  higher  levels  of  education  were  judged  to  be  more 
knowledgeable  about  cancer  in  a  number  of  studies  (Weinrich  et  al  1992; 
Breslow  et  al  1997;  Ratnasinghe,  Weed  &  Shankar  1999;  Wardle  et  al  2001; 
McCaffrey, Wardle & Waller 2003). Weinrich et al (1992) also found that those 
with  higher  levels  of  income  possessed  greater  cancer  knowledge.  Typically, 
women are reported to be more knowledgeable than men (Wardle et al 2001; 
McCaffrey, Wardle & Waller 2003).  
In their review of health beliefs, cancer and ethnicity, Pfeffer and Moynihan 
(1996)  documented  the  lack  of  relevant  British  research.  They  outlined  the 
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make a plea that this is approached with more sensitivity. They also found that 
most studies of ethnicity and health focus on a single ‘ethnic’ group, rather than 
compare the ethnic minority with the white majority. More recently Scanlon & 
Wood  (2005)  found  that  there  were  significant  differences  in  breast  cancer 
awareness  both  between  different  minority  ethnic  groups  and between  those 
groups and the general population. The same is not true of the United States 
where  ethnicity  is  always  considered  and  reported.  Dein  (2004)  provided  an 
overview  of  research  on  attitudes  towards  cancer  across  the  world  and 
demonstrated that there are a plethora of studies that highlight the cultural 
nuances  apparent  in  explanatory  models  of  cancer  (Perez-Stable  et  al  1992; 
Mishra, Aoulua & Hubbell 2000; Estape et al 2003).  
3.4 Understanding Cancer Risk 
Estimating  risk  through  the  mechanism  of  candidacy  is  central  to  lay 
epidemiology. Candidacy relates to evaluations of risk not just in others but also 
in oneself, although admittedly it was more effective judging others’ risks. In 
the previous section awareness of cancer risk factors was reviewed. Knowledge 
and awareness of risk factors are crucial for the development candidacy models. 
This section will look at the perception of risk in relation to cancer.  
3.4.1 Cancer and the ‘risk society’ 
Risk has become an issue in late modernity. Both Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991) 
have developed discourses around ‘risk society’, which at its most basic refers to 
a society preoccupied with the future. A detailed examination of the concept of 
the risk society is beyond the scope of this thesis but the idea is relevant to 
perceptions of cancer risk in a number of important ways. First, where once the 
major threats were natural disasters that were volatile and attributed to acts of 
God, risks are now thought to be man-made and posed by society itself. Risk has 
become central to the way we think about cancer. First, we are aware of the 
importance of behavioural risk factors in the development of cancer. Moreover 
there are links, albeit contested, between environmental factors and cancer. 
Related to this is the shift towards individual responsibility for health. While 
risks were once experienced at a societal level, risks in the 21st century are 
faced by individuals. This is extremely important in how we think about health in Chapter 3    55 
general and cancer more specifically. Epidemiologists construct risk estimates 
which  are  then  used  by  health  promoters  and  educators.  The  way  in  which 
messages about risks were communicated was key for Davison and colleagues in 
explaining the resistance to behavioural change. Resistance or non-adherence to 
health promotion messages that ask people to change their behaviour introduces 
a moral dimension to the risk discourse. The responsibility to engage in good 
behaviours  and  thus  avoid  disease  lies  with  the  individual  (Giddens  1999).  If 
people are able to avoid risk, are they able to avoid cancer? If so, according to 
Lupton, risk adopts a ‘moral’ tag (Lupton 1993; 1995): 
“  when  risk  is  believed  to  be  internally  imposed  because  of  lack  of 
willpower, moral weakness or laziness on the part of the individual, the 
reciprocal relationship of sin and risk is reversed. Those who are deemed 
to  be  at  risk  become  sinners,  not  the  sinned  against,  because  of  their 
apparent voluntary courting of risk.” (Lupton 1995:90)  
Moral judgements are common in cancer narratives and this will be returned to 
in greater depth in the later section on cultural understandings of cancer.  
3.4.2 Cancer and perceptions of risk 
Theories  of  behavioural  change,  like  the  health  belief  model  (Rosenstock, 
Strecher & Becker 1988) and the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1991), have 
at  their  core  a  requirement  to  recognise  and  appreciate  risk  .Without  the 
knowledge that one is at risk one is unlikely to contemplate changing behaviour. 
Yet, surprisingly few studies have focused discreetly on perceptions of cancer 
risk  among  the  ‘lay’  public.  There  are  a  number  of  qualitative  studies  that 
consider risk perceptions but do so in the context of screening awareness and 
behaviour. Studies that had screening as their main focus were excluded from 
this  review.  These  often  examine  the  decisions  about  participating  in  the 
cervical screening programme (Armstrong 2005; Armstrong & Murphy 2008), for 
example among women who have had abnormal pap smear results (Kavanagh & 
Broom 1998; Bertram & Magnussen 2008). There are also a number of studies 
that have looked specifically at the views of minority ethnic groups (Chavez et al 
1995; Cohen & Azaiza 2005, Ackerson, Pohl & Low 2008) Some compare views 
across socio-demographic groups. For example a recent study found that non-
whites perceived themselves to be at lower risk than whites even when other 
important  variables  like  behaviour  were  controlled  (Orom  et  al  2010).  The Chapter 3    56 
authors attributed this to variations in perceptions of family history. Non-whites 
were  less  likely  to  believe  that  they  had  a  family  history  of  cancer.  Breast 
cancer  and  mammography  screening  are  also  commonly  studied,  particularly 
amongst  those  judged  to  be  from  high  risk  families  (Chalmers,  Thomson  & 
Degner  1996;  d’  Agincourt-Canning  2005;  Bakos  et  al  2008)  or  those  with  an 
identified  genetic  susceptibility  (Ryan  &  Skinner  1999).  There  are  those  that 
concentrated on individuals who have a heightened genetic risk of colorectal 
cancer  (Harris,  Treloar  &  Byles  1998;  McAllister  2003).  Other  studies  have 
tended to look at high risk groups like smokers (Lowry & Craven 1999; Marteau, 
Rana & Kubba 2002) or those from a particular minority ethnic groups or migrant 
population that are at a heightened risk by virtue of their social status (Lanz et 
al 1994; Morgan, Park & Cortes 1995; Mishra, Aoulua & Hubbell 2000; Allen et al 
2007) 
3.4.3 The lay view of risk 
Those few studies that did examine perceptions of risk among the lay public 
present an understanding of risk that is variable. Humpel and Jones (2004) found 
that most women over-estimated their risk of breast cancer. Robertson (2000) 
similarly  found  that  the  risk  of  breast  cancer  was  over-estimated  and  that 
women  reported  that  they  felt  an  ‘inevitability’  about  breast  cancer. 
Perceptions of risk were fluid and that explanatory models changed in light of 
new information. Using tangible examples to inform beliefs about health was 
also  documented  by  Katapodi  et  al  (2005),  who  introduced  the  ‘availability 
heurtistic’. Heuristics are information shortcuts and, in the context of health, 
facilitate the development of health belief systems. The availability heuristic 
draws on data which is most convenient to access, like family experience rather 
than information from expert sources (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Katapodi 
and  colleagues  suggested  that  the  women  involved  in  their  study  of  breast 
cancer  risk  had  used  heuristics  to  develop  a  ‘stereotype’  of  a  high-risk 
individual. They then compared themselves with the stereotype and made their 
risk judgement about themselves accordingly. Most believed that they were at 
low  risk  because  family  history  was  a  key  feature  of  the  stereotype.  Their 
description  of  the  stereotype  is  akin  to  the  candidacy  element  of  lay 
epidemiology, and like candidacy the women in this study gave examples of the 
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similar process to arrive at their individual risk assessment as Davison reported 
of  candidacy,  what  is  less  clear  is  the  universality  of  the  stereotype.  The 
universality of the coronary candidate was fundamental for lay epidemiology. 
Risk was similarly underestimated in studies of colorectal cancer (Robb, Miles & 
Wardle 2004, 2007; Hay, Coups & Ford 2006). Robb, Miles and Wardle (2004) 
found that perceived risk of colorectal cancer was higher among those with a 
family  history  of  the  disease,  poorer  self-reported  health,  higher  levels  of 
anxiety, the presence of bowel symptoms, smokers and the physically inactive. 
Men  and  older-age  groups  tended  to  under-estimate  their  risk.  Similar 
conclusions  were  reached  by  Hay,  Coups  and  Ford  (2006),  though  the 
relationships between smoking and risk and gender and risk were not upheld. 
Bowel symptoms, anxiety and poor self-reported health were again associated 
with a higher perceived risk (Robb, Miles & Wardle 2007). The qualitative arm of 
this study however found that more than half of the participants believed that 
their risk was average. Diet was central to the risk estimate, though the authors 
concluded that family history is critical in any estimation of risk.  
A  more  general  exploration  of  health  promotion  and  cancer  prevention  was 
undertaken  by  Goldman  et  al  (2008).  They  studied  a  group  of  working  class 
people who had been exposed to a health promotion programme in the work-
place,  and  found  that  most  did  not  think  cancer.  There  was  widespread 
acceptance of risk factors – smoking, diet, the use of sunbeds, and obesity were 
commonly  reported.  While  smoking  was  the  most  common  risk  factor,  good 
nutrition was seen as the key to cancer prevention. Food additives were thought 
to be especially hazardous. As in other studies stress was also thought to be a 
risk  factor.  Environmental  factors  like  toxins,  radiation,  power  lines  and 
pollution  were  all  introduced  into  interviews  by  participants.  Environmental 
dangers posed by working conditions were also cited as risk factors. A widely 
held view was that ‘cancer is in us or around us, waiting to happen’ (Goldman 
2008:784). Genetics, though not linked with all health issues, were frequently 
mentioned in relation to cancer.  
A recent thematic synthesis carried out by Lipworth et al (2010) reviewed the 
literature  on  perceptions  of  cancer  risk.  The  review  included  87  papers  that 
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of groups. The information is synthesised into eight categories: perceptions of 
risk, the process of risk perception, seeking control and taking responsibility, 
experiencing  cancer  directly,  constructing  risk  temporally,  embodying  risk, 
identifying with risk and constructing risk in a social context.  Although not all of 
the  categories  are  relevant,  it  was  clear  that  perceptions  of  risk  are  not 
straightforward.  While  many  sought  to  control  their  risk  by  behaviour 
modification or screening, others found strategies that allowed risk to be denied 
(Murray & Turner 2004). Many of those with an increased genetic risk, down-
played the overall importance of the genetic component (Sanders et al 2003). 
Some reported struggling to reconcile the unavoidable nature of risk, and many 
were fatalistic. 
The  finding  that  had  most  in  common  with  lay  epidemiology  was  the 
construction of risk in a social context, and although the findings in this section 
refer in part to relationships with health professionals, they include one study 
that considered the community experience of cancer (Salant & Gehlert 2008). 
Salant  and  Gehlert’s  study  of  African-American  women  drew  on  the  ideas 
embodied in lay epidemiology. They conducted a series of focus groups and were 
particularly interested in the ‘community’ response to breast cancer risk. They 
found  that  participants  evoked  memories  of  a  nostalgic  time  where  risk  was 
reduced because  life  was  thought  to be  ‘purer’.  Participants  emphasised the 
chemical aetiology of cancer, including pesticides. Stress was also thought to be 
major risk factor for breast cancer. Perceptions of candidacy were mixed though 
the major elements inherent in breast cancer candidacy were hereditary factors, 
poor lifestyle and age – though both older and younger women were identified as 
candidates. They did not find a precise model of causality or candidacy. Many 
participants reported that they gave no consideration to breast cancer unless 
they were confronted with it but that perceptions of risk are integral to their 
community’s feeling of victimization.  
Lipworth  and  colleagues  (2010)  concluded  that  what  many  of  the  studies 
included in their review had in common, was the assumption that if lay beliefs 
do not match those of health professionals, then the public are ignorant. The 
review  recommended  that  the  many  factors  that  shape  perceptions  of  risk 
should  be  taken  into  account  including  social,  personal  and  psychological 
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literature  on  perceptions  of  cancer  risk  factors.  This  method  of  qualitative 
synthesis attempts to pull together findings from disparate studies and present a 
single message (Dixon-Woods 2006). However, including 87 studies makes this a 
large qualitative review. Although they aimed to include a very wide range of 
studies  the  meaningfulness  of  the  resultant  data  must  be  questioned.  The 
variety in both the types of participants and the subjects under study means the 
conclusions  lack  depth.  They  identified  gaps  in  the  existing  literature  and 
confirmed that ‘at risk’ groups are most commonly the subjects of studies that 
seek  to  explore  risk.  There  is  scope  therefore  to  consider  the  views  of  the 
‘ordinary’ person in relation to risk. 
3.4.4 Risks and Genetics 
Genetic risk is an area of great importance in terms of cancer beliefs. Family 
history is frequently placed at the centre of risk assessments – either for others 
or oneself. Scientific advances that have resulted in the identification of cancer 
genes have clearly captured the public’s imagination. Specific genes BRCA 1 and 
BRCA 2 have been linked with breast and ovarian cancer and genetic elements 
are  also  found  in  some  colorectal  cancers,  prostate  and  testicular  cancers. 
Introducing a series of papers entitled ‘Public Understanding of Science’ in 1995, 
Macintyre predicted a future where people could be screened for a ‘wide range 
of  cancers’.  The  paper  called  for  a  ‘scientific  understanding  of  the  public’ 
(Macintyre 1995:228), where professionals appreciate the public’s sophistication 
in this issue, rather than assume that they are unable to correctly process this 
data. According to Macintrye, many of the important factors, like interpretations 
of chance and probability, are well understood and moreover, that many studies 
of lay beliefs about health and illness show how embedded in British popular 
culture  are  ideas  about  the  inheritability  of  diseases  (Macintyre  1995:228). 
While this may be true, there is also evidence that risk can be underestimated 
because of the assumptions about inheritability (Kapodi et al 2005). In reality 
familial links explain only a small part of the risk. Further, the folly of assuming 
that lay and expert models of genetic risk are similar is demonstrated by Parsons 
and Atkinson (1992). In their seminal study of perceptions of risk among families 
with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy they found that the women they interviewed 
often  misinterpreted  the  risk  information  given  to  them,  which  in  turn  had 
influenced  their  reproductive  decisions.  This  tied  in  with  Gifford’s  (1986) Chapter 3    60 
assertion that while for the epidemiologist the calculation of risk is an objective, 
technical  process,  but  for  the  lay  person  it  is  a  subjective,  lived  experience 
drawing on many different types of information. As Blaxter (1999) cautioned: 
“there is a considerable risk in the assumption that we are all talking 
about the same thing" (Blaxter, 1999: 23). 
Irrespective of the difficulties associated with genetics and cancer, it is an area 
that  is  receiving  increased  attention.  Although  the  great  majority  of  cancers 
have no genetic element, significant efforts have been made to raise awareness 
of  cancer  genetics.  Piniewski-Bond  et  al  (2003)  evaluated  a  widespread 
advertising campaign to raise awareness of the cancer and genetics. They found 
that  around  40,000  households  had  been  aware  of  the  campaign  and  around 
15,000 had changed their views as a result. Although the authors conclude that 
the campaign  served to  eradicate  myths  about cancer  genetics,  much of  the 
work that has been done reports that this is an area that is poorly understood. 
Of the 87 papers included in the thematic synthesis by Lipworth and colleagues, 
23 dealt directly with ‘cancer families’. The location of a gene for breast cancer 
has led to a substantial amount of work which explores the perceived risks of 
women with a family history of breast and or ovarian cancer (Chalmers et al 
1996;  McAllister  et  al  1998;  Ryan  &  Skinner  1999;  Werner-Lin  2007).  Also  of 
colorectal cancer (Jacobs 2002, Harris, Treloar and Byles 1998). One concept 
introduced by Lipworth and colleagues is that of ‘liminality’ (Lipworth 2010), 
where  those  from  at-  risk  families  describe  a  sense  where  they  are  neither 
sufferers nor disease free. There is an important distinction to be made between 
those cancers where a ‘gene’ can be isolated and tested for, others where there 
may be a hereditary element, like prostate cancer, and those where there is no 
link. Macintyre claimed that the public understanding of genetics and disease is 
embedded  in  our  society  but  the  difficulty  is  that  it  may  be  that  it  is  too 
embedded.  Most  of  the  studies  already  included  here  reported  that  people 
believe there to be a strong hereditary element in cancer, and as Kerr et al 
(1998) suggested, people falsely estimate their genetic risk. It is perhaps not 
surprising  that  those  with  a  greater  number  of  affected  relatives  believe 
themselves to have a higher risk (Beebe-Dimmer 2004).  Chapter 3    61 
3.4.5 Cancer risk models  
The discovery of cancer genes and the rise in importance of risk has driven the 
development of cancer risk models. The result has been a burgeoning literature 
in this area (Freedman 2005) and a number of models that calculate risk. The 
National Cancer Institute in the US devotes a website to the calculation and 
estimation  of  risk
8.  Much  of  the  literature  in  this  area  has  focused  on  the 
understanding  of  risk  and  the  most  appropriate  means  of  imparting  such 
information.  Han  and  colleagues  (2007,  2009a,  2009b)  have  been  prolific 
commentators in this area and have produced a series of papers that explore 
participants’ views about and understanding of risk models, many of which were 
being  promoted  by  the  US  National  Cancer  Institute.  Much  of  Han’s  work 
considered the preferences for the presentation of risk information and models 
but concluded that risk could be interpreted in many different ways.  
3.4.6 Risk and Cause: a semantic distinction? 
While risk may be open to interpretation, it does refer to a prospective rather 
than retrospective judgement. Risk is probabilistic in nature and as Gabe (1995) 
posited, while it was once a neutral term, it has become almost wholly negative. 
The language of risk is important. All of the studies on awareness have asked 
individuals  to  comment  on  associations  between  risk  factors  and  cancer,  not 
causal  relationships.  Retrospective  candidacy  refers  to  perceived  causal 
relationships – obesity caused the CHD event. Davison admitted that candidacy is 
less powerful when making future risk assessments.  
There are few studies that discuss causality and cancer amongst the lay public. 
Some, like Blaxter’s study, had health generally rather than cancer specifically 
as  its  focus  (Blaxter  1982).  Where  there  is  a  larger  literature  is  the  area  of 
‘causal attribution’. These studies employ psychological concepts, like Health 
Locus of Control (Wallaston 1976) to gain an understanding of people’s health 
beliefs, particularly about aetiology. Typically studies of causal attribution take 
cancer  patients  and  survivors  as  their  sample  and  ask  them  to  propose  the 
reason for the development of their disease (Faller Schilling & Lang 1995; Kohli 
1998; Stewart et al 2001a, 2001b; Arman et al 2006; Costanzo et al 2005). Many 
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of  these  studies  have  found  that  the  importance  of  behavioural  factors  is 
underestimated (Maskarinec et al 2001) and typically that cancer patients are 
less certain about causality than non-patients (Linn, Linn and Stein 1982).  
3.5 Cancer ethnography 
Most of the studies outlined in the first section on cancer awareness among the 
general  public  deployed  large  questionnaire  cross-sectional  studies.  Those 
studies  in  the  previous  section  on  perceptions  of  cancer  risk  highlighted  the 
complexity  of  beliefs  about  cancer.  Few  studies  have  set  out  to  capture  the 
views of the lay population about what causes cancer, particularly in the UK and 
USA  (Dein  2004).  There  have  been  a  number  of  studies  that  have  looked 
specifically at the understanding of cancer among various ethnic groups, most 
notably in the USA. Dein’s review of this literature suggested that the majority 
of the groups studied have very little biomedical knowledge about cancer but 
they do have firmly held beliefs, many of which are heavily influenced by God 
and fate. One study of particular relevance to the west of Scotland that also 
explored beliefs about cancer in a cultural minority group was Scanlon et al‘s 
(2006) ethnographic study that compared Irish and white British people. A series 
of focus group discussions took place in Glasgow, Manchester and London among 
first,  second  and  third  generation  Irish  individuals  and  the  indigenous  white 
British  population.  They  found  few  differences  between  the  Irish  and  British 
participants  and  concluded  that  neither  group  had  a  particularly  clear 
understanding  of  cancer.  The  majority  saw  cancer  as  a  single  disease  that 
affected different parts of the body, though distinctions were made between 
good  and  bad  cancers.  Good  cancers  were  those  perceived  to  be  curable. 
Participants also felt that some cancers could be “hidden” or “silent”, and the 
sufferer  may  not  know  they  have  the  disease.  This  unpredictable  nature  of 
cancer emphasised the fear associated with the disease, a response that was 
keenly  felt  among  the  groups,  irrespective  of  biomedical  advances.  Some 
believed that cancer merely required a trigger to set it off. Most participants 
held a complex model of causality and a series of factors were thought to be 
important,  including  lifestyle,  family  susceptibility,  and  the  physical 
environment. Irish participants were more likely to believe that cancer could be 
the result of economic disadvantage. Many, particularly Irish participants, were 
sceptical  about  the  influence  of  lifestyle  factors,  though  interestingly  they Chapter 3    63 
believed that the traditional rural Irish way of life offered a protection, unlike 
their urban existence, which encouraged unhealthy lifestyles.  
The emphasis on the importance of environmental factors is not novel. In an 
earlier paper, Balshem (1991) recounted her experience as a health professional 
undertaking  a  research  project  in  Philadelphia  in  1980.  She  had  originally 
intended to discuss heart disease but, partly as a result of recent media interest 
in the idea of cancer ‘hot spots’ in Philadelphia, cancer became central to her 
analysis. As with earlier studies (Linn, Linn and Stein 1982) Balshem found that 
the participants in her study concentrated on external factors when seeking an 
explanation for cancer. Most common among them was environmental pollution, 
though both God’s will and fate were also commonly offered as explanations. 
Fate therefore was more important in many ways than lifestyle because although 
lifestyle can improve your chances of avoiding cancer, fate had the ultimate 
power. Balshem attributed the elevated position of fate to the failure of modern 
science to convince her study participants that it was able to provide answers. 
Participants  in  Balshem’s  study  bemoaned  the  fact  that  ‘everything  causes 
cancer’. In this respect cancer is the disease equivalent of the boy who cried 
wolf; if everything causes cancer there is no certainty about anything causing it. 
Participants in Balshem’s study were therefore sceptical of the importance of 
lifestyle  factors  and much  like  Davison’s  ‘Uncle  Norman’  (Davison,  Frankel  & 
Davey  Smith  1991),  Balshem’s  participants  introduced  the  ‘Defiant  Ancestor’ 
who had engaged in all the ‘wrong’ behaviours but remained disease free. While 
the original ‘Uncle Norman’ stereotype simply defied the odds by living to a 
‘ripe  old  age’  in  the  context  of  smoking  and  drinking  heavily,  Balshem’s 
ancestors  had  an  additional  quality.  The  ancestors  were  described  in  moral 
terms. They were seen to work hard, not to dwell on disease and to have a 
positive attitude. Such features are similar to the respondents in Blaxter’s (1982) 
generational studies of mothers and daughters where work and ‘not giving in’ to 
disease were lauded.  
3.6 Conclusion: What do people know about cancer? 
This section on the understanding of cancer has highlighted a number of critical 
points. First, there are relatively few studies that deal with the understanding 
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tend  to  employ  large  scale  quantitative  methods  that  say  little  about  the 
subtlety and complexity of beliefs. Awareness of cancer risk factors is variable. 
The risks of tobacco are universally accepted and sun exposure is also becoming 
widely  recognised  as  a  hazard.  Other  known  risk  factors  are  less  well 
appreciated,  typically  the  importance  of  physical  activity  and  alcohol 
consumption.  The  public  are  attached  to  a  number  of  ‘mythic’  risk  factors, 
stress being principal among them. They also appear wedded to the importance 
of  heredity  across  all  cancer  sites.  Many  introduce  fate  and  God’s  will  into 
explanations of causality. Perceptions of risk are similarly variable. Some studies 
report  an  underestimation  of  risk  and  many  others  find  the  opposite. 
Undoubtedly the level of media attention the cancer risk factor receives is key 
in shaping beliefs. This would explain both the success of the smoking message 
and the misconception about the links between breast cancer and age.  
As the reliance on ‘Gods will’ as an explanation suggests, the lay public draws on 
more than biomedical explanations in reaching an understanding of cancer. The 
cultural  experience  of  cancer  is  also  important,  as  the  following  section 
demonstrates.  
3.7 The culture of cancer 
For Davison, candidacy represented a “cultural mechanism” that allowed an easy 
understanding  of  what  heart  disease  meant.  The  coronary  candidate  is  a 
familiar, axiomatic image. It is an image based on a heart which endures strain, 
one that has to work too hard.  This pervasive metaphor, of the heart as a pump, 
fits  neatly  into  the  wider  mechanistic  metaphor  dominant  in  the  biomedical 
model. This picture is arguably simplistic but there is no doubt that it aids the 
widespread understanding of ‘heart trouble’, which was central to the power 
and legitimacy of candidacy.  
Cancer  is  arguably  less  straightforward  and  is  often  thought  of  as  the  most 
feared of diseases. If lay epidemiology is to be applicable to cancer then the 
cultural position of cancer needs to be fully understood. The following section 
first considers one of the most influential pieces of writing about cancer, if not 
disease: Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor. It then goes on to look at some of the 
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hint at the way in which a disease is viewed by wider society. The section also 
details the depiction of cancer in the popular press, before concluding with a 
comparison  between  cancer  and  heart  disease,  which  is  at  the  core  of  this 
thesis.  
3.7.1  Illness as metaphor: Sontag and cancer 
Much  can  be  learned  about  the  cultural  position  of  cancer  by  exploring  the 
metaphors  associated  with  the  disease.  An  obvious  place  to  begin  is  Susan 
Sontag’s  ‘Illness  as  Metaphor’.  Published  first  in  1978,  the  essay  dealt  with 
Sontag’s own experience of breast cancer, though arguably it went far beyond 
the conventional personal accounts of living with illness. Sontag drew on the 
experiences of fellow patients and observed interactions in clinics and concluded 
that cancer metaphors worsened the entire disease experience.  
“As  long  as  a  particular  disease  is  treated  as  an  evil,  invincible 
predator, not just a disease, most people with cancer will indeed be 
demoralized by learning what disease they have.” (Sontag 1978:7)  
Sontag drew comparisons between Tuberculosis, the disease of the 19th century, 
and cancer, the scourge of the 20th century. She referred to both tuberculosis 
and cancer as ‘master illnesses’ because both held social, moral and political 
significance,  but  they  were  not  indistinguishable.  Unlike  cancer,  tuberculosis 
was romanticised and Sontag provides frequent examples of literary figures who 
have  succumbed  to  ‘consumption’.  As  Lupton  (1994)  summarised  Sontag’s 
representation of tuberculosis 
“…a disease of romance and passion, a sign of ‘inward-burning’ or 
ardour, conceptualized as disintegration, transparency, hyper-activity 
alternating with elegant languidness, leading to a  noble and often 
lyrical death’ (Lupton 1994:58) 
Conversely, cancer had nothing to redeem it. It is ‘horror-filled’, consuming the 
public-psyche with dread. Sontag analysed the way in which cancer had been 
portrayed  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century.  Her  overwhelming 
conclusion was that cancer could not escape the stigma associated with it:  
“…  treating cancer as no mere disease but a demonic enemy, make it 
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This  shame,  according  to  Sontag,  rendered  individuals  reluctant  to  discuss 
potential  symptoms.  Consequently,  they  failed  to  seek  help  and  were 
untreatable by the time they sought help. Sontag’s solution is to purge cancer of 
its  symbolism  and  to  view  it  as  a purely  biological  entity.  In her  later essay 
(Sontag 2001) Sontag adapted the original Illness metaphor to include AIDS. Here 
she highlighted the morality inherent in illness metaphors. Both cancer and AIDS 
are  seen  to  be  punishments  for  not  behaving  correctly,  for  being  weak,  yet 
reckless and choosing to take risks. Sontag’s chief aim was to de-bunk the taboo 
and stigma. She believed that:  
“The most truthful way of regarding illness – and the healthiest way 
of being ill – is one most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric 
thinking” (Sontag 1978:3) 
Though Sontag’s motivation was clearly honourable, there are ironies inherent in 
her essays. She overestimates the ability of science and therefore medicine to 
be objective. Moreover, she too utilises metaphors liberally, for example, in the 
introduction: 
“Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the 
well and the kingdom of the sick.”(Sontag 1978:3) 
Sontag  has  been  labelled  naïve  for  suggesting  that  illness  can  be  free  of 
metaphor  and  more particularly  for claiming  that  bio-medicine,  itself  riddled 
with, and reliant on, metaphor for meaning, can be objective. The mechanical 
metaphor for the body is central to biomedicine and is used by patients and 
physicians  alike.  Some  of  the  metaphors  are  so  well-established  that  Lupton 
questioned whether they are now ‘dead metaphors’. Lupton (1994) showed that 
there  are  many  examples  of  medical  professionals  relying  on  metaphors  to 
explain  illness  to  patients.  While  Lupton  acknowledged  Sontag’s  naivety,  she 
also recognised Sontag’s role in illustrating the function of metaphor. People 
make  sense  of  illness  through  metaphor  and  Sontag  was  instrumental  in  the 
widespread acceptance of this fact. 
Weiss  (1997)  paid  homage  to  Sontag  in  a  study  that  interviewed  nurses, 
physicians and students about their views of cancer, heart disease and AIDS. The 
project  asked  participants  to  provide  pictorial  images  of  each  disease.  Like 
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linked with suffering, and only AIDS patients experience similar levels of stigma.  
Yet, she offered a more contemporary analysis of cancer metaphors and claimed 
that rather than being seen as the ‘leprosy of modern times’, as cancer once 
was,  the accent has shifted to more ‘heroic’ metaphors of ‘hope’ and ‘fighting 
spirit’.  In  the  pictorial  representations,  Weiss  claimed  that  heart  disease  is 
devoid of imagery. The imagery attached to cancer was undoubtedly familiar. 
Cancer  eating  the  sufferer  from  within  and  eventually  consuming  the  whole 
person  was  presented  repeatedly.  Interestingly,  Weiss  found  little  difference 
between lay and professional depictions.    
Sontag is not without her critics. In a provocatively titled essay ‘Who’s afraid of 
Susan  Sontag?,  Clow  (2001)  not  only  criticised  Sontag  for  her  naivety,  but 
questioned the entire validity of her premise. Though Clow accepted that cancer 
is a disease that patients are fearful of, she challenged the depth of the stigma 
and the apparent shame associated with the disease. Sontag, and later Patterson 
(1987),  cited  the  euphemisms  present  in  obituaries  and  implied  that  this 
evidenced the reluctance to reveal cancer as a cause of death. Clow conducted 
a  detailed  examination  of  post-war  obituaries.  She  concluded  that  obituaries 
were ‘opaque’, which proved nothing and, according to Clow, fewer than 15% of 
all obituaries specified a cause of death. Clow asserted that the presence of 
euphemisms simply confirms cancer. Such an admission however surely serves to 
strengthen Sontag’s argument. Clow stated that rather than attempt to obscure 
cancer,  health  professionals  sought  to  provide  information  about  cancer  on  
mass scale and, what is more, the public had an appetite for personal accounts 
of cancer in newspapers and magazines. Yet Toon’s (2007) account of the public 
health  movement  in  the  United  Kingdom  before  the  Second  World  War 
reinforced Sontag’s argument. Toon demonstrated that there was a reluctance 
to provide information about cancer, as it was assumed that information would 
only increase fear. A similar conclusion was reached by Patterson (1987) who 
believed  that  public  enthusiasm  for  cancer  information  was  the  result  of 
‘cancerphobia’. Clow cited a Gallup poll from 1940, where 98% of people did not 
see  any  shame  attached  to  a  cancer  diagnosis.  This  challenged  Sontag’s 
assumption that a cancer diagnosis is inherently shameful. Clow believed that 
Sontag’s sources have not been sufficiently scrutinised. Though Clow is generally 
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profoundly  important  she  concluded  that  Sontag  simply  succeeded  in 
‘mythologising’ the very metaphors she set out to eliminate: 
“Despite her intellectual prowess, despite the tremendous power and 
importance of Illness as Metaphor, it turns out that some people are 
not afraid of Susan Sontag.” (Clow 2001;310) 
A further critique of Sontag was tendered by Coulehan (2003) who questioned 
the necessity of removing metaphor from the medical encounter and the illness 
experience.  Coulehan  used  the  example  of  the  Navajo  where  narratives  and 
metaphors are central to the traditional healing process. 
3.7.2 Historical Perspectives 
Sontag essentially initiated the debate about the culture of cancer. Ten years 
after Sontag, Patterson (1987) published The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern 
American  Culture,  a  cultural  history  of  cancer  since  the  1880s.  Patterson’s 
account  was  arguably  more  academic  and  evidenced  than  Sontag’s  but  both 
reached similar conclusions. Patterson’s work led to a flurry of social histories of 
cancer.  Jasen  (2002),  Aronowitz  (2001)  and  Moscucci  (2010)  all  provide 
interesting accounts that offer clues to the origins of the metaphors that Sontag 
described as so pervasive.  
3.7.3 Cancer Metaphors 
“  …  cancer  is  a  disease  which  has  occasioned  a  constellation  of 
metaphorical  systems,  largely  due  to  its  severity,  mystery  and 
evasion of medical solutions.” (Lupton 1994: 66)  
Regardless of the legitimacy of Sontag’s interpretation of the stigmatising nature 
of cancer, there is little doubt about the pervasiveness of the metaphoric nature 
of  the  disease.  As  the  above  quote  from  Lupton  suggests  there  are  many 
metaphorical representations of cancer. Cancer itself is a metaphor, and reflects 
the image of a tumour with the protruding legs of a crab. Lupton traced the 
history of cancer metaphors and showed that even in medieval times cancer was 
seen  as  a  ‘gnawing’  animal  and  as  rot  invading  the  body  which  destroyed 
sufferers from within. There are a number of variations on this theme that bring 
the metaphor up to date. Hawkins’ (1999) analysis of pathographies concluded 
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 ‘an alien intruder or invading enemy’ (Hawkins 1999:66) 
Allied to this are the ubiquitous combative or militaristic metaphors that have 
become standard when describing cancer. ‘War on Cancer’ was declared by US 
President Richard Nixon in 1971 when he launched the National Cancer Act. The 
aim of the Act was to eradicate deaths from cancer and though there have been 
notable improvements in mortality since then, the war continues. In this context 
cancer  becomes  ‘the  enemy’  -  a  label  that  invites  a  string  of  metaphors.  If 
cancer is both a disease that comes ‘from within’ and the ‘enemy’, then the 
leap to combative metaphors seems logical. Moreover, Lupton proposed that the 
use of many of the metaphors in modern media aim to ‘simplify’ cancer and 
improve  the  public’s  understanding  of  a  complex  disease.  Yet  the 
straightforward description of the reproduction of ‘rogue’ cancer cells is easily 
translated as irrational and disorderly. Portraying cancer as an irrational, out of 
control ‘entity’ is also common (Lupton 1994). Unlike other diseases, cancer is 
often assigned a personality, displaying a series of traits. Adjectives like devious, 
sneaky, evasive are all commonly used to characterise cancer (Balshem 1991).  
Herzlich and Pierret (1987) described cancer as ‘THE disease’ of the twentieth 
century:  
“In our representations cancer is the specific illness of our society, 
the  prototype  of  the  ‘modern  illness’,  that  has  become  the  very 
embodiment of physical suffering for us.”(Herzlich & Pierret 1987:55)  
Over a number of studies spanning 30 years Herzlich and Pierret collected the 
views of cancer patients. They reported that some participants in their studies 
denied  the  historical  existence  of  cancer,  while  others  believed  that  though 
cancer  may  have  existed,  it  was  labelled  as  something  else.  Despite  the 
participants’ insistence on the modern nature of cancer, Herzlich and Pierret 
charted a long history of accounts of cancer. They cited very early use of the 
‘eating away’ metaphor from Thomas Paynell in 1528 who wrote ‘a canker is a 
melanchoyle impostume, eatynge partes of the bodye’. Death from cancer was 
documented as early as 1666, when Anne of Austria was reported to have died of 
breast cancer. Causal links were first documented in Sir Percival Pott’s study of 
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Interest in cancer then waned during the Victorian era, when the focus was on 
what  they  termed  ‘social  scourges’  –  small  pox,  syphilis  and  tuberculosis. 
Nevertheless  the  language  of  plague  continued  to  be  used  in  reference  to 
cancer, and they provided the example of ‘drop like flies’. This, according to 
Herzlich  and  Pierret,  explains  entirely  the  fear  that  was  synonymous  with 
cancer.  People  were  unsure  about  the  origins  of  cancer  and  whether  it  was 
contagious. Herzlich and Pierett reported that their interviewees talked about 
the  contemporary  ‘obsession’  with  cancer.  Many  participants  suggested  that 
while at one time a symptom was recognised as innocuous, the modern way was 
to immediately assume that cancer was at its root. Cancer was so feared that 
some were reluctant to ‘speak its name’. It was this duality that led them to 
conclude that cancer inhabited both the modern and the archaic: 
“If  cancer,  like  all  great  diseases  whose  impact  on  the  collective 
consciousness we have tried to retrace, is indeed a metaphor, it is 
infinitely richer than Susan Sontag would lead us to believe: it is a 
metaphor that merges the archaic with the modern version of illness; 
a metaphor that uncovers our relationship with today’s world and at 
the  same  time  brings  us  face  to  face  with  our  fragility  as 
individuals.” (Herzlich & Pierret 1987:66) 
3.7.4 Metaphors and the individual 
It  is  in  the  realm  of  the  individual  that  metaphors  become  problematic. 
Separating cancer from the cancer patient is awkward, particularly as cancer is 
often believed to come from ‘within’. There is ample scope then for the ‘evil’ to 
be associated with the patient as well as the disease. The consequence is the 
stigma  and  shame  trailed  by  Sontag.  Arriving  at  aetiological  explanations  for 
each cancer case raises issues of personal responsibility and Lupton proposed 
that such ponderings often have a moral tone. Lupton cited Pinell’s (1987) paper 
that collated data from letters written by cancer patients to the Department of 
Health in France, the Concertation Nationale Cancer. Pinell asserted that the 
fear surrounding cancer is disproportionate to the actual threat, and claimed 
that  
“Cancer condenses all the characteristics of an unforgettable horrible 
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Pinell  found  that  most  contributors  were  reluctant  to  take  any  personal 
responsibility  for  cancer,  instead  locating  the  cause  outside  of  themselves. 
Environmental  pollutants  for  example  were  often cited.  However,  the  letters 
went  beyond  that  and  hinted  that  ‘disharmony’  caused  cancer.  As  one 
respondent wrote:  
“I  am  convinced  that  there  will  be  no  cancer  in  a  better  world” 
(Pinell 1987: 32) 
Pinell concluded that the ability to see oneself as an innocent victim of cancer 
was  important  to  those  writing  the  letters.  Similar  findings  were  reported in 
earlier studies that asked cancer patients to comment on the causes of cancer 
(Bard  &  Dyk  1956;  Moses  &  Civaldi  1966;  Linn, Linn  &  Stein  1982).  All  three 
studies  found  that  patients  tended  to  hold  factors  outside  their  control 
responsible  for  their  illness.  Some  of  those  factors  included  over-work,  early 
deprivation (Bard & Dyk 1956) heredity or poor medical care (Moses & Civaldi 
1966). Linn, Linn and Stein’s study compared the views of cancer patients with 
non-cancer patients and found that cancer patients were less certain about the 
causes of cancer than those without cancer. Those with cancer were more likely 
to  endorse  heredity  and  “God’s  Will”,  so  distancing  themselves  from 
responsibility (Linn, Linn & Stein 1982).  
3.7.5 Moral Responsibility 
All of the above studies capture the importance of moral responsibility in the 
modern discourse on cancer. Are people responsible for their own illness? Does 
anyone deserve cancer? These questions force a return to Herzlich & Pierett’s 
analysis  that  cancer  is  both  modern  and  archaic.  Lupton  showed  that  as  the 
major diseases have moved from widespread epidemics to individual diseases 
like cancer and coronary heart disease the determinants of health have moved 
from  the  social  to  the  individual.  The  emphasis  is  on  behaviour.  Smoking  is 
widely  recognised  as  a  significant  risk  factor  for  cancer.  The  stigma  felt  by 
smokers has been reported (Mackenzie et al 2009). Again, Sontag’s analysis is 
relevant  because,  irrespective  of  Clow’s  questioning  of  the  depth  of  shame, 
studies have clearly documented the stigma expeirnced by lung cancer sufferers 
(Chapple,  Ziebland  &  McPherson  2004).  Stigma  is  attributed  to  the  ‘horrible’ 
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high death rate. The paper is littered with examples of moral judgements and 
references to the ‘dirty’ label associated with all cancers, not just lung cancers. 
Though some interviewees saw smoking as the most significant factor, others, 
especially  those  that  had  joined  support  groups  introduced  environmental 
factors as possibilities. This shows the need to absolve oneself of responsibility.  
As well as the moral responsibility associated with the cause of disease, another 
significant component of the cancer narrative is ‘hope’ (Lupton 1994; Ehrenreich 
2009). Current convention suggests that cancer patients should remain positive 
and fight back. Hawkins’ (1999) analysis of pathographies presented numerous 
personal  accounts  of  illness  that  document  ‘the  fight’  against  cancer.  Both 
patients  and  health  professionals  use  militaristic  metaphors  frequently  and 
clinicians report that the use of such terms provides an essential analogy for the 
course of treatment and the ‘journey’ that the patient is about to embark on. 
Yet, Hawkins claimed that in many of these pathographies the veiled inference 
is that cancer patients who do not possess sufficient quantities of the ‘fighting 
spirit’ ultimately have poorer outcomes.   
3.8 Cancer and the media 
The media influence our understanding and experience of disease (Lupton 1994; 
Philo 1999; Seale 2003). However, much of the available information should be 
treated  with  caution.  MacDonald  and  Hoffman-Goetz  (2002)  found  in  their 
analysis of the accuracy of information presented in Canadian newspapers that 
only 7% of articles contained factually correct information. Many of the well-
known metaphors already described can be found liberally cited in the media 
coverage of cancer. Clarke’s (1986, 1992) studies of the depiction of cancer in 
magazines  published in  the  United  States echoed  Sontag’s  original  thesis  and 
reported on the commonality of military metaphors when reporting cancer: 
“Cancer is described as an evil, immoral predator.” (Clarke 1992:108) 
Even  before  Nixon  declared  war  on  cancer,  Clarke  unearthed  militaristic 
metaphors  and  cancer  ‘fighters’  in  popular  magazines.  Reports  showed  that 
cancer, unlike other diseases, impacts on the whole person and that following a 
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discussed  personality  characteristics  associated  with  cancer.  Principal  among 
them  were  “hopeless,  inadequate  or  somehow  desperate  people”  (Clarke 
1992:108). Together with individual traits, Clarke showed that a wide range of 
potential  causes  are  put  forward  in  the  magazines,  including  ‘chickens  or 
viruses’, though the most common cause was smoking. Individual responsibility 
was at the forefront of all the pieces. Clarke concluded that personal behaviours 
rather than environmental factors were more likely to be held responsible for 
cancer. These findings were replicated in a Clarke’s later analysis of Canadian 
magazines printed in 2001(Clarke & van Ameron 2008), and most of the articles 
suggested that people have the power to change their own health.  
Seale (2001a, 2001b) carried out an analysis of the coverage of cancer in British 
and American Newspapers in one week in October 1999. He subsequently offered 
an analysis of both religious and sporting metaphors. Seale developed Sontag’s 
ideas that explored the moral connotations of cancer and suggested that cancer 
can be viewed as a form of divine punishment and is seen as a demonic enemy. 
He believed that religion might answer questions about cancer that biomedicine 
is unable to answer, primarily, who deserves cancer? He postulated therefore 
that much of the media coverage would include the religious status of cancer 
sufferers, particularly in the United States, arguably a more religious society. 
Despite this he found only a handful of references to the role of religion in the 
cancer  sufferer’s  life.  Religious  language  was  used and  individuals  alluded  to 
blessings  and  miracles  though  Seale  surmised  that  these  terms  unknowingly 
evoked religiosity. Seale claimed that recovery from cancer is assumed to be a 
personal responsibility and much of the language, rather than militaristic, simply 
conveys ‘struggle’. It was rare for reports to make direct causal links between 
faith and survival. Faith was more likely to be introduced into terminal cancer 
stories. Seale concluded his analysis on religion by suggesting that patients with 
cancer and their families appear to seek answers from biomedicine rather than 
religion, though he did propose that the increased interest in complementary 
medicine and what he described as ‘psychological’ thinking may have replaced 
religious thinking in contemporary secular societies.  
As well as an analysis of religious content, Seale (2001a) also examined the data 
he  gathered  to  explore  sporting  metaphors.  Previous  work  by  Clarke  and 
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metaphors were commonplace. Seale suggested that sport is a ‘civil religion’, 
which  provides  a  means  to  demonstrate  individual  worth  and  triumph  when 
faced  with  cancer.  Seale  drew  parallels  between  militaristic  imagery  and 
sporting language. In sporting stories terms like fighting and winning were used 
and  interestingly  Seale  pointed  to  the  use  of  ‘rounds’  to  describe  stages  of 
treatment, much like sporting heats or boxing bouts. Often the sporting pastimes 
of people with cancer were reported. Seale provided a number of examples of 
young women with breast cancer involved in mountain climbing. The analogy of 
reaching the top while also overcoming cancer was used and, according to Seale, 
sport facilitates the emphasis on the ‘heroic’ nature of the cancer struggle.  
Clearly the treatment of cancer in the media will focus on what is newsworthy. 
Seale noted that the concentration is on cancer among younger people, and in 
particular  tragic  cases.  The  focus  on  younger  people  has  been  documented 
elsewhere.  Henderson  and  Kitzinger  (1999)  have  looked  at  the  way  that 
‘inherited breast cancer’, linked with younger women, has been treated by the 
media.  In  their  analysis  of  newspaper  coverage  in  the  years  following  the 
discovery of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes they found that genetic factors were 
the second most common risk factor mentioned in newspaper articles. This is in 
spite  of  the  estimate  that  only  around  10%  of  breast  cancers  are  genetic. 
Nevertheless  genetic  breast  cancers  are  often  tragic  stories,  some  involving 
prophylactic mastectomies. Clearly, emphasising the unusual helps consolidate 
the tragic representation of cancer. Clarke and Everest (2006) in their synthesis 
of  data  from  magazines  found  that  the  exacerbation  of  fear  was  the  most 
common  theme  in  cancer  stories,  and  that  fear  and  cancer  had  become 
conflated. Fear was presented in a number of ways: the silent nature of cancer 
is stressed, so one can have cancer unknowingly, cancer is presented as being 
common and has so many risk factors that some suggest that ‘everything causes 
cancer’. Clarke and Everest proposed that the ubiquity extends to individuals, 
which  exudes  the  idea  that  everyone  will  eventually  develop  cancer.  The 
presentation  of  cancer  in  this  way  accentuated  the  uncertainty  that  is 
synonymous with cancer. As Comaroff and Maguire’s (1981) study of parents of 
children with leukaemia claimed, it is the uncertainty that families are most 
fearful  of.  Despite  advances  in  treatment,  a  proportion,  albeit  small,  of  the Chapter 3    75 
cancer puzzle remains unsolved. The unanswerable, by its very nature, assumes 
a mythic quality. 
3.9 Cancer vs. heart disease 
Davison’s work on lay epidemiology was developed from data generated in a 
study about Coronary Heart Disease. Lay epidemiology shows the importance of 
social factors in the understanding of disease, which also includes the cultural 
context in which information flows. It is useful therefore to compare cancer and 
CHD,  in  cultural  terms.  Many  of  the  studies  already  reviewed  make  direct 
comparisons between the diseases. As Sontag noted: 
“the doctors also treated the cancer as if it were something more 
than an illness: It wasn’t like having a heart attack ….. there was a 
taboo about it” ( Sontag 1978:101) 
Clow  (2001)  also  considered  the  disparity between cancer and heart  disease. 
Death from heart disease epitomises a ‘good death’, one that is both quick and 
unexpected,  while  cancer  is  characterised  as  a  slow,  painful  and  agonising 
demise. NicGabhainn et al (1999) concluded that heart disease was feared less 
than cancer. Lupton (1994) claimed that heart disease was ‘morally neutral’ and 
that very often rather than relying on graphic metaphors we need only look to 
biomedicine  for  our  understanding  of  heart  disease.  Arguably  then,  lay  and 
professional views of heart disease are more attuned than they are for cancer. 
Moreover, the reductionist model of heart disease allows the sufferer to become 
separate from their disease, with the heart is viewed in its mechanical context. 
Cancer, however, permeates slowly from within:  
“It begins in silence. In the beginning no one knows what is happening 
inside. Then it begins its course. Ruins you from the inside. Until it 
consumes everything.” ( Weiss 1997:462) 
Weiss concluded that metaphors for heart attacks were more pragmatic, and less 
emotionally loaded or sad as cancer metaphors. Similar findings are reported by 
Emslie,  Hunt  and  Watt  (2001a)  in  their  study  in  the  West  of  Scotland.    The 
strength of the tragic in cancer metaphors may in part be explained by a lack of 
understanding.  MacFarlane  &  Kelleher  (2002)  found that cancer  was  the  only 
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the studies already detailed in this review (Balshem 1991; Weiss 1997; Scanlon 
et  al  2006)  have  found  that  participants  were  surer  of  the  causes  of  heart 
disease:  
‘When  they  say  heart  attack  I  see  fat  ambulatory  treatment,  fat 
dishes, hamburger, cigarettes, gym, smoking, weak person, a machine 
in need of fixing, pump, heart transplant, explosion, plumbing, heart 
palpitation’ (Weiss 1997:467)  
Heart disease, Davison found was often attended with humour (Davison, Frankel, 
& Davey Smith 1992). This is not echoed in any of the studies of cancer. What 
this brief comparison shows is that cancer and heart disease have very different 
meanings. This is likely to reflect the different ways in which the diseases are 
culturally framed.   
3.10 Conclusion: culture of cancer 
Much  of  the  previous  section  has  shown  that  cancer  has  a  distinct  cultural 
position. It is thought to be the ‘most feared’ disease, and even allowing for 
medical advances it continues to inhabit the terror ground. This terror and the 
associated uncertainty can be traced back to early experiences where a cancer 
diagnosis almost inevitably meant death. The manner of this death was always 
negative, characterised by a sudden shock or a long, painful demise. Early health 
promotion  efforts  hoped  to  demystify  the  disease  but  by  offering  only  small 
amounts of information tended to exacerbate cancer’s negative image.  Cancer 
is defined by shame and stigma and although this is perceived to be a somewhat 
old-fashioned view, modern media continues to emphasise fear and the stigma 
comes from the lack of hope or fight in the face of the disease. Any study of 
beliefs  about  cancer  and  how  they  are  developed  and  refined  needs  to  be 
mindful  of  the  disease’s  unique  cultural  position.77 
 
4. Aim & Research Questions 
4.1 Aim 
The study aims to explore beliefs about cancer and ascertain the utility of the 
ideas held within lay epidemiology in the formation of such beliefs  
4.2 Research Questions 
￿  What are typical views about cancer?  
￿  Does lay epidemiology offer an aid to our understanding of beliefs about 
cancer and cancer risk? 
￿  How  important  are  personal,  social,  cultural,  biomedical  and 
environmental  factors  in  the  formulation  of  beliefs  about  cancer  and 
cancer risk? 
￿  Is there any notion of candidacy in relation to cancer?  
￿  To  what  extent  are  anomalous  deaths  and  unwarranted  survivals 
employed in formulation of beliefs about cancer and cancer risk?  
￿  Do lay explanations view cancer as a homogenous disease or multi-site 
and multi-causal? 
￿  Are  there  differences  between  beliefs  in  deprived  and  affluent 
communities?   
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5. Methodological Considerations 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study was to explore whether features of ‘lay epidemiology’ 
could be found in beliefs about and explanations of cancer. Access to rich, in-
depth information was required. Moreover, the focus was not on cancer sufferers 
but  on  ‘ordinary’  views.  Qualitative  interviews  provide  an  ideal  vehicle  for 
generating  such  data.  A  qualitative  approach  was  proposed.  However,  ‘lay 
epidemiology’  is  an  already  established  theory  and  qualitative  work, 
conventionally,  seeks  not  to  test  theory  but  to  uncover  new  findings.  The 
methodological  challenge  for  this  study  was  to  locate  it  within  a  qualitative 
paradigm  despite  this  obvious  departure,  before  selecting  an  appropriate 
research strategy. The following chapter outlines those deliberations and the 
process of finding a method to fit. More detail of the methodological design of 
the study appears in the following chapter on methodological design.  
5.2 Background 
Unlike quantitative theses, those embarking on qualitative studies are expected 
to provide detail of their ontological and epistemological persuasion (Silverman 
2005). There are a number of ways to interpret this. It could point to the status 
of  qualitative  methods  as  the  ‘poor  relation’  in  social  sciences  research  and 
there is no doubt the method has struggled to gain credibility and acceptance. 
Alternatively,  the  requirement  could  be  viewed  in  a  more  positive  light.  By 
asking students to grapple with a set of complex issues and ideas that deviate 
from the received view, the result is a thorough grounding in the theoretical 
underpinning  of  their  work  and  the  ability  to  use  and  defend  their  chosen 
method with confidence. 
From its inception this study focused on the ‘lay’ voice. Despite modifications to 
the research questions in the early part of the study, the desire to locate and 
understand ‘ordinary’ views about cancer and how these were shaped remained 
constant. The aim was to build individual cancer narratives for each participant, 
detailing not only their current views but also to explore how and why they had 
arrived there. There was a need then for the ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) Chapter 5    79 
captured by qualitative enquiry. Once heralded as the method that ‘reaches the 
parts others can’t reach’ (Pope & Mays 1995) a qualitative approach not only 
allows the access to in-depth material, but also more importantly for this study, 
sheds light on the ‘process’ as well as the ‘outcome’.  
In the planning stages of the study the research question evolved to include the 
ideas found in an already established theory. By introducing the concepts found 
in lay epidemiology into the research questions, was the essence of this work 
hypothesis  testing?  Was  this  work  largely  deductive,  therefore  breaching  a 
cardinal rule of qualitative research? This posed a serious challenge, initially, 
and there was concern that it would struggle to ‘fit’ philosophically, within a 
qualitative paradigm. 
This chapter will look closely at the theoretical issues raised by this thesis, most 
notably  the  difficulty  associated  with  combining  qualitative  research  and 
existing  theory.  An  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  research  and 
theory is considered before ‘theory’ itself is explored. Epistemology, ontology 
and methodology are key to understanding the dominant paradigms and each 
will  be  discussed.  The  discussion  will  conclude  by  locating  the  study  in  an 
appropriate theoretical tradition (or traditions).  
5.3 Placing theory in the context of research  
Traditionally, the separation is drawn between deductive and inductive theory. 
It  could  be  argued  that  deductive  theory,  the  central  tenet  of  quantitative 
study, is being employed here rather than the inductive theory associated with a 
qualitative approach. The distinction is thought to be crucial and lies at the 
heart  of  the  quantitative/qualitative  debate.  Deductive  logic  follows  a 
sequential loop where theory leads to the development of a hypothesis that can 
be tested in experimental conditions; the outcome (either the verification or 
falsification of the hypothesis) is then fed back into the theory. The contrary 
position is inductive reasoning. In an inductive approach theory is the end result 
rather  than  the  starting  point.  Conventionally  then,  deductive  theory  is 
associated with quantitative work and inductive with qualitative work. Bryman 
(2004) however reminds us that the distinctions are not always straightforward. 
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opposing tradition. For example, Bryman highlighted that induction often takes 
place at the end of a deductive cycle by adding to the body of theory. Moreover, 
in a largely inductive approach, deduction can be found and is in fact a central 
feature  of  grounded  theory  (Glasser  &  Strauss  1967)  where  an  ‘iterative’ 
relationship between data and theory is encouraged from the outset. Silverman 
(2005, 2001) has argued that qualitative researchers frequently engage in testing 
theories, which demonstrates the maturity of the strategy.  
With this in mind then it is clear that the introduction of ‘theory’ in the early 
stages of this study does not immediately obviate its place within a qualitative 
paradigm. Further reflection on the research questions shows that the emphasis 
is not on hypothesis testing but rather on the exploration of the utility of the 
ideas found in lay epidemiology when applied to cancer, rather than deducing 
that lay epidemiology can, (or can’t) explain beliefs about cancer.  
5.4 Paradigms: ‘The complexity deepens the more you 
delve’ 
In  any  deliberation  of  theories  that  underpin  research,  their  complexity  is 
instantly  evident.  This  is  not  helped  by  authors’  use  of  a  wide  range  of 
jargonistic terms and the frequent overlap between descriptions of ‘paradigms’, 
‘traditions’ and ‘strategies’. For the purposes of this discussion it is helpful to 
organise these components in a hierarchy beginning first with a description of 
paradigms  followed  by  their  constituent  parts,  namely  epistemology  and 
ontology.  The  major  traditions  within  each  paradigm  will  then  be  described 
before specific research strategies are discussed.  
Within texts on the philosophy of science and social science, paradigms feature 
strongly.  Kuhn  (1970)  referred  to  a  paradigm  as  an  epistemological  and 
ontological view of the world, the ‘model’ in which science is located. It is a 
common set of principles that guide enquiry and offer solutions to problems. 
Although Kuhn believed that social sciences were in a pre-paradigmatic phase 
because there was, as yet, no dominant set of guiding principles it is common 
for the social sciences to be described in paradigmatic terms. Like Kuhn, Denzin 
& Lincoln (2000) describe paradigms as ‘a basic set of beliefs that guide actions’. 
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each  component  asks  a  specific  question.  Firstly,  epistemology  questions  the 
nature of knowledge and what can be known. Ontology is concerned with reality, 
and questions the nature of reality and finally methodology offers guidelines on 
how to gain knowledge about that reality.  
5.5 Epistemology: realism vs. interpretivism 
There are two main epistemological standpoints - realism and interpretivism. 
Realism, which is akin to positivism, asserts that social science should emulate 
natural science and arrive at ‘reality’ where a ‘truth’ can be found. The process 
is bound by already agreed and appropriate strategies of investigation and the 
investigated and investigator represent discrete entities. Studies within realism 
strip  away  bias,  and  results  can  be  replicated  and  widely  applied.  As  with 
natural science, the method of inquiry is experimental. Critics label it ‘naïve’ 
realism because it fails to acknowledge the importance of ‘structure’ and social 
reality. To counteract this Bhaskar (1978) offered critical realism, which trusts 
that  a  tangible  reality  exists  but  there is  more  than  one  way of  knowing  it. 
Further, critical realism allows for intangible ‘mechanisms’ whose effects can be 
observed (for example racism) rather than ‘knowing’ only what can be directly 
observed.  
Interpretivism  posits  an  alternative  epistemological  view.  It  distinguishes 
between the social and the natural world and rejects the possibility of studying 
the social world in the received ‘scientific’ view. The tradition embodies the 
Weberian notion of Verstehen, which loosely translated means ‘understanding’ 
or ‘appreciation’ (Tucker 1965). Weber believed that through ‘interpretation’ it 
was  possible  to  offer  explanations  for  social  phenomena,  and  to  extend  the 
scientific  observation  of  realism.  Similarly,  hermeneutics  and  phenomenology 
concern themselves with the study of how individuals make sense of their world. 
Schutz (1967) insisted that an alternative epistemological tradition is required 
because  quite  simply,  social  reality  means  something  to  humans,  and  their 
actions  are  inseparable  from  their  interpretation  of  ‘reality’.  Phenomenology 
then, attempts to see the world from the point of view of those being studied. 
Symbolic interactionism too has been placed within an interpretive paradigm, 
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interactionism is the notion that our sense of self is derived from the way in 
which others see us.  
5.6 Ontology: objectivism vs. constructionism 
Objectivism  views  social  phenomena  as  ‘facts’  that  exist  separately  from 
individuals or society. For example, Bryman (2004) asserted that organisations or 
culture  are  afforded  tangible  properties,  which  hold  within  them  distinct 
features  that  ensure  their  continuation.  The  opposing  view,  constructionism, 
sees phenomena as the creation of individuals and society, which are constantly 
changing and shifting. Even those of a constructionist persuasion acknowledge 
that there is some ‘reality’ because the extreme of this position is untenable, 
although some would argue that the way we reach an  understanding of such 
phenomena is in itself socially constructed. Such constructions will vary across 
time and place and in different cultures and communities.  
Intuitively,  an  exploration  of  lay  views  about  cancer  fits  within  the 
interpretivist/  constructionist  paradigm.  In  the  broadest  sense  the  research 
focus is on beliefs about health. Health, however, is an abstract term, which is 
difficult to scrutinise in scientific conditions, particularly because the meaning 
ascribed to it varies widely. In the 21st century, in the developed world, health 
has come to mean more than simply the absence of disease, and has adapted to 
incorporate new ways of thinking and developments. Further, health is likely to 
mean different things to different individuals and communities, both at different 
historical time points and within different cultures. In this study, comparisons 
are  made  between  views  in  affluent  and  deprived  communities  in  Glasgow. 
Observational studies show stark differences in mortality and morbidity between 
the two and it may be that the experience and meaning ascribed to ‘health’ will 
be different.  
5.7 Quantitative/Qualitative divide.  
Positivism is the paradigm associated with quantitative research and the answers 
to  questions  of  epistemology  and  ontology  appear  relatively  simple.  Crudely, 
within positivism, it is accepted that there is a single reality that can be studied 
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(epistemology) and that there are established techniques or strategies that allow 
the pertinent questions to be answered (methodology). It is worth noting that 
Guba and Lincoln (2000) suggested that although the term ‘qualitative’ is often 
used as the umbrella term for a number of paradigms, they prefer its use to be 
confined to a description of methods. They believed that qualitative methods 
have been and continue to be employed in a positivist framework.  
5.8 Theoretical traditions 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000), when charting the history of qualitative research, 
described five main epochs of qualitative method. This provides a helpful way of 
contextualising the method and shows how it has evolved into its present guise. 
They  began  with  the  traditional  period,  which  started  around  1900  and 
culminated  with  post-modernism  from  1990  onwards.  The  most  industrious 
period,  from  1950-70,  was  a  moment  of  “creative  ferment”  that  saw  the 
emergence of the qualitative enquiry proper. A number of interpretive theories, 
including ethnomethodology, phenomenology, and critical theory all emerged at 
this time. This period then gave way to a time dominated by “blurred genres 
where researchers had a full complement of paradigms, methods and strategies 
to  employ  in  their  research”  (Denzin  &  Lincoln  2000:9).  All  of  the  major 
methodological  movements  were  by  now  established.  In  recent  times, 
methodology  has  a  postmodernist  feel,  and  the  critical  may  describe  it  as  a 
methodological ‘free for all’.  
Despite this ‘full complement’, Guba & Lincoln (2000) claimed that four basic 
inquiry  paradigms  inform  everything  else:  positivism,  postpositivism,  critical 
theory  and  constructivism.  Positivism  and  postpositivism,  are  seen  as  falling 
within  the  tradition  of  realism/objectivism,  while  critical  theory  and 
constructivism inhabit the interpretive/constructionist paradigm.  
Denzin and Lincoln (2000) proposed that the research process should follow a 
standard pattern. First, researchers should place themselves within a paradigm, 
decide upon epistemology and ontology, and this would in turn prescribe the 
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“ All research is interpretive, guided by a set of beliefs and feelings 
about the world and how it should be understood and studied. Some 
of these beliefs may be taken for granted, only assumed; others are 
highly  problematic  and  controversial.  However,  each  interpretive 
paradigm makes particular demands on the researcher, including the 
questions that are asked and the interpretations that are brought to 
them.” (Denzin & Lincoln 2000:13) 
More  recently  there  has  been  a  shift  in  emphasis.  Qualitative  research  is 
becoming  more  pragmatic.  Silverman  (2005)  and  Bryman  (2004)  for  example, 
advocate a process which begins with the research question. The starting point 
should not be the paradigm. Methods are chosen because of their suitability in 
answering the question. Of course, it is unlikely that researchers who feel at 
home in one tradition would ask ‘incongruous’ questions. So, the researchers’ 
beliefs  are  likely  to  colour  research  projects  from  the  outset.  In  itself,  this 
reflection is important philosophically as it demonstrates the centrality of the 
researcher to the process.  
The newfound pragmatism negates the necessity of being overly concerned with 
epistemological  and  ontological  questions.  However,  it  is  naive  to  assume 
research studies are themselves conducted in value free vacuums. The focus on 
the  ‘lay’ and  not  scientific  view  of cancer  in  itself  hints  at  the  rejection  of 
realism. Giving equal weight to a variety of different lay views demonstrates an 
acceptance of a constructivist ontology where no single truth is sought, or even 
required.  However,  the  duality  of  positions  in  realism  and  interpretivism  or 
objectivism  and  constructionsism  fails  to  capture  the  spectrum  of  positions 
between  the  polarised  extremes.  In  reality  research  is  more  likely  to  exist 
somewhere  in  the  middle.  Hammersley’s  (1992)  ‘subtle’  realism  offers  an 
attractive alternative. It could be described as a common sense approach, which 
allows  that,  while  there  is  no  ‘certainty’  in  knowledge,  there  are  areas  of 
knowledge that can be judged true based on being both credible and plausible. 
Yet, subtle realism also allows for multiple truths or realities, giving comfort to 
social constructionists. Hammersley states that the job of social research is not, 
as positivism or realism would suggest, to reproduce reality but to represent a 
credible and plausible version of it. Nevertheless, subtle realism remains within 
the  positivist  school  and  its  adoption  could  be  seen  as  imposing  a  positivist 
framework on an essentially interpretive endeavour.  Chapter 5    85 
Social constructionsim chimes in with the basis of  this study in an important 
way, namely that it acknowledges that the result of research is a construct of 
the interaction between the researcher and the researched. Not the production 
of independent data waiting to be unearthed. It is data-generation rather than 
collection (Barbour 2003) with the researcher playing a central role. Ordinary 
views about cancer will not be articulated in precise lay epidemiology concepts, 
though clues to the utility of the concept will emerge in the individual narratives 
told throughout the interviews. These were not however narratives waiting to be 
told, as they might be for cancer patients. Indeed, placing their ideas in the 
context of lay epidemiology was not natural for them; it was a construct placed 
upon  them.  Moreover  the  impact  of  social  factors  on  these  views  is  clearly 
understood. 
5.9 An embarrassment of choices 
As well as the epistemological and ontological standpoint the actual research 
strategy  employed  is  of  obvious  importance.  A  number  of  strategies  were 
considered but it was clear that no one strategy coincided precisely with the 
research question. Phenomenology, for example, aims to capture the essence of 
lived experiences and is a method that is useful when researching the impact of 
an illness or particular event on a patient’s life. So, if this study were looking 
specifically at the ‘lived experience’ of cancer, a phenomenological approach 
may have been apt. This study is subtlety different because it did not aim to 
explore  a  particular  experience,  instead  it  sought  explore  belief  frameworks 
about cancer among the ‘ordinary’ public. Ethnography too, offered a possible 
strategy but crucially traditional ethnography demands some time immersed in 
‘the  field’  observing  the  reality  of  communities.  From  this  perspective 
ethnography is often regarded as descriptive rather than interpretive, and would 
therefore have represented a significant paradigmatic shift for this study. The 
distinction between data excavation and data construction needs to be made 
and both phenomenology and ethnography could be viewed as excavation tools. 
Though  not  without  flaws,  grounded  theory  provides  a  useful  template  for 
analysis and this study is therefore influenced by, but does not claim to follow, a 
pure grounded theory approach.  
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5.10 Grounded theory  
Glaser & Strauss (1965, 1967) developed the ‘grounded theory approach’ during 
their studies of the end of life during the 1960s. It was a direct response to the 
dominance of quantitative methods, as Charmaz comments: 
“ In the Discovery of Grounded Theory, Barney G Glasser and Anselm 
L  Strauss  (1967)  set  forth  a  powerful  rhetoric  of  change  from  the 
quantitative cannon to legitimize qualitative enquiry.” (Charmaz K 
2009:128) 
Grounded  theory  offered  a  systematic  method  for  carrying  out  qualitative 
research.  Originally  grounded  theory  featured  a  number  of  crucial  tenets: 
coding, memo-writing, constant comparative analysis and theoretical sampling. 
At its heart was the notion that the theory should emerge from the data, and 
that analysis should be iterative with emergent theories being fed back into the 
data collection process. Thus making additions and refinements to the questions 
and seeking out specific participants to test emergent themes. The theory has 
altered  since  its  development  and  although  Glaser  (1978,  1992)  largely 
maintained his original position, Strauss diversified and through work with Corbin 
concentrated specifically on grounded theory as an  analytical tool (Strauss & 
Corbin  1990).  While  Strauss  has  urged  researchers  to  take  a  smorgasbord 
approach to grounded theory, his description remains prescriptive as he insists 
on the inclusion of most of the original elements.  
Grounded theory is not without its critics. A common problem associated with 
the method is the idea that researchers should enter the field of study with no 
preconceived  ideas;  that  they  approach  it  as  a  ‘blank  canvas’.  Any  theory 
emerging does so naturally rather than as a result of the researcher’s previous 
orientation.  Silverman  (2001)  has  rejected  this  notion  and  cautioned  against 
data  gathering  without  any  analytic  basis.  Bryman  (2004)  too  questioned  the 
intelligence  of  such  a  position  and  suggested  that  to  wipe  clean  any  prior 
knowledge  and  learning  does  research  a  disservice.  Pure  grounded  theory 
however is both impractical and almost impossible to achieve, and as Barbour 
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“ We (researchers) have some notion, even at the outset, of what our 
data  are  likely  to  look  like  and  what  we  intend  to  do  with  it” 
(Barbour 2003:1022) 
Despite this, grounded theory has recently become synonymous with ‘quality’ in 
qualitative  research.  Barbour  (2003)  warned  of  the  technical  essentialism 
associated with the acceptability of qualitative research. There is a sense that in 
seeking to make qualitative work fit in with a received view, it may lose its 
essence.  So  although,  as  Barbour  (2001)  reflected  that  grounded  theory  has 
become ‘an approving bumper sticker’ (Bryman & Burgess 1994), the analytic 
tool – constant comparison of data – intuitively ‘fitted’ here. More attention is 
paid to the analytic methods in the following chapter.  
5.11 Chapter Summary 
Placing  this  study  neatly  within  a  single  research  paradigm  was  initially 
problematic. The aims and objectives were clear but it was not always obvious 
that  it  neatly  fitted  any  of  the  conventional  ‘perspectives’.  Instead,  it  was 
important  to  first  locate  the  study  in  an  epistemological  and  ontological 
paradigm.  Seeking  views  about  cancer  and  the  utility  of  lay  epidemiology 
required an interpretation of the stories told and views offered rather than the 
uncovering  of  one  true  story.  Moreover  the  stories  and  interpretations  were 
constructed  via  the  interaction  between  the  researcher  and  respondent.  It 
seemed  then  that  this  study  naturally  fell  into  the  social  constructionist 
paradigm, despite the difficulties with this position. An extreme constructionist 
view necessitates that all knowledge is ‘new’, with nothing to build on. As Morse 
warned: 
“The practice of some qualitative researchers of refusing to consult 
the literature and refusing to place the theory within the context of 
the  work  that  has  already  been  published  is  a  serious  problem.  It 
results  in  a  plethora  of  small  and  competing  contributions  to  the 
literature. These contributions are not additive, they do not build on 
what  has  been  published  before;  thus,  qualitative  inquiry  as  a 
discipline makes only a minor impact and has trouble demonstrating 
its contribution to science.” (Morse 2000:715) 
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Primarily this study was pursued with pragmatism. It accepts Strauss’ (Strauss & 
Corbin  1990)  invitation  to  adopt  a  smorgasbord  approach  when  considering 
methods.  A  discussion  of  the  methodological  design  and  process  follows. 89 
6. Methodological Design 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first, design, outlines the research 
plan, while the second outlines the research process. Both include descriptions 
of  sampling,  methodological  technique,  namely  interviewing,  and  finally, 
analysis.  
6.1 Sampling Strategy  
6.1.1 Design 
A  number  of  sampling  strategies  are  available  to  the  qualitative  researcher. 
These  are  principally  theoretical  or  purposive  sampling,  though  convenience 
sampling  and  snowballing  may  also  be  employed.  The  validity  of  relying  on 
convenience techniques has been questioned (Richie & Lewis 2003). The chosen 
strategy  should  reflect  the  aims  of  the  study  and  the  degree  of  prescription 
about the characteristics of the sample will reflect both the strategy adopted 
and the research questions.  
Theoretical and purposive sampling strategies are often set out as two distinct 
approaches  but  Mason  (1996)  regards  them  as  more  or  less  identical.  A  fluid 
approach  to  sampling  is  assumed  and  it  aims  to  deal  with  gaps  or  address 
interesting findings that emerge early in the research process. The tool is closely 
aligned to Glaser and Strauss’ Grounded Theory (1967). They outlined it as a 
method: 
“whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data 
and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in 
order to develop his theory as it emerges.” (Glasser & Strauss 1967 
p45)  
Purposive sampling similarly targets respondents with certain characteristics but 
these are generally fixed from the study’s outset and a sampling frame, which 
allocates the sample population to appropriate groupings, is produced to inform 
the strategy. While neither strategy claims to be representative an attempt has 
been made to access a wide range of views. In discussing the approaches Lewis 
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“Both  rely  on  the  use  of  prescribed  selection  criteria,  although 
prescription takes place at different stages of the research.” (Lewis 
2003:82) 
The strategy adopted in this study was more purposive than theoretical in the 
Glaser and Strauss sense. The aim of this study, to obtain lay views and beliefs 
about  cancer,  was  clear.  Shaw  (2002)  alerted  researchers  to  the  difficulties 
associated  with  studies  that  claim  to  report  a  ‘lay’  view.  Often  quasi-
professional  language  is  adopted  by  patients  and  Shaw  argued  that  many 
patients take on expert role in the management of their illness. The result is a 
viewpoint not typically associated with the laity. Cancer patients were unlikely 
to offer a genuinely lay view and as such were excluded from this study. Carers, 
it could equally be argued, may be experts and certainly many are likely to ‘live’ 
through  the  illness  with  the  patient.  Deciding  whether  carers’  views  were 
sufficiently  lay  was  a  significant  challenge  for  this  study.  Ultimately,  it  was 
judged that the common incidence and prevalence of cancer may make a sample 
‘unaffected’  by  cancer  difficult  to  recruit.  Moreover,  if  carers  were  to  be 
excluded, a definition of ‘carer’ would have to be reached. Such a definition 
would have necessitated arbitrary judgements to be made about ‘closeness’ and 
as Chapter 7 shows closeness and relationships within families are not always 
logical.  Those  who  regarded  themselves  as  carers  were  included  and  on 
reflection,  in  the  context  of  a  high  cancer  incidence  and  prevalence,  their 
inclusion  may  be  more  likely  to  represent  an  ‘ordinary’  view  than  those 
unaffected by cancer.  
The  description  of  the  lay  epidemiology  concept  in  Chapter  2  shows  that 
information to populate health belief models is gathered from many sources. 
Among them are wider community networks. The original ethnography carried 
out by Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith (1991) took place in three communities 
in South Wales. Salant and Gehlert (2008) in their study of lay epidemiology and 
breast  cancer  risk  suggested  that  arriving  at  a  definition  of  community  is 
challenging.  Ordinarily,  community  simply applies to  a  geographical  boundary 
that is drawn to ascertain socio-economic and structural characteristics; often to 
decide need and allocate resources. This accurate but administrative definition 
tells  little  of  what  it  means  to  live  in  a  community.  Notwithstanding  the 
difficulties  in  definition,  if  community  is  important  in  ordinary  views,  the 
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Glasgow, a city now infamous for the striking health gradients between affluent 
and  deprived,  it  was  apt  to  reflect  both  constituencies.  Indeed,  as  the 
background  and  introduction  in  Chapter  1  outlined,  the  administrative 
boundaries have allowed the identification of very different cancer experiences 
between the affluent and the deprived.  
There were therefore two main criteria to consider when sampling. First, that 
cancer patients should be excluded and second, that the views from affluent and 
deprived  communities  should  be  accessed.  The  sampling  frame  and  strategy 
were relatively straightforward. However, the strategy represented something of 
a departure from usual approaches. While theoretical and purposive strategies 
seek to ensure that a range of views and experiences are accessed, this study 
did not begin from this starting point. Instead it aimed to uncover a variety of 
phenomena that contributed to ‘ordinary’ beliefs about cancer. What was sought 
was the ordinary view and in that respect the study did not seek to fill quotas.  
Samples in qualitative studies are typically small. There are both theoretical and 
practical reasons for this. Qualitative data does not aim to generalise findings to 
a  wider  population,  so  large  numbers  are  not  required  to  ensure  validity.  In 
addition, qualitative research is data heavy and labour intensive, particularly if 
approached conscientiously (Richie, Lewis and Elam 2003). This study aimed to 
carry out 40 interviews, 20 in each community. It was judged that this number 
would allow a meaningful comparison between communities. 
6.1.2 Process 
The first step in the sampling process was to select the communities in Glasgow. 
The  communities  were  selected  primarily  because  of  their  health  statistics. 
Bearsden and Milngavie are suburbs of Glasgow and are locally recognised as 
affluent  communities.  The  towns  form  part  of  the  East  Dunbartonshire  local 
government district, which was recently voted one of the best places to live in 
Scotland
9. Life expectancy for the area is high
10 and the health behaviour profile 
reflects that of other affluent areas. Conversely, Glasgow’s east end has become 
synonymous  with  poor  health.  It  is  an  area  of  high  unemployment  and 
                                         
9 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/north_east/8421193.stm 
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experiences  the  multifarious  problems  associated  with  socioeconomic 
disadvantage. The study initially targeted Shettleston, primarily because of the 
‘Shettleston man’
11 media coverage, but expanded to other areas of Glasgow’s 
east end.  
Recruiting  participants  from  general  practice  populations  was  considered 
initially. It was planned that letters would be distributed to a random sample of 
general  practice  patients  in  both  communities.  The  distribution  of  patient 
information would take place over a discreet time period. For example, every 
fifth patient attending their doctor, over the course of a specified time period, 
who met the inclusion criteria, would receive a letter of invitation. A number of 
problems were anticipated with this method. First, inviting patients, via their GP 
practice,  to  participate  in  a  study  about  cancer  could  potentially  cause 
confusion and distress. Second, it was thought likely that those who attended 
their  general  practice  more  than  once  over  the  defined  time  period  might 
receive  multiple  invitations.  Even  misconstrued  coercion  was  best  avoided. 
Finally, in light of Shaw’s (2002) caution, it was thought that selecting ‘patients’ 
from a healthcare setting would compromise the lay and ordinary nature of the 
study.  
To satisfy the aims of the study it was decided that volunteers should be sought 
from community organisations. Health-related groups were excluded, again in an 
attempt  to  avoid  the  ‘lay-expert’  health  view.  A  variety  of  community 
organisations  and  leisure  clubs  were  contacted  in  each  community.  This  was 
done both by email and a more conventional mail-shot. In Bearsden/Milngavie 
many  local  organisations  were  listed  on  the  East  Dunbartonshire  Council’s 
website.  The  Community  Health  Partnership  in  Glasgow’s  east  end  keep  a 
database of community organisations. Due to data protection guidelines, they 
were unable to share the data base but agreed to contact the groups on the 
study’s  behalf.  Local  political  parties,  community  councils,  tenants’ 
organisations  and  churches  of  all  faiths  in  each  area  were  also  approached. 
Posters  were  displayed  in  libraries  and  community  centres.  A  full  list  of  the 
organisations contacted is available in Appendix 2.  
                                         
11 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/glasgow_and_west/7227953.stm Chapter 6    93 
 
6.2 Data Generation 
6.2.1 Design 
Like sampling strategies, there are a number of strategies available within the 
cannon  of  qualitative  methods  to  generate  data.  Observation  methods  were 
quickly  dismissed  because  it  was  felt  that  these  would  not  provide  the  data 
required to meet the aims of this study. Consideration therefore needed to be 
given to whether focus groups or interviews would best suit the purpose. Focus 
groups  are  ideal  for  generating  a  certain  type  of  data  that  draws  on  the 
interaction between group members (Kitzinger and Barbour 1999). Although an 
argument could have been made for using focus groups for this study because of 
its  community  perspective,  there  was  the  danger  that  the  discussions  could 
simply have become a trade in cancer anecdotes. Rather, this study hoped to 
generate rich data that encapsulated thoughts and beliefs about cancer and in 
depth interviews provided the most likely vehicle for this. Moreover, the original 
lay  epidemiology  model  as  described  by  Davison  and  colleagues  (1991)  was 
derived from data generated during one-to-one interviews and it was felt apt to 
replicate this method, if useful comparisons were to be made.  
Most qualitative research is carried out by some form of interview despite it 
being ‘hard, creative, active work’ (Mason 1996:67). Such popularity has meant 
that  there  are  many  texts  available  that  offer  hints  on  how  to  carry  out 
interviews. For example, Kvale (1996) suggested that there are ten important 
skills that any qualitative researcher should possess and nine different types of 
questions.  A  more  helpful  summary  was  offered  by  Mason  (1996)  who 
recommended that qualitative interviews include the following ‘core’ features. 
Interviews should resemble an informal dialogue that is guided by themes or 
topics and crucially, there must be recognition that the product of the interview 
reflects a ‘construction’. The ideal interviews therefore are what Burgess (1984) 
called  ‘conversations  with  purpose’,  though  this  ‘touchy-feely’  language  may 
betray the complexity of good interviewing. The various skills associated with in-
depth interviewing were summarised by Legard, Keegan and Ward (2003):  
“First the ability of the researcher to listen is fundamental to the art 
of interviewing. The researcher must hear, digest and comprehend Chapter 6    94 
the participant’s answers in order how to decide to probe further. 
Second,  good  in-depth  interviewing  requires  a  clear,  logical  mind. 
The  researcher  needs  to  be  able  to  think  quickly  to  distil  the 
essential points of what the participant is saying, exercise judgement 
about  what  to  pursue,  and  simultaneously  formulate  the  relevant 
question. Third, a good memory is an important attribute. It is often 
necessary to make a mental note of a point made earlier on by the 
participant and return to it at the judicious moment in the interview 
to seek further clarification or elaboration.” (Legard, Keegan & Ward 
2003:142)  
Given the repertoire of necessary skills, and the ability for participants either to 
clam up or ramble it is evident that unearthing helpful data is demanding. Not 
‘getting  at’  the  required  data  is  not  the  only  problem  associated  with 
interviews. Bordieu (1977) argued that interviews are the least effective method 
because the information given by participants is a “public account” that tells 
interviewers  what  they  want  to  hear  or  what  participants  are  comfortable 
disclosing. Bordieu suggested observation methods be used to counteract this 
but such a method was not applicable in this study. Alternatively a series of 
interviews with the same cohort of participants may foster the emergence of 
‘private accounts’ (Cornwell 1984). Though such an approach may have been 
beneficial in this study, it was dismissed on purely practical grounds. 
6.2.2 Interview process  
Semi-structured  and  unstructured  formats  are  both  used  in  qualitative 
interviews, although many suggest that even the most unstructured interviews 
will  have  some  structured elements  (Mason  1996;  Collins  1998).  Unstructured 
interviews generally begin with loosely focused questions. Subsequent questions 
and prompts are individually tailored in response to the interviewee’s answers. A 
level of structure may be employed to ensure a level of consistency throughout 
the  interviews.  The  interview  process  in  this  study  followed  a  largely 
unstructured approach but it also sought to ensure that the key concepts in lay 
epidemiology were sufficiently covered. A number of key ideas were introduced 
in each interview and the topic guide reflected this (Appendix 7). The concepts 
of risk estimation, candidacy, anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivals all 
required exploration in interviews. Lay epidemiology as a concept is relatively 
jargon-heavy so it was necessary to find a more familiar and informal language. 
This was done by first asking participants to talk about people they had known Chapter 6    95 
who  had  had  cancer.  Participants’  responses,  in  the  form  of  narratives  and 
anecdotes, provided the opportunity to probe further details and explore the 
impact of the experience of others. Participants were then asked to consider any 
apparent similarities between sufferers and reflect on the extent that they met 
with their ideas about ‘who gets cancer’. It was this line of questioning that 
allowed the exploration of the notion of cancer candidacy. Such discussions also 
facilitated the discussion of anomalies. Prior to the interviews it was anticipated 
that children might be identified as anomalies and  as such participants were 
asked  to  comment  on  children’s  cancer.  It  was  important  to  establish  which 
types of narratives are entered into explanatory models. Asking participants to 
recall  cases  of  celebrity  cancer  would  initiate  the  discussion  of  the  relative 
importance of narratives. As well as asking about lay epidemiology the study also 
sought to access participants’ reflections on different types of cancer. Clinically 
and epidemiologically cancer is treated as a multisite and multi-causal disease 
and  the  study  questioned  whether  the  views  of  the  lay  public  mirrored  the 
experts  in  this  respect.  Despite  this  need  for  structural  consistency  it  was 
equally important that the interview was flexible enough to permit additional 
salient themes to emerge.  
6.2.2.1  The interview 
The  interviews  took  place  between  July  2007  and  June  2008.  All  interviews 
began with a description of the aims of the study. Rather than introduce lay 
epidemiology, the stated aim of the study was to gather ‘ordinary’ views about 
cancer.  The  information  shared  with  participants  prior  to  the  interview  had 
outlined  that  the  study  was  part  of  a  PhD  project  and  many  participants 
remembered  this.  This  automatically  labelled  the  researcher  as  a  student. 
Establishing roles within an interview situation has an impact on the outcome of 
the process, and the ‘student’ status of the researcher provided distance from 
the ‘expert’ view (Richards and Emslie 2000). Although in this context neither 
the  interviewer  nor  the  interviewee  was  ‘expert’,  it  was  not  uncommon  for 
participants to state: ‘Well, you’ll know more than me’ and participants often 
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6.2.2.2  Fieldnotes 
There is some disagreement about how fieldnotes should be collected and more 
specifically  what  information  they  should  include  (Emerson  et  al  2001). 
Fieldnotes were collated in this study after each interview. These gave general 
observations about the interview, how it had progressed and impressions on the 
interviewee. In particular, anything that marked them out. Even from the very 
early interviews it was apparent that the perceived closeness or ‘proximity’ to 
cancer  was  important  and  that  this  was  likely  to  frame  participants’  overall 
beliefs. Fieldnotes then became a statement of proximity for each participant 
and more detailed ‘proximity vignettes’ appear in Appendix 10. 
6.3 Analysis 
6.3.1 Design 
The  utilisation  of  theory  from  the  outset  of  the  study  meant  that  the  big 
‘themes’  were  already  determined.  As  such,  adopting  a  framework-type 
approach  (Richie  &  Spencer  1993)  to  the  analysis  may  have  been  useful  but 
ultimately it was decided that the approach may stifle the analysis. Although the 
themes were pre-determined the analytic process had to be flexible enough to 
allow  other  important  themes  to  emerge.  If,  for  example,  candidacy  had  no 
application in the data, the analyses would have to explore other themes and 
avenues that might illuminate the content of lay beliefs of cancer.  
As  the  previous  chapter  on  methodological  considerations  demonstrated,  a 
version of the grounded theory method was adapted. The constant comparative 
method  of  looking at  transcripts  and  data  was  used  as  an  analytic  tool.  The 
method allows for the analysis of a single case but at the same time incorporates 
cross-case  analysis.  According  to  Glaser  and  Strauss  (1967)  the  constant 
comparative  method has  four  clear  stages:  comparing  incidents  applicable  to 
each category, integrating categories, defining the theory and finally writing the 
theory. Clearly the presence of the ‘theory’ from the beginning gave the analysis 
a focus but the analysis did seek to provide a theory about the utility of lay 
epidemiology. The study was not embarked on with preconceived ideas about 
the value of lay epidemiology in this context and no hypothesis was tested. From 
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6.3.2 Analytic process 
The first task in the analytic process is to assign codes to the data that will be 
built on to create a coding frame. Developing and refining a coding frame is vital 
because it allows the systematic exploration of data. Individual elements within 
lay  epidemiology  provided  the  starting  point  for  the  coding  frame.  Although 
beginning the process with fixed codes in mind is not always usual in grounded 
theory,  Kelle  (1997)  maintained  that  we  are  most  likely  to  embark  on  any 
analysis with a set of a prioi codes, which are distinct from the nvivo codes that 
emerge from, and are grounded in, the data.  
Each interview was transcribed verbatim and as is customary with good practice 
in qualitative analysis, each recording was listened to after the interview and 
again on receipt of the transcript. Initial codes, based on the a priori codes from 
lay epidemiology, were applied to the transcripts. Thereafter new codes were 
developed and added as patterns and themes emerged. The analysis followed a 
circular rather than linear process and the coding frame went through a number 
of iterations. The a priori coding frame and the final coding frame appear in 
Appendix  8.  Codes  from  the  initial  coding  frame  were  applied  to  all  the 
transcripts. However, re-reading the transcripts often provided new avenues or 
possibilities and where appropriate new codes were added. This is consistent 
with the constant comparative and iterative approach. The data were initially 
coded  manually  before  the  coding  frame  and  transcripts  were  entered  into 
Nvivo
12.  The  data  were  anonymised  before  being  entered  into  Nvivo.  The 
organisation of nodes and trees gives a helpful ‘filing cabinet’ to store data (See 
Appendix 9). So, rather than use Nvivo as an analytical prop, it was used merely 
as a catalogue and reference system. As Mason reminded us: 
“Computers  cannot  perform  the  creative  and  intellectual  task  of 
devising categories, of deciding which categories or types of data are 
relevant to the process being investigated or what is a meaningful 
comparison,  or  of  generating  appropriate  research  questions  and 
propositions with which to interrogate the data.”(Mason 1996:108) 
Coding and organising the data is simply the first step to the analysis proper. The 
data need to be constantly checked and rechecked and eventually stories begin 
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to take shape. While much is written about coding, this stage in the process is 
given little attention: 
“This is an aspect of analysis that tends not to be described in full, 
being  something  that  the  researcher  picks  up  along  the  way.” 
(Barbour 2008:215) 
The constant comparative method of reading and re-reading transcripts has been 
described  as  ‘a  painstaking  and  somewhat  unglamorous  process’  (Barbour 
2008:217). Yet this meticulous and conscientious exercise is what gives rise to 
the emergence of the impressions and feelings about the data:  
“Ideas occur to us when they please, not when it pleases us... Yet 
ideas would certainly not come to mind had we not brooded at our 
desks and searched for answers with passionate devotion.” (Weber 
1918)  
Interpreting  the  data  generated  in  interviews  was  central  to  this  study. 
Participants  provided  a  series  of  narratives  to  evidence  their  views  and  the 
analytic task was judging whether the concepts in lay epidemiology applied to 
the data. 
6.4 Ethical considerations and approval 
As shown in section 6.1.2 on the sampling and recruitment process, a number of 
ethical matters were considered when deciding how study participants might be 
recruited.  Cancer  is  for  many  a  sensitive  area  and,  as  the  literature  review 
highlighted, is a topic often attended with fear. This was among the reasons for 
deciding to ensure that the recruitment did not have a healthcare focus. It was 
possible that some patients may receive the invitation via their GP practice and 
misunderstand the aims of the study and become distressed.  
The  decision  to  recruit  participants  from outside  the  National Health  Service 
resulted in an ethical permission being sought from the University of Glasgow’s 
Faculty of Medicine Research Ethics Committee. Ethical Approval was granted by 
the committee in June 2007 (Appendix 1).  
Community  organisations  were  contacted  once  either  by  letter  or  email 
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community  centres.  Any  additional  was  initiated  by  the  organisation  or  the 
individual  volunteer.  Involvement  was  on  an  entirely  voluntary  basis.  Some 
organisations  invited  the  researcher  to  attend  a  meeting  to  provide  further 
information. Others contacted the researcher directly. Any community volunteer 
was  provided  with  an  information  sheet  (Appendix  5),  and  consented  to 
providing  the  researcher  with  contact  details.  They  were  given  48  hours  to 
decide if they wanted to take part in the study. The researcher then contacted 
the  volunteer  by  telephone,  again  to  assess  interest  and  where  appropriate 
arrange a suitable time for interview. Prior to the interview, participants were 
informed  of  the  purpose  of  the  interview  and  the  consent  form  was  then 
discussed  in  full  (Appendix  6).  It  was  made  clear  that  they  were  free  to 
withdraw at any point and could choose not to answer any questions. Interviews 
were recorded with participants’ permission. One participant refused permission 
for the interview to be recorded. All participant data were kept in accordance 
with  the  University  of  Glasgow’s  data  handling  and  research  governance 
procedures
13.  
Cancer can be an upsetting area for some and it was anticipated that some of 
the participants may experience distress during the course of the interviews. 
Few participants became distressed during the course of the interviews. As an 
experienced interviewer it was possible to handle these situations empathically.  
6.5 Rigour in qualitative research 
The ability to adopt a ‘smorgasbord’ approach in qualitative research has led to 
questions  about  its  rigour.  There  remains  little  agreement  on  how  best  to 
guarantee rigour, though numerous guidelines and checklists provide hints and 
tips (Hoddinot & Pill 1997; Seale & Silverman 1997; Rogers et al 1998). The lists 
are not uniform, and contain a range measures thought to add rigour to the 
process, including: the transparency of the researcher’s role or using computer 
programmes to aid analysis. Collectively, they display a lack of agreement on 
the ‘right way’ to approach qualitative research and fail to capture the need for 
pragmatism in the qualitative research endeavour. Indeed, opting for one over 
the other introduces the danger of scrabbling for what Barbour (2001) termed, 
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the ‘technical fixes’ that have come to represent a proxy for quality. This does 
not suggest that quality should not be considered, yet some of the techniques 
like  triangulation,  respondent  validation,  and  multiple  coding,  were  not 
applicable in this study (Pope & Mays 2000). This should not detract from the 
rigorous approach adopted in this study.  
 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlined the methodological design and process of the study. The 
sample  was  recruited  from  community  organisations  and  leisure  clubs  in  two 
communities in Glasgow. One affluent and one deprived. The sample was chosen 
to  reflect  ‘ordinary’  views  A  total  of  31  interviews  were  conducted.  The 
interviews  were  loosely  structured  and  a  topic  guide  ensured  consistency 
throughout the interviews. Interview participants were asked to provide details 
about cases of cancer known to them. The data generated in interviews were 
analysed  by  adopting  the  constant  comparative  method  utilised  in  grounded 
theory approaches.  
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7. Findings  
7.1 Findings introduction 
Although the interview topic guide and the means of coding those conversations 
into themes have been discussed in the previous chapter, it is useful to briefly 
revisit this as it provides an outline for the findings chapter. The primary aim of 
this study was to consider the utility of the ‘lay epidemiology’ concept when 
exploring beliefs about cancer. The interviews were informal discussions that 
centred  on  the  participants’  experience  of  cancer.  A  range  of  themes  were 
introduced  in  each  interview  to  ensure  consistency,  though  in  keeping  with 
qualitative  work  generally,  the  interviews  were  flexible  enough  to  allow 
participants to introduce subjects important and unique to them  
The aim of this chapter is first to introduce the sample in more detail. It focuses 
on the demographic characteristics of the sample. The findings have then been 
grouped under three main headings or sections: experience of cancer, meaning 
and understanding of cancer, and finally, lay epidemiology. Essentially the first 
theme, experience of cancer provides a routine description of the information 
imparted during interviews. The second theme, meaning and understanding of 
cancer, illustrates how this experience has shaped participants’ views of cancer. 
The  final  section  looks  specifically  at  whether  these  views  and  experiences 
suggest that a lay epidemiological perspective is adopted when thinking about 
cancer.  Both  the  sections  on  meaning  and  understanding  and,  to  a  greater 
extent, the lay epidemiology theme are not descriptions but interpretations of 
the interview data.   
The aim is first to describe the participants’ experience of cancer. Here the 
focus is on details of individual cases known to the participants as well as to 
explore  different  sources  of  information.  Participants  have  been  assigned 
pseudonyms  throughout.  What  emerged  from  the  experiences  shared  by 
participants in the interviews was an insight into the process of developing an 
explanatory  framework  of  cancer.  From  close  personal  experiences  and 
knowledge gleaned from wider, and often removed sources, participants built a 
personal  evidence  base.  While  each  is  uniquely  tailored  to  the  participant’s 
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understanding. Finally lay epidemiology and its relevance to cancer beliefs will 
be  scrutinised.  Held  within  lay  epidemiology  are  a  number  of  crucial 
components, including candidacy, anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivals. 
Each of these will be considered. It is notable that both the chapters on meaning 
and  understanding  of  cancer  and  lay  epidemiology  assume  a  more  discursive 
tone, and data relevant to the findings of this study is introduced. The final 
chapter  on  lay  epidemiology  in  particular  consistently  contrasts  the  findings 
from this study with Davison’s.  
Although the findings are presented in linear, sequential logic, there is overlap 
between  each  section.  This  is  especially  true  of  those  sections that  consider 
meaning  and  understanding  and  lay  epidemiology.  Explanations  of  cause  or 
aetiology for example are found across the chapters.  
7.2 Introducing the sample 
A total of 31 individuals agreed to participate in the interviews. Most interviews 
took place in the participants’ homes, although five opted to be interviewed at 
the Section of General Practice and Primary Care, University of Glasgow. One 
participant chose to be interviewed at her workplace. All interviews were taped 
with respondents’ permission, only one respondent refused permission and on 
one  occasion  the  recording  equipment  failed.  All  audio  recordings  were 
transcribed in full.  
Two of the interviews were undertaken with married couples, both of whom had 
agreed to be interviewed but opted to be interviewed at the same time. Other 
married couples were also interviewed but chose to be interviewed separately. 
On three occasions another person was present while the interview was being 
conducted, and although they often contributed or offered opinions they were 
not regarded as respondents. There is one notable exception to this when one 
participant’s  mother  offered  a  particularly  pertinent  insight  into  cancer  and 
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7.2.1 Demographics  
Respondents ranged in age from 25 to 83, though the majority were over 50. 
This marked out the sample in a number of ways. First, most of the sample were 
retired. More importantly, the age of the respondents provided the opportunity 
to  discuss  the  changing  nature  of  cancer  in  light  of  medical  advances.  The 
advantages and disadvantages of this are discussed more fully in Chapter 11, 
which provides an overall reflection on the study. The majority too were female 
(22 of 31). More interviews were carried out with those living in the affluent 
community.  All  of  the  participants,  with  one  exception,  were  or  had  been 
married or cohabiting. Four of the participants were widowed or divorced and 
also  lived  alone.  The  remainder  lived  with  their  partner  or  spouse  and  two 
respondents  lived  with  other  family  members.  Table  2  outlines  respondents’ 
characteristics.  
 
7.3 Sample recruitment 
As detailed in the previous chapter a number of community organisations were 
approached  (Appendix  2)  in  a  bid  to  secure  volunteers  for  the  study.  The 
majority of participants were recruited via this method. A series of posters and 
leaflets  were  distributed  in  libraries  and  community  centres  in  the  selected 
communities  (Appendix  4).  None  of  the  participants  were  recruited  via  this 
method.  
 
7.4 Experience of cancer 
As Table 2 shows the majority of participants were close to someone who had 
had or was currently experiencing cancer. The majority had experienced cancer 
among extended family, and this included grandparents and aunts and uncles. 
Table 2 records the closest experience only. The closest experience was judged 
to be spouse, followed by parents and then siblings before going on to extended 
family  and  wider  social  networks.    Some  participants  had  experience  in  all 
categories. Only three respondents reported that they had experienced cancer 
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 Table 2 Characteristics of participants 
Respondent  Age  Socioecono
mic status* 
Gender  Employment   Proximity to 
cancer** 
Lisa  45  A  F  Part-time info officer  Spouse 
Murray  83  A  M  Retired engineer  Social network 
Kathleen  68  A  F  Retired Admin  Extended family 
Andrew  57  A  M  Full-time   Extended family 
Jessie  63  A  F  Retired nurse  Parent 
Elsie  62  A  F  Retired/housewife  Spouse 
Jim  64  A  M  Retired police officer  Parent-in-law 
Phyllis  58  A  F  Self-employed  Parent 
Colin  61  A  M  Management consultant  Extended family 
Janet  46  A  F  Nurse  Extended family 
Grace  62  A  F  Childcare worker  Spouse 
Angus  56  A  M  Self-employed   Sibling 
Emily  37  A  F  Optometrist  Parent-in-law 
Clare  42  A   F  Self-employed PR  Parents 
Jenny  38  A  F  Pharmacist  Social network 
Barbara  64  A  F  Retired librarian  Social network 
Eileen  72  A  F  Retired Admin  Sibling 
Barry  74  A  M  Retired bank manager  Extended family 
Betty  61  D  F  Retired  Parent 
Charles  74  D  M  Retired Engineer  Spouse 
Gary  37  D  M  Unemployed  Parent 
Caroline  37  D  F  Carer  Parent-in-law 
Karen  25  D  F  Social Care worker  Extended family 
Patricia  62  D  F  Retired Community worker  Parents 
Pauline  57  D  F  Retired nurse  Extended family 
Rose  61  D  F  Long-term sick  Extended family 
Josephine  61  D  F  Retired retail  Parent in law 
Lorna  57  D  F  Long-term sick  Extended family  
Rona  31  D  F  Self-employed PR  Extended family 
Peter  67  D  M  Self-employed  Parent in law 
Julia  65  D  F  Retired Catering  Parent  
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7.4.1 Proximity Vignettes 
Proximity in this study denotes the participants ‘closeness’ to cancer. From the 
earliest  interviews  it  became  clear  that  the  level  of  personal  experience  of 
cancer  was  extremely  influential  in  the  participants’  beliefs  and  discussions 
about cancer. Proximity could be experiential, for example through the cancer 
event of a spouse but also temporal in terms of how recent the cancer event 
was. The importance of proximity for the formulation of explanatory models is 
reiterated throughout the findings chapters. As well as Table 2, which provides a 
brief  outline  of  proximity,  a  short  vignette  of  each  participant,  based  on 
interview fieldnotes, appears in Appendix 10. The detail gives background and 
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8. Experience of cancer 
8.1 Introduction 
Central to this thesis are the participants’ experiences of cancer and these will 
be  described  in  this  chapter.  Personal  experiences  formed  the  basis  of  their 
explanatory  models  of  cancer,  which  were  supplemented  with evidence  from 
wider mainstream sources, like the media. Participants’ experiences of cancer 
were  wide-ranging.  All  could  provide  at  least  one  example  of  someone  they 
knew with cancer though the level of detail or narrative offered about individual 
cases varied greatly. Typically participants gave detailed accounts of one or two 
relatives’ or friends’ cancers. A handful of respondents felt that cancer had not 
affected them and could cite no one they regarded as ‘close’ as having or having 
had cancer.  
As Table 2 in Chapter 7 demonstrated the majority of participants did have what 
they described as a ‘close’ experience of cancer. A small number had a spouse 
with cancer, or a spouse who had died of cancer, a number also had parents or 
parents-in-law,  grandparents,  siblings,  aunts,  uncles  and  close  friends.  Ideas 
about cancer were articulated through these borrowed narratives. Often patient 
experience is chronicled through the use of narrative and it is usual for research 
participants to be asked to ‘tell their story’. This is the approach used by Health 
Talk Online
14, the video archive of patient experience in a number of clinical 
areas, including cancer. The participants in this study show that when asked to 
talk  about  cancer,  often  in  abstract  terms,  even  those  with  little  direct 
experience borrow narratives. This resonates with Kapodi et al’s (2005) paper 
that discussed the importance of availability heuristics. People will discuss the 
information that they have readily available and they evidence their beliefs by 
providing anecdotal examples. (Scanlon et al 2006) 
8.2 Proximity 
Proximity refers to the participant’s closeness to cancer. Clearly those with a 
closer proximity to cancer provided more detailed narratives than those who felt 
they had not been affected by cancer. Those unaffected talked about cancer in 
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more  general  terms  and  merely  pooled  information  from  alternative  sources, 
such as the media. Those affected by cancer could often provide very detailed 
information  of  cancer  journeys  and  drew  comparisons  and  highlighted 
differences between the cases they were familiar with. Family dynamics vary 
significantly.  For  some  participants,  the  experience  of  an  aunt  or  uncle  was 
thought to be very close while for others this was barely regarded as being in the 
family.  Those  participants  with  a  closer  proximity  to  cancer  had  deliberated 
more and had been more questioning about the potential causes of illness in the 
cases  known  to  them.  What  emerged  was  a  more  reasoned  and  intricate 
explanatory model. This group talked about the need for explanations and to 
understand why the event had or was happening, particularly if no obvious cause 
was apparent. As Clare demonstrated when discussing her mother’s cancer: 
So there wasn’t any kind of obvious links in that (family) and so I 
guess that made myself and my sister, who have spent a long time 
discussing these things, wonder about where it all came from. (Clare 
42, Affluent) 
Proximity refers not only to relational or kinship closeness but also closeness in 
time. Those participants with a very recent close experience of cancer tended to 
offer more and be more thoughtful about the event. For example, Kathleen’s 
friend was undergoing surgery for colorectal cancer on the day of the interview, 
and she reported seeking out information on her friend’s behalf.  
8.3 Distant proximity 
While those participants with a closer proximity to cancer were more likely to 
offer  information  about  individual  cases  in  depth,  all  participants  drew  on  a 
breadth  of  information.  So,  while  the  intricacies  of  cases  might  have  been 
missing  from  narratives,  participants  did  proffer  views  and  insights  into  the 
disease experience of not just family, but friends, and wider social networks. 
This  ranged  from  neighbours,  school-gate  peers,  fellow  club  members, 
churchgoers,  and  colleagues.  Although  the  sufferer  may  not  have  been  well-
known to the participant they were able to routinely provide detail about their 
cancer and disease experience. It was clear that in such affiliate organisations or 
social networks discussions about illness were regular occurrences. The result 
was akin to ‘Chinese whispers’ and although the quality of the information may Chapter 8    108 
be dubious, participants accepted these cases as truth or fact. Moreover, many 
of these half-known cases were critical to views about cancer.  
The  following  extract  highlights  that  information,  even  from  someone  quite 
removed,  can  impact  on  the  overall  cancer  belief  system.  Throughout  the 
interview the participant, Josephine, returned to the unpredictability of cancer, 
particularly with regard to the speed at which cancer can take hold:  
Josephine: What I cannae understands aboot cancer is em the speed, 
you know how quickly. Now there’s a wee boy, I say a wee boy, but 
I’ve known him since he was a wee boy em that goes to oor church, 
he’s the minister’s son’s friend. His mum works round in the chemist 
and eh I think it’s Lymphoma he’s got but anyway, and I know there’s 
all different kinds of cancers and all different, but this wee boy has 
been maybe ongoing for aboot three years maybe. Noo when he was 
first diagnosed as I say he got his chemotherapy and his treatment 
and all the rest of it and he was free of cancer.  
I: How old is he? 
Josephine: He’s twenty-one now. And then, aboot less than a year 
ago, em, his mum was saying that he was going for tests and he was 
quite worried but when he came back he was still cancer free. And, it 
was only a matter of weeks, now when I’m saying a matter of weeks, 
it was only maybe aboot three weeks, four weeks, he was back in the 
hospital,  it’s all  re-appeared  and  he’s  back  on  chemotherapy.  And 
apparently, em, I think he’s terminal now because eh, whit dae you 
call it, the minister was saying a couple a weeks ago when he was, 
you  know,  gieing  the  intimations  that  the  boy  had  stopped  the 
treatment. (Josephine 61, Deprived) 
This extract illustrates two fundamental points. First, cases of cancer that are 
far removed can be offered as experiential narratives. This is not unique. The 
interviews are littered with examples of stories from wide social networks. More 
importantly in the extract above , the most salient factor for Josephine  was the 
‘speed’ at which an apparent success story had changed, thus emphasising what 
she believed to be a major feature of cancer; unpredictability. Being unable to 
forecast the disease trajectory and outcome are likely to be the root of those 
universal metaphors that emphasise the irrationality of cancer (Balshem 1991; 
Lupton 1994). 
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8.4 The legacy of early memories  
Many participants began the interview by telling of their first encounter with, or 
experience of, cancer. As detailed in the introductory chapter the majority of 
participants in this study were aged between 55 and 70 and this generation has 
witnessed  dramatic  changes  in  cancer  treatment  and  outcomes.  Early 
experiences  were  important  in  formulating  their  beliefs  about  cancer.  The 
contrast between past and more recent experiences is touched on in the first 
extract from Rose, who illustrates the importance of the relationship between 
experience  and  understanding.  Yet,  despite  medical  advances  there  is  an 
underlying sense of permanent negativity:   
When I was twenty-one, and it came, when I realised what it was, 
because my aunt had it and I watched her. In they days they didnae 
have the Macmillan Sisters or they didnae have, you know, the places 
for them to go. And I watched my mum and her other sister nursing 
and I saw her degrading, and it lasted a long time. She was ill for a 
long time. So that was my nearest, that was when I was twenty-one, 
now that was the first time of actually realising what it was. (Rose 
63, Deprived) 
My grandfather died of, em cancer, he died in 1962 of cancer rising 
from a wound or a wart and by the time he died .... I went to see him 
in Stobhill then Royal Infirmary for a year before he died and eh it 
was just awful I mean the whole side of his face it was a wound in his 
temple and it spread down into his shoulder. And I mean he was like 
that by the end and I mean it was just awful, you know, I mean it 
would be awful to see anyone but in someone you loved it was a very, 
very traumatic experience and I was fourteen or fifteen at the time. 
Em so I guess that left its mark (Colin 61, Affluent) 
8.5 Cancer Narratives 
8.5.1   Disease trajectory 
Participants provided many detailed examples of cancer among people that they 
knew.  In  terms  of  the  general  course  of  the  disease,  cancer  was  typically 
described  as  either  a  long,  painful  process  or  as  an  aggressive,  fast  moving 
disease that took hold quickly. Neither trajectory was positive, each bringing 
with it its own difficulty for family and friends. As Grace whose husband died of 
colorectal cancer, ten years after his initial diagnosis demonstrates:   Chapter 8    110 
What I’m scared of is if somebody tells me some relation or other has 
got cancer I hope they die quickly and didn’t go through what Bill had 
to because he went from fourteen stone to six stone and his watch 
strap wouldn’t fit me. I used to take the links out for him and his 
wrists were so thin that his watch wouldn’t fit me after he died. And 
I think to myself if they could avoid that, if they can’t be cured, if 
they could avoid that, going through what he went through and the 
agony and the pain and the indignity of colostomies and things like 
that, yeah it was, and if they could avoid going through that and sort 
of go quickly it would be a blessing. (Grace 63, Affluent) 
The  above  description  of  physical  demise  is  not  uncommon,  others  talked  of 
‘wasting’ away or of sufferers being ‘shadows of themselves’ and cancer had 
completely ‘consumed’ them. Yet, the opposite was also true. Some participants 
were alarmed at the speed of the disease, particularly in what they regarded as 
largely asymptomatic patients. Angus describes the case of his brother who died 
of pancreatic cancer: 
What I think was, he turned yellow one day he went to the GP and 
the GP says “Oh you’ve got jaundice” and then a week later he was 
yellower and he just wasn’t himself. So basically I just said to him 
“No you’re no going back to the GP we’ll go down to the Hospital X” 
and they said “Right we’ll keep you in for an examination.” Within 
two days they transferred him to Hospital Y and the usual hospital 
‘Don’t worry it’s nothing scary’ but then basically,  really just within 
three days he died. (Angus 57, Affluent) 
8.5.2 Pre-diagnostic symptoms and delay 
This  potential  for  individuals  to  be  apparently  healthy  and  then  receive  an 
entirely  unexpected cancer  diagnosis emphasised the  unpredictable  nature  of 
the disease. The majority of stories though did involve symptoms, and how the 
sufferers  responded  to  these  symptoms  also  varied  greatly.  A  number  of 
participants talked about how the patient ‘wasn’t the type to sit about’ and 
sought  help  for  symptoms  promptly.  Most  sensed  that  something  was  wrong. 
Grace described her husband’s symptoms of colorectal cancer as ‘all you see on 
television’,  yet  her  husband  had  not  presented  to  his  GP  for  many  months. 
Although she did not question the potential importance of the delay to diagnosis 
in  her  husband’s  death,  Colin  did  question  what  might  have  happened  if  his 
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I mean if he’d gone to the Doctor when he was first aware he was 
unwell who knows he might have still have been alive today I mean 
I’ve got no idea but eh apparently by the time he got into [hospital] 
he was pretty well eaten away, you know. (Colin 61, Affluent) 
Most  participants  were  clear  about  the  importance  of  early  diagnosis.  The 
existence  of  screening  programmes  confirmed  this.  Screening  for  breast  and 
cervical cancer was widely welcomed but led some to question why screening for 
other cancer sites was not routinely offered, particularly when it was thought to 
be relatively straightforward: 
Because some people think that everybody should get tested for say, 
bowel cancer and I think they are going to, well I think women should 
get  tested  for  ovarian  cancer  because,  that,  apparently,  is  just  a 
blood test (Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
The inference then appeared to be that early diagnosis would certainly improve 
survival and further that the extension of the screening programme would offer 
undoubted benefits: 
The health service could do an awful lot more in terms of screening 
and as far as I’m concerned that was the intention when it was set 
up. Prevention is better than cure and a damn site cheaper, better 
for the patient (Peter 67, Deprived) 
Participants regarded speedy treatment as a necessity and policy targets around 
waiting times drive this. Angus, whose brother had recently been diagnosed with 
a rare colorectal cancer, illustrates the alarm that can be felt by families of 
cancer patients: 
I think cancer is one of these things where I think we’ve discovered 
you  have  to  move  very  quickly.  How  quickly  is  quickly?  You  know, 
that’s what I don’t know how quickly, quickly is? I mean it’s taken to 
get  to  the  stage  where  Philip  [brother]  is  now  about  to  begin  his 
treatment I would think within the next two to three weeks that’s 
probably been about three months. Now is that quick enough? I don’t 
know. Has that made it harder to treat the cancer? Should we do it as 
soon as we identify the type. The next day should you be in getting 
the treatment? I know it couldn’t be. the next day because what he 
said was he’s had to have ECG ‘s and everything because the chemo 
can kill you as well, but how long should you wait? Cause I feel three 
months is a long time, you know. (Angus 57, Affluent) Chapter 8    112 
Practitioner  delay  was  also  introduced  by  participants  and  some  general 
practitioners’ reluctance to thoroughly investigate symptoms. Some participants 
felt that long periods of time elapsed when ‘nothing’ was done. For some this 
was not an isolated incident. Julia, whose father had a brain tumour that went 
undiagnosed  for  “years”,  reported  that  her  father  had  been  told  that  his 
symptoms were “all in his head”. Some years later her sister was treated by her 
GP for more that 12 months for dyspepsia and was eventually diagnosed with 
oesophageal cancer. The cancer was ‘untreatable’ by the time her diagnosis was 
received. Angus described the case of a colleague who had a ‘bad back’ and had 
repeatedly presented to his GP, who had suggested he attend a chiropractor, but 
received a diagnosis of renal cancer after the delay. Betty talked about the pre-
diagnostic phase in her mother’s illness, who died of gastric cancer: 
My mum, she was for two years going to the toilet, her bowels, going 
to the toilet all the time and her Doctor kept giving her eh, and I 
forget the name of the pills now,  eh to stop the diarrhoea, and not 
investigating the cause. (Betty 61, Deprived) 
8.5.3 Recurrence 
The possibility that cancer could and would most likely recur was frequently 
discussed. Participants presented a number of cases where cancer had ‘come 
back’.  Often  the  recurrence  was  speedy  and  arrived  unexpectedly,  as  Clare 
described her mother’s illness: 
Yes, I guess she had (sigh) she was sixty-four when she died I think 
she would have been sixty when she was diagnosed and she had a 
mastectomy and chemo and radium. But made a very good recovery 
and quite a swift recovery and, I suppose I mean with that because 
also, she was very determined not to let it kind of shut her life down 
and she had a very clear goal as well, something that she wanted to 
attend and be part of it, which was an active thing. So that seemed 
to have focused her hugely and I think to the rest of us it made us 
sort of think she was going to be okay. But em it did recur (Clare 42, 
Affluent) 
Lisa,  whose  husband  had  survived  both  a  primary  tumour  and  a  recurrence, 
talked about how she had once thought that “it always gets you in the end”. She 
told  how  she  had  re-evaluated  her  position  in  light  of  her  experience  and 
expressed  shame  at  her  previous  presumptions.  Nevertheless,  the  supposition 
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clear of the benefits of early detection but also that if the cancer returns or 
develops into ‘secondaries’, there is little hope: 
Aye, I mean I know that you get a tumour or whatever it is you get 
and I know that there can be secondaries and I mean and I know that 
em if you catch it before it gets tae the, you know, before it spreads 
there is a chance. You know but em once the secondaries, you know, 
once it hits the other organs and you’re, you know, that it’s curtains, 
you know what I mean. (Josephine 61, Deprived) 
The horror of recurrence was not always borne out in reality. Two participants 
did provide examples of individuals close to them who had a primary tumour and 
a recurrence and had survived, one for many years. Here Phyllis describes her 
mother who, 87: 
She’s had cancer twice. She had cancer first at sixty-seven, she had 
breast cancer - smoked from she was thirteen until she was sixty-
seven  and  stopped  immediately,  of  course.  She  survived  that  and 
then when she was eighty-two she had, em, cancer of the uterus, and 
she  had  a  hysterectomy…..  And  eh  she’s  still  here  (Phyllis  58, 
Affluent) 
8.5.4  ‘Facing the worst’ - dealing with cancer 
The  overall  cancer  narrative  often  included  comments  on  the  psychological 
impact that the diagnosis had on the individual concerned. Participants were 
keen  to  stress  the  importance  of  remaining  positive  following  a  diagnosis  of 
cancer,  and  certainly  if  not  positive  then  largely  uncomplaining.  Many 
participants talked about the manner in which sufferers coped with the disease, 
particularly emphasising the strength with which it was dealt with. This mirrors 
much of the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, that looked at cancer metaphors. 
Hope,  resilience  and  positivity  are  all  common  narratives  that  illustrate  the 
salience of morality in the modern cancer discourse (Lupton 1994; Hawkins 1999; 
Ehrenriech 2009). A recurring theme was ‘just getting on with it’ and ‘carrying 
on’ even when sufferers had to ‘face the worst’. Kathleen illustrates this with 
her experience of family members, and in particular a paternal aunt: 
Although none of them I suppose, they didn’t all react in the same 
way  but  I  suppose  all  of  them  just  got  on  with  life.  Had  the 
treatment put up with the treatment, and just seemed to get on with 
their life, you know. The one that died having had the breast cancer 
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than she did and eh, but she didn’t because she had quite a young 
family and she was the one that definitely just got on with it, you 
know putting up with having to go on public transport, you know to 
go for her treatment and then go back and, no matter how bad it 
was, when it was over having to get on with family life and I think I 
was aware of that as well. I wasn’t that close to her but I was aware 
of that. (Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
Again, this echoes the findings of Blaxter (1982), Cornwell (1984) and Balshem 
(1991) who show that their respondents were clear that not giving in to disease 
or  lying  down  to  it  was  critical.  While  few  made  a  direct  link  between 
personality and survival, some had considered it but questioned what this meant 
for those who did not survive. Throughout her interview Lisa returned to the 
impact that her husband’s diagnosis had had on her overall belief system. This 
fits with Hunt and Emslie’s (2001) assertion that family experience will provide 
the most influential narratives. Almost all of her cancer beliefs and explanatory 
model  had  changed  to  accommodate  a  close  and  obviously  traumatic 
experience:  
I:  Do  you  think  those  kinds  of  things  help  with  survival  then,  you 
know if you do have it?  
Lisa: Em, you know, I don’t know about that, you would need to ask 
me that before Alan was ill. Funnily enough, I think I would have said 
that but maybe because I have heard that so often that I have just 
accepted it as fact. You know, you hear people say, you know, she’s a 
right, sort of, got a really positive attitude, you know she’ll fight this 
kind of thing, as if people who actually die of cancer are weaker and 
less resolute than other people (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
By noting that her presumptions might suggest that “people who actually die of 
cancer  are  weaker  and  less  resolute”,  echoes  the  stories  shared  in  Hawkin’s 
pathographies, where the weakness of those who succumb to cancer is inferred 
(Hawkins 1999). So while positive attitude has been championed and thought to 
help with survival, there were also those that were thought to have ‘given up’. 
Gary reflects on the case of his cousin, who had died in her 40s, and made a 
more obvious link between attitude and survival: 
She was eh in her forties and left a young family, a wee boy thirteen, 
I say young the daughter was twenty-one and the boy was fourteen it 
was really sad, you know. But she, there was other things involved 
there, but she seemed to gie up, you know, too easy, you know, you 
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know what happened I think just an abusive relationship there, you 
know. But, you know, how people get, after the fact, they make wee 
comments and all that but that seemed to be the general picture. 
(Gary 37, Deprived) 
Both Gary and Lisa use the word fight. The pervasiveness of military metaphors 
in relation to cancer is well-established (Sontag 1978, Seale 2001a). The idea 
that cancer was something to be fought, a battle entered into, was raised again 
and again. Even when facing a terminal diagnosis respondents were clear that 
the  proper  course  of  action  was  ‘not  to  let  it  beat  you’  as  Jessie,  who 
volunteered in a hospice stressed: 
Well if you go into that atmosphere and found how these people have 
accepted their illness with great fortitude. They are very brave they 
have their sad moments, don’t get me wrong, its not all just fun and 
games but there’s very little doom and gloom, they  seem to have 
accepted, they’ve got their diagnosis and its right lets get on with 
life, what we’ve got left (Jessie 68, Affluent) 
Yet, Jessie was so clear of the negative impact of a cancer diagnosis that she 
removed the mirrors from her house while she was caring for her mother, in 
order that her mother would not witness her demise. Some participants decided 
to withhold information about diagnoses, especially to elderly relatives. Betty 
told that her mother-in-law was terrified of cancer and asked that professionals 
did not disclose her diagnosis.   
Sontag (1978) first raised the notion that the stigma associated with cancer was 
as bad as the disease itself. While the depth of the stigma has been questioned, 
some of the participants, particularly those in the older generation allude to the 
continued fear of the most dreaded disease, in spite of the advances: 
We’re all still scared of it but then it wasn’t spoken about the same 
as it’s spoken about now. (Rose 61 Deprived) 
Balanced against the fear though was the idea that advances have been made 
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8.6 Success stories 
While  most  of  the  narratives  were  about  cancer  deaths,  there  were  some 
positive experiences.  Some participants presented examples of sufferers who 
had defied medical opinion. Colin talked of a friend, who, when diagnosed with 
leukaemia in 1986, was given a ‘50/50 chance’ but is now ‘as fit as a fiddle’. 
Similarly Emily told of her father-in-law, who had  also been disease free for 
many years, despite an initially bleak prognosis. Phyllis’ mother, had overcome 
cancer twice. More generally, there was widespread acceptance that, although 
they may not know many success stories personally ,improvements in survival 
and treatment were could not be denied: 
I  think  that’s  the  instantaneous  thing  because  I  know  a  lot  more 
people who have died from cancer than have recovered from it. So 
while I automatically think, ‘Oh that’s terminal’ I actually know that 
it’s not, em because I have family members that have had cancer and 
are now fine (Rona 31, Deprived) 
Clare demonstrates that she sees beyond her immediate experience of losing 
both her parents and a close friend to cancer:  
I  say  that  (cancer  equals  death)  because  that’s  how  it  is  for  me, 
that’s the first thing that comes into my head because that’s what 
my very direct experience of it, has resulted in that. So I feel that 
but I know if people ask me,  do I think everyone dies of cancer? No I 
don’t think that at all. Em, the things that I tend to read and become 
aware  of  is  the  fact  that  more  and  more  people  live  with  it  and 
survive it and get over it and don’t even really experience it and I 
suppose  em  been  more  aware  of  that,  you  know.    I  couldn’t,  I’m 
trying to remember any of the statistics but I know I have read about 
different things, about things actually, you know, rates of recovery 
improving and better systems of treatment and all of that kind of 
thing.  And  less  invasive  techniques  as  well  when  they’re  actually 
operating. So yes my immediate view is quite negative but my wider 
view isn’t. (Clare 42, Affluent) 
8.7 Lay or expert accounts? 
Much has been said about the expert patient (Department of Health 2001; Shaw 
2002). Armstrong and Murphy (2008) describe the ‘weaving’ of lay and expert 
information in patient narratives. Undoubtedly those with a close experience of 
cancer had been privy to information about their loved one’s case and as such 
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a central part of many narratives. Angus relates information from a consultant 
and describes the ‘revolutionary’ treatment planned for his brother: 
He (consultant) said the way forward was CHOP-R, which is, you’ve 
probably  never  heard  of  CHOP-R  either.  It’s  some  kind  of 
chemotherapy with an additional chemical in it. And he says really if 
you use this it will kill everything in your body, it will kill it, it will 
also  destroy  your  bone  marrow  so  you  will  need  a  bone  marrow 
transplant.  One  of  the  strange  things  the  oncologists  who  he’s 
attending  they  said  “We’ll  use  chemo,  we’ll  extract  some  of  your 
bone marrow which is infected and then we’ll re-inject it into you 
after the treatment.” And he said “But it’s infected your re-injecting 
infection”  and  the  Professor  in  London  said  “Yeah,  have  you  any 
brothers?” and he said “Yeah” and he said “Well get some of theirs if 
they’re compatible get some of theirs and get that back into you. 
Very risky because your antibodies may go for it but it’s the best 
way.” (Angus, 57 Affluent) 
Although Angus’ example is a complex one, participants did speak a common 
cancer language that featured in most accounts. The expert stretches beyond 
the  patient  and  extends  to  ‘lay’  audiences.  Participants  were  aware  of  the 
chemotherapy, radiotherapy and the side-effects of some treatments, the most 
obvious being hair loss, remission and secondaries. The key stages of the cancer 
journey  were  well  understood  and  medical  jargon  was  employed  easily 
throughout.  
8.8 Sources and quality of information  
By  foregrounding  stories  of  close  family  and  friends,  the  participants 
demonstrated  that  personal  experience  contributes  the  bulk  of  knowledge  to 
cancer belief systems. Yet personal experience is by no means the sole source of 
knowledge and information about cancer.  
There was a tendency for participants to mention information received without 
citing  the  source.  Sentences  often  began  with  ‘They  say…..’  without  ever 
detailing  who  ‘they’  actually  are.  This  was  also  found  by  Calnan  (1987)  who 
reported that in his study women from social classes I and II were more likely to 
use such terms, which he interpreted as seeking credence for their accounts. For 
participants in this study it was sometimes clear, when they were talking about 
individual  cases  that  they  were  referring  to  medical  professionals.  Generally 
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Well they say that mobile phones give you cancer (Rona 31 Deprived) 
Your lifestyle sometimes they say now, you know, obesity eh staying 
too near pylons (Gary 37 Deprived) 
Well  they  say  it’s  diet  as  well,  it’s  doon  tae  diet,  you  know 
(Josephine 61 Deprived) 
 
More  often  participants  cited  their  information  source.  The  media,  in  all  its 
forms,  was  a  widespread  source  of  knowledge.  Participants  typically  talked 
about  newspaper  articles,  television  documentaries  and  the  Internet  and 
gleaned information from all such sources: 
I read as well, I tend to kind of read medical articles and things like 
that and I watch documentaries, you know I went into a site, because 
actually one of my friends in fact she was at the meeting has had an 
operation for bowel cancer, I did go into a site, the bowel cancer site 
for the first time. (Kathleen, 68 Affluent) 
 
Some  participants  talked  about  the  sheer  volume  of,  often  conflicting, 
information. While many recognised the need to inform people, some expressed 
the feeling that messages should be treated with caution. Concentrating on the 
fearful aspects of cancer is common in the media and the suggestion of ever-
more  risk  factors  leads  to  the  supposition  that  “everything  causes  cancer” 
(Clarke  &  Everest  2006;  Niederdeppe  &  Levy  2007).  There  is  a  danger  that 
messages can become counter-productive: 
I think it’s sometimes the little things that are so ludicrous that you 
think sometimes people feel bombarded with so many things that you 
should be doing, shouldn’t be doing. What’s next?  Oh don’t bother, 
this is as good as whatever and I think people get sick of the whole 
thing and I think oh whatever I’ll just do what suits me (Emily 37, 
Affluent) 
Or potentially harmful: 
I think there’s too many mixed messages for people because I think 
some people and I’ve got friends that do this. They look up things on 
the internet and they imagine they’re dying and they’ve got this and 
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information for some can be a bad thing because they then take it 
literally and if they then know what symptoms are or what to look 
for and I don’t think they need to know because some people make 
them apply to themselves so if you’re getting mixed information then 
they are doing one thing but on the other hand they’re be doing it 
and they apply that literally to their life and then 6 months later 
they hear that that’s wrong and they are sent into a frenzy and a 
panic  and  they  think  that  they’ve  maybe  done  themselves  damage 
you know about doing it you know. I think anybody can write reports 
on things and publish, can’t they? They can say whatever they want 
and I think things should be taken with an element of caution. (Rona 
31 Deprived) 
8.9 Celebrity 
Although the media report breakthroughs in cancer treatment and trail cures, 
and  also  engage  in  public  health  activity  by  highlighting  risk  factors,  the 
majority  of  information  centres  around  celebrities  with  cancer.  Participants 
were asked in interviews to think about celebrities with cancer. According to lay 
epidemiology data is gathered from an array of sources and it was important to 
ascertain  if  celebrity  experience  filtered  into  explanatory  models.  Often 
however participants raised celebrity cases unprompted.  Celebrity stories are 
used as evidence in the same way as family and friends.  Their stories can have 
an obvious and lasting impression. As Chapter 9 details, Roy Castle has become 
synonymous with passive smoking.  
Although many celebrities were mentioned during the interviews, Kylie Minogue 
was introduced most frequently. Although the interviews took place some two 
years after Kylie’s diagnosis, it did receive a great deal of media attention. So 
much so that the impact was felt by health services (Chapman et al 2005). A 
celebrity  cancer  case  can  remain  in  the  public  eye  for  many  months  and 
effectively follow patients throughout their journey. Coverage of Jade Goody’s 
cervical cancer was analysed in a recent paper by Hilton and Hunt (2010). They 
show  that  although  there  were  obvious  increases  in  coverage  according  to 
changes in her status, for example there were more stories around the time that 
cancer ‘had spread’, stories continued across the time from diagnosis until her 
death  in  March  2009.  It  is  not  surprising  then  that  Kylie’s  Minogue’s  cancer 
appeared  fresh  in  participants’  minds.    Although  anomalous  cases  will  be 
discussed  in  more  detail  in  Chapter  10,  for  some  of  the  younger  female Chapter 8    120 
participants  especially,  Kylie  Minogue’s  diagnosis  did  not  fit  with  typical 
explanatory model because she represented the typical embodiment of health:  
God, I can’t believe it because she does kind of present a kind of 
healthy looking em image, which not all celebrities do. I mean quite 
a few of them, although they might be slim and attractive, you feel 
that a lot of it is, well they may be cosmetically enhanced or they 
may have drug problems so their health, you know they, might not be 
looking  after  their  bodies  and  I  could  be  totally  wrong  about  this 
because I don’t know a great deal about Kylie Minogue but she always 
looked to me as a very healthy person, you know her skin and her 
teeth and her eyes and she looks as if she eats very healthily, she 
looks like she looks after herself, and obviously exercises, I think I 
would have been quite shocked if it hadn’t been for my husband’s 
experience, yeah (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
Again I put that down to bad luck rather than anything else cause 
obviously she’s, well she looks like a healthy, she doesn’t look the 
type of person that’s going to get cancer but then I am aware that 
breast cancer can occur in younger women cause you read magazine 
about people in their twenties etc.(Emily 37, Affluent) 
There was acknowledgement though that Kylie represented a success story:  
But noo you hear of people getting cancer and beating it and you hear 
them on the telly noo like maistly mainly celebrities and stuff like 
that getting cancer and you hear of them. I think is it Kylie Minogue 
she’s one of the ones that just recently beat it, you know, so it makes 
you mair aware that it can be treated and people can beat it, you 
know.(Caroline 37, Deprived)  
Caroline’s repeated use of the word ‘beat’ raises the issue of cancer metaphors. 
Clive Seale (2001a, 2001b) concluded that sporting stories were as common as 
military metaphors when reporting individual cancer cases and often the two 
were combined. Kathleen introduced Jane Tomlinson and her ‘attitude’ when 
discussing how people deal with a cancer diagnosis: 
Oh look at that woman, Jane Tomlinson, her 10 year old son just got 
presented  with  her  CBE    all  the  years  she  survived  after  she  was 
diagnosed and I mean most people wouldn’t attempt, whether they 
had cancer or not would have attempted to do the sports things that 
she did for fundraising, these triathlons and things like that but she 
was still only in her early 40s but I think she was diagnosed at 28 or 
something like that and I don’t think she would have had anything 
like the life she had if she hadn’t had the attitude ….(Kathleen 68, 
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Barry though had quite a different view of Jane Tomlinson: 
She made herself famous because she had it (Barry, 74 Affluent) 
Celebrity stories also introduced participants to information that they may not 
readily  have  had  via  their  families.  This  strengthens  Sanders  et  al’s  (2003) 
assertion that people draw on only what is available to them when explaining 
their health belief models. In the following extract Betty demonstrates that she 
cannot provide a reason why ‘men’ get cancer : 
Eh well I don’t know how men get cancer eh likes of Bob Champion 
the  jockey  eh  I  don’t  know  how  he  got  cancer,  you  know,  in  the 
testicles I don’t know is it chemicals that build up in the body, I don’t 
know.(Betty 61, Deprived) 
Celebrity was discussed in relation to cancer to  evidence that ‘everyon’ can get 
cancer and no one is immune. In particular that money is of no consequence, as 
Kathleen states: 
Well, money doesn’t matter does it? I mean King George VI, he died 
of cancer didn’t he, lung I think (Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
8.10 Differences in accounts of experience 
8.10.1 Age 
The  majority  of  respondents  in  this  study  were  over  55.  They  had  seen 
remarkable changes in the social understanding of cancer. The transition from 
the ‘Big C’ to a more positive outlook was raised in many of the interviews. 
Given that age is a significant risk factor for cancer it is surprising that Murray, 
the oldest respondent, had so little direct experience or proximity via family and 
friends.  Similarly,  Karen,  the  youngest  respondent  had  limited  direct 
experience.  
8.10.2 Gender 
Conventionally, health is thought to be the preserve of women. They are often 
presumed to be the keepers of family health information (Graham 1984). In this 
study women were more likely to have been carers for cancer sufferers and a 
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male  participants  who  had  adopted  an  interest  in  cancer  because  of  a  close 
family cancer experience, the women in study gave more. A number of couples 
were interviewed, some together and others separately. Often, men looked to 
their spouses for more detail and confirmation. Typically women appeared to 
have  greater  general  awareness  and  more  complex  explanatory  models  of 
cancer.  
8.10.3 Affluence and deprivation 
Those in more deprived communities are more likely to experience cancer and 
have poorer outcomes following diagnosis (Brewster et al 2001). This was not 
reflected in this study. While those in both communities had a wide range of 
experience of cancer those in affluent communities were more likely to have 
either a spouse or a sibling with cancer than those in the deprived community. 
There was also a tendency for those in affluent communities to describe closer 
relationships within families. Among the participants in the affluent community 
were a number of professional women in their 30s and 40s and this group tended 
to be most aware. They had all shared a close experience of cancer and as a 
group they were most articulate. Such a demographic group was not represented 
in the deprived community. If comparisons are drawn between older women in 
either  community,  those  in  the  affluent  community  did  not  portray  greater 
awareness. Similar men in both communities, with little experience of cancer 
had  similar  levels  of  awareness.  An  additional  difference  between  the 
communities was that those in the deprived community were more likely to offer 
‘triggers’ as an explanation for cancer.  
Participants  were  aware  that  the  study  was  being  conducted  across  the  two 
communities. This prompted some, particularly in the deprived community, to 
comment on the health differences between the two communities.  
8.10.3.1  The health divide: health determinants 
There  was  some  disagreement  at  the  extent  to  which  cancer  was  socially 
patterned: 
 “ it (cancer)  just seems to have a certain predictability for people 
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“Um, I don’t know if poverty, social deprivation have a role to play 
...  I  ruled  those  out  yes  because  it  seems,  as  far  as  I  can  gather 
cancer can strike right across the social spectrum and across income 
scales” (Murray 83, Affluent) 
Those in the affluent community attributed the health differences between the 
communities to behavioural differences. Those living in deprived communities 
had poorer health outcomes because they engaged in risky behaviours, in spite 
of  being  aware  of  the  dangers.  Lisa,  initially  at  least,  focuses  firmly  on 
behaviour but shies away from apportioning blame: 
“ I think, you know, people really, you know with that sort of, you 
know  the  lower  socio-economic  group  who  are  really  obese  and 
smoking heavily and you know their lifestyle is quite likely to shorten 
their life dramatically. I think the message has pretty much filtered 
down, I think people pretty much know what they need to do but 
that’s not to blame these people either because, you know, to be 
honest I think if I lived in deprived community x  and didn’t have a 
job and no money and was living on benefits you know had no real 
life chances or opportunity to better my lot, I don’t really know that 
I  would  alter  my  lifestyle  .......  I  think  people  here  (affluent 
communty) take a long-term view. You know, its just a stone cold 
fact that people here are, the vast majority of them are gonna live, 
you know, to a ripe old age and people in deprived community  are 
not. They just don’t have the same life chances, so I think you can’t 
impose the same requirements on people, I’m very much a believer in 
that.  (Lisa 45 Affluent) 
Well you keep reading about the different age that people will live to 
in the leafy suburbs of Bearsden & Milngavie, as opposed to over in 
the East End or something like that, so I think maybe, statistically a 
lot more people still smoke, I think unfortunately a lot of people who 
don’t have money smoke and its a shame because its such a waste of 
money  but on  the  other  hand  once  you’re  hooked on  smoking and 
that’s maybe the only pleasure you’ve got, you will try and find the 
money for cigarettes (Kathleen, 68 Affluent)  
 
Andrew sums up the differences and refers to directly to culture, and introduces 
the idea of fatalism: 
Well, the life expectancy in Shettleston is I think about 56 .... I think 
there’s a massive cultural education change needed. I mean it was 
nothing  to  me  to  fall  out  of  a  car  drunk  driving  in  the  70s,  they 
should be doing that with drugs ... I don’t think drugs is as big a 
problem as they make out. They pick on easy things to improve; I 
think they need to improve people’s optimism, which is a hard thing 
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what  they  have  done  with  smoking.  Not  even  smoking,  I  can’t 
understand why girls are smoking more. One of my daughters said to 
me. I was picking her up from school and I was smoking up until 1990, 
and shesaid to me ‘Gonna no smoke, I don’t like my friends seeing 
you  smoking’,  now  that’s  good  education,  but  that’s  happening  in 
Bearsden, I don’t know if its happening in the east end? The thing 
about the east end, just while we are talking here, there’s a fatalism 
about the east end you know, ‘I won’t get anywhere’, they will  not 
rise above their station and they have terrible fatalism about life..... 
Later, he then goes on to consider the temporal shifts in experience:  
Andrew:  Well, I wonder, if a 20 year old from the east end, you know 
... if you said to me in 1970, you know if someone said to me ‘He’s 
got cancer’, didn’t matter what type it was, you’d think he’s not long 
for this world and maybe, if you say to someone in Shettleston now, a 
20 year old, they’d say the same 
I: Because? 
Andrew: Because Shettleston now is not unlike ... well, Anderston 20 
years ago, uh huh. 
Andrew’s idea that there is effectively a trickle down effect from affluent to 
deprived communities with respect to health promotion messages is interesting. 
It  ties  in  with  Lawlor  et  al’s  (2003)  work  that  considered  the  relationship 
between lay epidemiology, the prevention paradox and smoking cessation. The 
variation in the experience of health in affluent and deprived communities is 
captured  by  epidemiological  data.  That  aspects  of  health  promotion  may  be 
received differently in different communities is not so widely accepted.  
Those living in the deprived communities were equally wedded to the idea that 
behavioural differences could explain the varied health experience. Gary was 
unemployed at the time of interview and could personally relate to some of the 
problems  faced  by  those  in  the  east  end.  Gary,  summarises  the  multifarious 
problems associated with multiple deprivation: 
See I believe, see the noo,  eh we’re probably the poorest financially 
noo we’ve ever been, you know. Just because of finishing University 
and no a full time wage coming in for five years. See the stress wae 
that, that goes along wae that like,  really. It’s the first time I would 
say, I still widnae say we were living in poverty right we’re no rich by 
any manner of means but see the likes of Joe and Ryan and Ellie,  
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holiday we maybe go to the caravans, you know but we don’t go a 
foreign holiday. See the stress, no having tae worry aboot things like, 
certain things like I think that could be a big, big factor and they say 
the sun has got qualities like, we were talking aboot sun giving you 
cancer  but  the  sun  is  also  good  for  your  skin,  you  know.  And  you 
probably find people go two, three different holidays a year … and 
they’ve probably got a lot mair room as well, you know, space wise in 
the hoose and eh they’ve probably got a better social life. Money gies 
you, we all know money disnae buy happiness,  but it gies you a lot of 
different options, you know.And like going back tae the food - people 
in  the  East  End  of  Glasgow  buy  what  they  can  afford.    Whereas 
people on that side of the city could buy anything they want, you 
know, no anything they want,  but you now what I mean they’re no 
restricted tae ….We’d like tae buy fresh fruit every day,  well if I had 
money  I  would  buy  it  every  day.    And  you’ve  been  up  and  doon 
Shettleston  Road  there’s  one,  two,  three,  four,  five,  six,  seven, 
there’s aboot ten pubs in less than a mile, you know, so a lot of 
people in the east end their alcohol consumption is probably a wee 
bit mair. Whereas if they had a wee bit mair money instead of having 
a spare fifteen quid going to the pub if they had a spare couple of 
hundred quid they’d maybe dae other things. So I think that’s a big 
factor. you know,  lifestyle’s definitely,  there must be something in 
that, you know, well it’s kind of telling us isn’t it if you’re living ten, 
twelve years more. (Gary 37, Deprived)  
Gary, perhaps because of his own situation tended to be more understanding of 
the lack of choice faced by those living in the east end. Rona talked about the 
importance of awareness: 
I think a lot of that is education, I think a lot of that is lifestyle 
people,  a lot of people thing that this is o.k. because I’ll not get it 
anyway, they tend to, and I live in the east end,  and I’m born and 
bred in the east end but people do tend to drink more, people do 
tend to smoke more and there’s people in the west end or Bearsden 
will  take  their  children  to  museums,    will  take  their  kids  to 
restaurants,  whereas in the east end they get fried food and they 
get stuck in front of a computer game. Whereas if you even drive to 
Kelvingrove,  you will see kids playing football in the garden, running 
about,  having  fun,  it  doesn’t  even  cost  anything  and  its  free  but 
people in the east end tend to put more of an emphasis, if you’ve got 
money,  then  you go and drink at the weekend and new outfits and 
the kids have the best computer games and for them that makes their 
lives richer, its priorities for whatever reason. A lot of it is how they 
are brought up as well and things are passed down as well. They see 
parents, you know its all right for them, but they hardly leave the 
east end so they don’t know that this other world exists two miles 
form their doorstep. Its ignorance a lot of it I think,  but a lot of it is 
not  necessarily  bad  ignorance,  its  just  unfortunate  (Rona  31, 
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Priorities were also touched on by Josephine: 
Josephine: What I mean,  so this is what I’m saying,  when you’re 
saying about em the poor health and all the rest of it I think a lot of 
it  comes  doon  an  all  tae  peoples  ain  perceptions  eh  whit’s  their 
priorities, you know, I mean eh… 
I: So, do you think health isn’t a priority? 
Josephine: I would think that would be your number one priority but 
as I say they’ve got their drink and their drugs and, you know, all this 
before they think of food, you know what I mean? And Tollcross,  the 
east end has got a high percentage of drug use so everything else is  
all further doon the list of priorities, you know, like their heating 
and,  you  know,  their  food  and  their  whatever.(Josephine  61 
Deprived)  
 
The extracts from Roan and Josephine rrepresent a departure from the findings 
in Blaxter (1982) and Cornwell’s (1984) work, where respondents were reluctant 
to apportion blame for ill-health on individuals. Indeed, while Lisa understands 
that  those  in  deprived  communities  simply  make  the  ‘wrong’  choice,  she 
continues to place the onus of the individual rather than society. 
While most recognised the health differences between the communities, Charles 
questioned the validity of the statistics:  
Im just wondering where they get their statistics from honest to God, 
if you’ve never worked in your life, if your mother and father have 
never worked so your on that pool of not working, eat fruit nah don't 
bother with fruit, cigarettes, tonic wine, if you abuse your body its 
inevitable your not going to live long but to say that all the people up 
to Shettleston. We know a lot of, you want to try some of the housing 
associations go out and see some of the old folks homes see some of 
the old people that are in there in the east end of Glasgow,  its just 
the same as anywhere else I should imagine. (Charles 74 Deprived) 
Participants in both communities recognise that behaviour is socially patterned. 
Some, like Gary, see structural difficulties and barriers impeding the adoption of 
a healthy lifestyle in deprived communities. Most participants however saw the 
health and behavioural differences as the result of poor choices. All showed that 
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8.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the participants’ experience of cancer. The findings 
show  that  although  those  with  a  close  experience  of  cancer  provide  more 
detailed information of individual cases, those with less direct experience also 
share  stories,  or  borrowed  narratives,  that  have aided  the  development  of  a 
cancer belief system. Commentators from Sontag (1978) to Clarke and Everest 
(2006)  have  depicted  the  fear  associated  with  cancer  and  shown  that  this 
negative tag is tenacious . Although vast improvements have been made and 
participants  recognise  this  advance,  the  uncertainty  remains.  Comaroff  and 
Macguire (1982) suggest the existence of uncertainty in the context of hope can 
prove  a  difficult  area  to  reconcile.  Experiences,  while  individual  were  also 
universal  and  participants  described  a  handful  of  common  disease  scenarios. 
Proximity to cancer is vital for in shaping views and beliefs and the paucity of 
opinions in those without close proximity is akin to Herzlich’s (1973) notion that 
the reserve of health is called on, only when a problem arises. Demographic 
characteristics are of little consequence in this context, though women typically 
offered  more  sophisticated  and  thoughtful  explanatory  models.  The  following 
chapter  will  return  to  some  of  these  issues  and  focus  on  the  meaning  and 
understanding of cancer that participants have derived from their experience.  128 
 
9. Meaning and Understanding of Cancer 
9.1 Introduction  
 
The  previous  chapter  demonstrated  that  respondents  drew  on  an  array  of 
different types of data when formulating their beliefs about cancer. Beliefs are 
articulated through a series of narratives, which are used as evidence (Scanlon 
2006).  Though  close  proximity  to  cancer  is  important,  stories  were  rarely 
confined  to  immediate  personal  experience  and  also  include  borrowed 
narratives. These are also interspersed with information from mainstream health 
education and the mass media. What emerges is a sophisticated and dynamic 
schema. It is this experiential schema that aids their understanding of cancer 
and it is from these stories that they have derived meaning. Though the schema 
is  individual  to  them,  the  addition  of  mainstream  information  means  that 
similarities can be found across narratives. This chapter will tackle the meaning 
and understanding of cancer among participants. It will focus on key areas: what 
cancer means and respondents understanding of why cancer happens.  
9.2 Meaning? 
Cancer  meant  many  things.  Respondents  immediately  mentioned  research, 
science, illness, treatment, medical advance and death.  The general tenor was 
negative.  Fear  was  paramount  and  cancer  had  connotations  of  unpleasant 
treatment, uncertainty and, for some respondents in this study, the death of a 
loved one. Cancer is synonymous with fear and this reaction from participants 
here is well-documented elsewhere (Sontag 1978, Balshem 1991, Lupton 1994, 
Scanlon et al 2006). Despite such negativity, most respondents articulated with 
clarity that much had changed in the landscape of cancer. There was recognition 
that advances made in survival and treatments necessitated a reworking of the 
meaning of cancer in the last 30 years.   
9.2.1 Changes in meaning: the move away from the Big C 
As has been noted in previous chapters, the majority of respondents in this study 
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that, at least in theory, cancer now held a different meaning. Many discussed 
the stigma that once surrounded cancer and the general reluctance to talk about 
the  disease  (Sontag  1978,  Paterson  1987).  The  ‘Big  C’  dominated  the  cancer 
discourse in their formative years. Often the word was ‘whispered’. It was not 
uncommon for participants to admit that they had not been aware until many 
years later that a relative or neighbour had died of cancer. Other tudies have 
similarly found shame and secrecy associated with cancer, particularly amongst 
older interviewees (Scanlon et al 2006). The source of such stigma was thought 
to be ignorance, particularly around causality. This was especially pertinent in a 
time when most major disease was infectious. Moreover, cancer meant death 
and death brought its own taboo. The following extracts symbolise the former 
status of cancer:  
I mean to me it’s a sort of biblical, mythical thing, the Big C ooh, and 
I’m  sure  that  prevailed  through  ignorance  and  I’m  sure  from  the 
medical profession as well. ‘Oh well ill just shut the door on that, 
the Big C.’(Charles 74 Deprived) 
See, when I was in my twenties if you had say Mrs Brown in the next 
close had cancer it was whispered and within what, maybe not even 
as long as a year, the poor woman would be dead, you know, that’s 
how…  She had cancer - that was the end. (Elsie 63 Affluent) 
When  I  was  in  my  teens  the  ‘Big  C’  you  didn’t  talk  about  it,  if 
somebody  got  cancer-  mind  you  didn’t  hear  of  that  many  people 
because  they  didn’t  talk  about  it.  But  eh  I  mean  people  died  of 
stomach-ache whereas it was probably cancer that they had but you 
never heard about it. (Angus 56, Affluent) 
Because it was fatal in a very short time, or it was thought to be 
fatal in a very short time and there was something taboo about it for 
some reason.(Barry, 74 Affluent) 
Well-documented medical advances, less of a taboo surrounding death and the 
relative freedom with which cancer is discussed have all resulted in a shift in 
meaning.  So  while  the  meaning  embodied  in  the  ‘the  Big  C’  was  clearly 
powerful,  some  participants  reported  that  they  now  thought  about cancer in 
terms of serious illness rather than certain death. Kathleen comments on this 
change: 
My initial reaction is not what it might have been say 20 years ago 
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better and I’ve actually got quite a lot of experience through various 
friends and things like that that have you who have had cancer and 
are still with us. So, I obviously think yes, it’s a worrying thing to 
have but I don’t think it’s the death sentence it used to be (Kathleen 
68, Affluent) 
It  was  not  simply  time  that  had  challenged  preconceptions  about  cancer, 
experience  too  could  force  a  re-evaluation.  Nearly  all  participants  knew 
someone that had survived or was currently living with cancer. Lisa’s husband 
had recently survived cancer and she spoke frequently of her recent change in 
attitude: 
I: Had you always thought about cancer in terms of dying?   
Lisa:  Oh  yes,  uh  huh,  definitely.  Yeah,  I  did,  in  fact  I’ve  said  to 
people in the past, I’ve had discussions with people which I’m now 
quite ashamed of, to the effects of, ‘Well, it always gets you in the 
end’ You know maybe people appear to have recovered you know? 
Because I’ve known some women of my own age, you know when I was 
younger,  in  their  30s,  you  know  early  30s  and  had  made  a  good 
recovery and everyone was like, ‘oh that’s great, oh her hair’s grown 
back, everything’s ok’ and then got a secondary and died. So, yeah, 
my definite perception was that um, it’ll get you sooner or later (Lisa 
47, Affluent) 
This  reflection  from Lisa illustrates an inherent contradiction in  many of the 
interviews. A shift in attitude towards cancer has taken place and many would 
like  to  trust  improvements  but,  instinctively,  cancer  remains  frightening 
territory.  The  uncertainty,  even  accounting  for  improvements  in  survival,  is 
pervasive  (Commaroff  &  Maguire  1982).  Among  these  participants,  there  is  a 
need to be hopeful, not only because people close to them have cancer but also 
for their own futures. Hope has become a major cancer narrative (Lupton 1994; 
Ehrenreich 2009).  
9.2.2 Cancer as tragedy 
The  idea  that  cancer  meant  tragedy  was  often  referred  to  throughout  the 
interviews. Janet recounts the impact of cancer: 
Yeah, Sally died of oral cancer.She had two wobbly teeth at the front 
and within a year she was dead. And that was really difficult it was 
horrible actually because, you know, she came to our wedding and 
that’s the last time I ever saw her and my uncle committed suicide Chapter 9    131 
cause he couldn’t live without her cause it had all happened so fast. 
That  was  very  tragic  and  em  I  was  very  close  to  her.  (Janet  46 
Affluent) 
Lives cut unexpectedly short were frequently described. Caroline talked about a 
school-friend, who died of leukaemia when she was a teenager: 
Well  she  was  a  perfectly  healthy  young  lassie  until  that  it  was  a 
shock. aye. The only time that her Ma had said was a difference was 
she died on the 7th July and it was the summer and the only thing 
that  she  noticed  was  that  she’d  commented  on  several  times  was 
bruising,  she was bruising very easily. But she thought that was her 
just oot playing wae her shorts oan but that’s what they said that she 
was bruising very easy. (Caroline 37 Deprived) 
Age is an important caveat. There was a tendency for participants to see cancer 
in older adults, not as a tragedy but an acceptance that ‘you’ve got to die of 
something’: 
And although it was a terrible death for my mother, her actual death 
bed was excruciating to witness but my mother-in-law just slipped 
away, so I accepted that you’ve got to die with something, you know, 
that I would rather it had been that way than an accident (Betty 61 
Deprived)  
9.2.3 Cancer is unpredictable 
Experience of cancer often led participants to believe that cancer was largely 
unpredictable.  This  unpredictability  manifested  itself  in  many  ways.  Sudden 
onset of cancer or symptoms led Angus to claim 
You never know when you’ve got it.  I could have it just now and I 
don’t  know,  there  are  no  signs  until  it’s  usually  almost  too  late. 
(Angus 54, Affluent) 
Angus’  views  have  been  found  in  other  studies,  and  to  believe  that  cancer 
assumes a silent quality is common (Balshem1991; Scanlon 2006). The unknown 
nature  of  cancer  was  confirmed  by  many  examples  of  events  in  seemingly 
healthy  and  asymptomatic  individuals  or  a  diagnosis  in  an  individual  with 
apparently benign symptoms. Karen provided an example of a 19-year-old school 
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Just a pain in her leg she was having for a couple of months and went 
back  to  the  Doctors,  back  and  forth  to  the  Doctors  and  I  actually 
remember cause I met her in the Doctors one day, my friend had a 
wee girl, and we were taking her in to see the Health Midwife, no the 
Midwife the Health Visitor, and she was there again wae a sore leg. 
And a few weeks later she was dead, so that was cancer. (Karen 25 
Deprived) 
The unpredictable disease experience was discussed by some participants in the 
context of those who were now thought to be ‘clear of cancer’ or in remission, 
but the disease recurred and spread very quickly. Cancer was thought also to 
‘hit’ unpredictably. Participants offered many stories of cancer sufferers who 
did not fit the expected cancer profile, so for example, lung cancer sufferers 
who had never smoked. Equally, some had experienced cases where cancer was 
believed to be terminal, yet the sufferer had survived until many years later. 
These anecdotes emphasised the inability even of science to predict outcomes. 
The following extract captures the unpredictable nature of cancer: 
It’s a completely (sigh) random strange disease that affects people 
totally differently. Some people can fight it for ages, some people it 
crashes incredibly quickly and I don’t know how you make sense of 
that. (Clare 42, Affluent) 
9.3 Cancer: one disease or many? 
Cancer was first introduced in the interviews in general terms and this generality 
was  reflected  in  responses.  When  providing  individual  narratives  the  focus 
tended  to  be  on  cancer,  rather  than  a  site-specific  disease  and  often  such 
information  was  only  introduced  on  prompting.  There  were  exceptions.  For 
example,  Lisa  always  referred  to  her  mother-in-law's  illness  as  “non-smoking 
related lung cancer”. Clare, who had lost both parents to cancer emphasised 
that these were different cancers, and this she believed was significant in terms 
of her own risk. Similarly, when reflecting on cause, cancer was often referred 
to collectively. Rarely was risk specified in relation to site when talking about 
environmental  hazards,  for  example.  Yet,  more  obvious  links  were  made 
between smoking and lung cancer and sun exposure and skin cancer. Perceived 
protective  behaviours,  like  drinking  green  tea,  or  eating  broccoli,  applied 
generally. This should not imply that an understanding of the site-specific nature 
of  cancer  was  lacking  because  all  participants  gave  examples  of  what  one 
respondent called ‘varieties’ of cancer. It was not always clear if participants Chapter 9    133 
thought about cancer as one disease that simply targeted many different areas 
of the body or if they saw cancer as an umbrella term for a host of diseases. 
There is some evidence to suggest the former:  
I think probably cancer is a kind of term that covers, but its usually 
something, I’m not medical, within the cells or something like that so 
I suppose it possibly is fair to just have one covering term, I tend to 
probably think of it as one disease striking in different places. (Eileen 
72, Affluent) 
Elsie  though  displayed  some  understanding  of  cancer  assuming  different 
properties depending on site: 
When  you  say  cancer  I  think  of  a  big  lumpy  tumour.  Em,  which 
shouldn’t be there eh and generally, well not generally, sometimes 
they’re inside the body, sometimes they come out of the body. So if 
they do come out in lumps then people notice them and can go and 
get them attended to. And further Me, oh dear I don’t know, well I 
presume for example, like leukaemia that type of thing, I think that’s 
different, that’s not, to me blood is flowing through the body while 
in tissue it’s stationary and it’s the cells that develop from it. (Elsie 
63, Affluent) 
Accounts of both common and rare forms of cancer were shared. Breast cancer 
was the most frequent and nearly all the participants could provide at least one 
example of someone with breast cancer. Breast cancer was also referred to in 
relation  to  screening,  prophylactic  mastectomies  and  heredity.  Colorectal 
cancers too were common, though the commonest cancer, lung cancer was cited 
less  frequently.  The  frequent  appearance  of  breast  cancer  may  reflect  the 
relatively high profile of breast cancer (Gottlieb 2001). Lisa talked about the 
media’s treatment of breast cancer: 
There is more media coverage given to breast cancer, I would say 
now,  maybe  in  retrospect,    it  gets  too  high  a  profile.Not  that  it 
shouldn’t,  but I think that sometimes male cancers aren’t seen in 
the same, they are not as sexy and not dealt with in the same way, 
but I suppose when I think about it, and this has only just occurred to 
me  now,  I  possibly  thought  of  cancer  as  being  something  that 
affected women more than men which is probably nonsense (Lisa 45, 
Affluent) 
Lisa’s  reflection,  not  only  on  the  attention  given  breast  cancer  but  on  her 
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had previously relied on societal level data to populate her explanatory model 
Her very recent experience with her husband’s cancer demonstrates that one 
‘new’ case can entirely change her viewpoint.  
9.4 Cancer is common 
Participants generally felt that cancer was common and was becoming more so. 
The  well-documented  change  in  attitude  towards  openness  in  cancer  might 
suggest  that  cancer  is  not  more  common,  but  more  public.  Nevertheless, 
participants  did  not  see  this  as  an  artefact,  they  believed  that  there  was  a 
higher incidence. The population risk of one in three was recognised by many, 
though this level surprised some. Yet, many felt that they heard about cancer 
‘more  and  more’.  Josephine  stated  that  she  felt  that  people  were  ‘catching 
cancer like the cold’. This is echoed by Karen: 
“I feel as if cancer’s out there and it’s not budging and it’s just as 
you  kind  of  go  along  if  there’s  not one  person  got  it  you  hear  of 
somebody else having it or if you could hear a conversation amongst 
other  people  whose  talking  about  somebody  whose  got  cancer, 
there’s quite a lot, a lot of people.(Karen 25, Deprived) 
Lisa described cancer as an epidemic but, as the following extract shows, when 
she considered cancer in the context of an overall increase in life expectancy, 
she shifts her position before returning to her original point: 
I mean, both before and after Alan was diagnosed, I do know so many 
people who have had it. Their parents have died of it and it seemed 
to me for a while I got completely swamped with it, it got to the 
stage that I thought, if one more person phones me and says that 
their mum or their dad is dying of cancer I’m going to crack up. I 
can’t take it, its like an epidemic that’s sweeping through the land 
and killing everybody I know. But, my friend who’s a health visitor, 
who is a very practical, down to earth, kind of nursey person, you 
know, no sentiment or anything like that said, ‘Don’t be so bloody 
stupid’ and she just kind of said quite bluntly: ‘You know, it’s the age 
you’re at, you know, lots of cancers are age related and as you get 
older and your friends parents get older, they are bound to die of 
something  so  you’re  getting  a  bit,  you  are  getting  this  out  of 
proportion,  of  course  your  next  door  neighbour’s  father  died  of 
cancer at 82’ she said, and I’m quoting her, “For god’s sake he’s 82, 
things wear out, things happen em, nobody is gonna live forever so its 
ridiculous  to  start  thinking”  but  on  the  other  hand  she’s  wrong 
because it does affect so many people so it is a kind of an epidemic, 
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Lisa’s final point here about cancer being contagious is interesting. Although it 
was a throw away comment and Lisa is aware that cancer is not contagious, she 
is  hinting  at  the  uncertainty  many  people  experience  when  trying  to  explain 
cancer. Many of these difficulties are raised again in the following section on 
aetiological explanations. 
9.5 Aetiological Explanations  
Before exploring aetiological explanations more closely, it is worth mentioning 
the language of causality. In scientific terms, cause and risk refer to different 
concepts. Cause refers to absoluteness, a definitive link between A and B. Risk, 
though, applies to a possibility, probability, a contributory factor or a potential 
hazard. Participants in this study did not make such semantic distinctions. Cause 
was used to describe not only aetiology but also risk. Participants were more 
likely to say ‘pollution causes cancer’ rather than ‘pollution may increase your 
risk  of  cancer’.  What  they  were  actually  alluding  to  was  risk,  not  cause. 
Judgements about cause, in its truest sense, were made retrospectively, and 
links were made between cancers and known individual risk factors. Risk tended 
to be used more frequently in the context of overall population risk or in risk 
reduction. 
The following section considers respondents’ views about potential causes of and 
risks  associated  with  cancer.  These  are  grouped  into  behavioural  factors, 
environmental factors, biological factors, and psychological factors.  
9.5.1  Behavioural Factors 
9.5.1.1   The embodiment of health. 
Although  an  examination  of  health  behaviours  was  not  intended  in  the 
interviews, many of the participants strayed into discussing ‘lifestyles’, while 
talking  about  cancer  risk  factors.  Moreover,  participants  were  not  asked 
specifically  about  their  own  behaviour  though  most  volunteered  this 
information.  Participants  were  plain  about  what  represented  a  healthy,  and 
consequently,  an  unhealthy  lifestyle.  The  models  mirrored  the  widespread 
health promotion messages and the typical description of a healthy individual 
was a non-smoker, who ate a balanced diet, rich in fruit and vegetables. Alcohol Chapter 9    136 
and exercise were to be enjoyed in moderation. For many, moderation was the 
key and the need to think about enjoying life, rather than being ‘faddy’ or over-
anxious about health issues, was stressed, which echoes earlier findings (Backett 
1992a; Lupton & Chapman 1995). This attitude has been found in other studies 
where limits were set on sensible risk-taking (Roberston 2006). 
Well they don’t want you to sit in your house – well, they want you to 
exercise for everything don’t they – but you don’t want to sit in your 
house and be frightened to eat this, that and the next thing, I really 
think its all things in moderation. (Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
Some were keen to stress that they were healthy. In the following extract, Angus 
gives a detailed description of his diet, and emphasises that the lengths that he 
and his wife go to, to eat healthily are ‘crazy’: 
I mean we exercise we take lots of fruit and veg, all wholegrain stuff, 
we don’t overindulge in alcohol. I mean, I probably have two glasses 
of red wine a week Gavin’s even less he doesn’t, well he’s a wimp, he 
doesn’t like red wine, but red wine’s better for you, so my wife and I 
take red wine. We don’t junk food, we just don’t junk food, eh we 
maybe have a fish supper once every six months, you know. We walk 
down to Helensburgh Pier and have a fish supper once every six, you 
know, that’s so, we really eat healthily. We don’t buy anything like 
mince out the shop we buy a piece of pork and I cut every piece of fat 
off it and I mince it myself, you know, we’re really crazy. (Angus 54, 
Affluent) 
There  was  some ambiguity  regarding  the  status  of  smokers.  While  they  were 
often  immediately  branded  unhealthy,  there  were  exceptions.  There  was  a 
tendency for smoking to be excused, particularly amongst family members. This 
was  especially  true  if  other  behaviours  were  deemed  ‘good’.  This  echoes 
Backett’s (1992a) finding that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviours were often traded 
and off-set against one another.   
9.5.1.2   Smoking 
As with many of the large scale quantitative studies that gauge awareness of 
cancer risk factors (Breslow et al 1997, Wardle et al 2001, Redeker et al 2009) 
smoking came up again and again and the link between smoking and cancer was 
universally accepted. Smoking inhabited a unique position. It was the only factor 
that  was  afforded  the  status  of  cause,  in  its  truest  sense.  Smoking  was Chapter 9    137 
mentioned, unprompted, by all participants. Many associated smoking with most 
cancers, irrespective of site, which confirms Wardle et al’s (2001) quantitative 
findings. For example, Janet, a nurse with experience of neurosurgery, made a 
definite link between smoking and primary brain tumours. Grace inadvertently 
made a link between childhood leukaemia and smoking: 
Em, Laura and John both had cancer but they both smoked heavily 
and  it  was  their  wee  boy  that  had  died  of  leukaemia.(Grace,68 
Affluent) 
Despite  the  unequivocal  link  between  smoking  and  cancer,  the  fact  that 
participants could cite examples of smokers who had never had cancer and non-
smokers  with  cancer,  especially  lung  cancer,  led  some  to  reassess  their 
explanatory models. Some participants raised the idea that ‘it must be more 
than  cigarettes’  as  the  following  extract  illustrates.  Here,  Phyllis  speculates 
about the cause of her friend’s colorectal cancer: 
So it may well be that she was in a really smoky atmosphere that…It 
sounds in our conversation to you smoking is the answer, you know, 
that if everybody stopped smoking there would be no cancer where 
that seems to be what we’re trying to put across. But there must be 
other things. (Phyllis 58 Affluent) 
Rose was clear about the irony of her position with regards smoking but was 
quick to raise alternative causes: 
But now here’s me sitting smoking which I know causes it, I’m still 
smoking.  I  sometimes  think  it’s  genetic  I  mean  I’m  no  educated 
enough to say whether it is or not but there’s so many genetic things 
going about.(Rose 62, Deprived) 
Colin, also a smoker, accepted the link between smoking and cancer but stressed 
that smoking was merely one, albeit important, risk factor:  
I mean because you smoke doesn’t mean that you do have cancer but 
there’s no doubting the stats that say, which says that you’re much 
more likely to get it at some stage and okay there are survivors and 
there are exceptions. Well I mean it’s not a rule that if you smoke 
you die of cancer (Colin 61 Affluent) 
Both Rose and Colin acknowledge the risks associated with smoking. Yet, they 
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not want to contemplate and adopt a stoical attitude (Scanlon et al 2006) or 
they wish to distance themselves from the stigma attached to smoking (Chapple, 
Zeibland & McPherson 2004).  
So established were the links between smoking and cancer that lung cancer in a 
non-smoker was particularly unexpected: 
 ….  Many  of  my  relatives  lived  into  their  80s  and  had  been  heavy 
smokers. So, my grandfather died of lung cancer, but again he was in 
his late 80s and he had smoked 60 a day since he was 14, so it wasn’t 
really a great surprise that he died of lung cancer. So no, but I think 
that  well,  my  mother-in-law,  as  well,  …  she  died  of  non-smoking 
related lung cancer and again, she had been ill and she had problems 
with her chest but we never imagined in any way, because she had 
never smoked. (Lisa 47 Affluent) 
Despite  offering  anecdotes  that  highlighted  cancer  among  non-smokers,  and 
smokers  who  remained  disease  free,  participants  expected  smokers  to  get 
cancer. They also accepted it when they did. Emily said of her mother-in-law, a 
smoker who died of breast caner in her early 50’s, ‘she knew the risks’. Lisa 
talked about cancer patients continuing to smoke: 
A  few  people  that  visited  Alan  in  hospital,  they’d  say  to  me  that 
they’d get annoyed with the people who were standing outside the 
hospital entrance, now it was the dead of winter and they were there 
with their dressing gowns on and some of them were obviously cancer 
patients, I mean you could see that, I mean some of them even had 
their drip stands with them, and they were still smoking and quite a 
few people who went to visit him commented ‘Does that not really 
upset you when you have to pass through that fug of smoke and these 
people who still won’t change their behaviour in any way, even when 
they are in hospital and they are so sick and yet they still won’t give 
up cigarettes’, you know’  (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
Chapple,  Ziebland  &  McPherson’s  (2004)  findings  are  echoed  here,  as 
participants  introduce  an  element  of  personal  culpability  when  talking  about 
smoking, particularly when others are considered blameless:  
It wasn’t long after my dad had died that I saw this old boy sitting in 
Glasgow we were out to celebrate the 4th of July and em he was 
coughing and smoking and he asked for money for cigarettes and he’d 
got a beer and I said to myself ‘why is he still alive and my dad’s not’ 
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Here Grace has decided that they ‘old boy’, by virtue of his behaviour has not 
led a ‘good life’. This clear introduction of moral judgements will be returned to 
later in this chapter.  
9.5.1.3   Passive smoking 
A number of participants mentioned passive smoking, which was implicated in a 
number of cases: 
 My brother, he never even came into my mind earlier, he had cancer 
of the throat five years ago, five or six years ago so eh he stays in the 
middle east so he travelled over from Bahrain he flew into the UK, he 
paid privately but he was in an NHS hospital right and he got a lot of 
his lymph glands, part of his throat, his cheek, part of his tongue 
everything all taken away, there’s only one gland going into his brain 
they all had been taken away but he was the doctors that see him 
said “How many cigarettes a day did you smoke?” he says “I’ve never 
smoked in life” and they said “You must have” and he says “I never 
smoked one cigarette in my life” and they didnae believe him so it 
must have been passive smoking.(Betty 61 Deprived)) 
The  consultant  said  himself  he  was  absolutely  shocked  (at  the 
diagnosis of laryngeal cancer). And the only thing that my uncle put 
it down to is when he was a very small boy he had spent a lot of time 
with his father in pubs in the east of London that were really smoky 
environments. Em and that’s the only, as far as he was concerned, 
contact that he had with smoking in any way. (Emily 37, Affluent) 
As was shown in the previous chapter, celebrity cases of cancer had an impact of 
participants’  understanding  of  disease.  Roy  Castle  was  synonymous  with  the 
dangers of passive smoking and Patricia extended his narrative to other famous 
people.  
Well maist of the famous people when you think about cancer used 
tae go into clubs where smoking used tae be going on all the time and 
they say passive smoking is worse than normal smoking. (Patricia 62, 
Deprived) 
Moreover Roy Castle’s story was similarly borrowed to explain a further case of 
cancer. Here Emily talks about her husband’s parents, both of whom had cancer: 
but  with  the  type  of  lifestyle  that  they  had  had  when  they  were 
younger. His dad worked in clubs etc, he was a musician, so spent a 
lot of time in a smoky atmospheres, that kind of lifestyle they had at 
that point in time. (Emily 37, Affluent) Chapter 9    140 
Peter was less certain about the effects of passive smoking: 
Eh, lung cancer is quite often attributed to smoking. I think there is 
enough evidence to suggest that smoking is related to lung cancer. 
Whether passive smoking has an effect or not, I don’t know. I suppose 
if you worked and spent 5, 6, 7 days a week in a smoky atmosphere it 
wouldn’t do you any good. (Peter 67 Deprived) 
9.5.1.4  Diet 
Diet  was  seen  as  important  for  a  healthy  lifestyle,  but  unlike  the  certainty 
attached to the dangers of smoking, fewer direct links were made between diet 
and cancer. This is reflected in larger cancer awareness studies (Breslow et al 
1997; Wardle et al 2001; Redeker et al 2009). 
I mean I don’t know what the risk factors are.Smoking versus a bad 
diet but I think generally when people think of cancer you think of 
smoking  and  not  all  the  other  rubbish  that  you  put  in  your  body 
including all the things in food that you probably don’t think about. 
(Emily 37 Affluent) 
Whether diet or exercise has got anything to do with cancer, I really 
couldn’t say because I wouldnae say anybody that I, I really don’t 
know anything about whether it’s, I cannae think of anybody that I’ve 
heard  of  that  did  various  things,  you  know,  either  did  a  lot  of 
exercise or didnae do exercise or who drank a lot or who smoked, 
well smoke you hear about but I don’t remember anything standing 
out  in  particular  regarding  diet.  Could  be  I  don’t  know.  (Rose  61 
Deprived) 
Few specific foods were labelled carcinogenic, though some danger foods were 
identified,  most  notably  red  meat.  Charles  attributed  his  grandmother’s 
longevity  to  her  avoidance  of  red  meat.  He  also  highlighted  the  beneficial 
effects  of  fish  and  cited  low  levels  of  cancer  in  Japan  as  evidence.  Other 
potential beneficial or protective foods were identified. A diet rich in fruit and 
vegetables was fundamental and there was widespread awareness of the 5-a day 
message. Antioxidants too were suggested. Obesity, as a result of a poor diet, 
was clearly acknowledged to be bad for one’s health but only on a few occasions 
was it offered as a direct cause of cancer. The exceptions were a small number 
of  cases  of colorectal  cancer in individuals  judged to be  obese.  It  should  be 
stressed that at the time of the interviews there were a series of press reports 
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Rather than diet per se, the impurities, chemicals and additives found in foods 
were  seen  as  potential  carcinogens.  Kathleen  talked  about  the  apparent 
increasing incidence of allergies in children and provided the example of her 
granddaughter’s allergy to genetically modified foods:  
I buy organic, I buy quite a lot of organic now because one of the 
reasons  is  I  don’t  want  to  have  too  many  chemicals  but  another 
reason is that I have a granddaughter who is eight who can’t eat, well 
she can’t eat quite a lot of things she can’t eat cherry tomatoes, but 
she can eat organic tomatoes and she can’t eat coleslaw from any of 
the big supermarkets or Marks, but she can eat coleslaw from Iceland 
and the only difference I can see is that Iceland is GM free. I mean 
she ended up at the hospital with the tomatoes closing her throat 
and my daughter thought she hadn’t washed them enough but the 
doctor  said  that  the  chemicals  would  penetrate  the  skin  and  you 
don’t get that with organic. You are allowed some chemicals with 
organic but nothing like what we get in ordinary food. So the fact 
that just that amount of chemical, which the government tells us is 
safe, for her and I have hay fever allergies but not food allergies but 
for somebody to be able to have food that doesn’t have that minute 
amount of chemicals but can’t have it if its got it then I think maybe 
none of us should have those chemicals. (Kathleen 68 Affluent) 
Pesticides too were mentioned. This echoes Baghurt, Baghurst & Record (1992), 
who  found  that  more  than  half  of  their  survey  respondents  believed  that 
pesticides in food were extremely important risk factors for cancer. A handful of 
participants in this study extolled the virtues of organic foods. The inference 
was that tampering with food must be harmful.  
I’m a great believer in organic a lot of things because nobody has 
ever, as far as I’m aware done research into all the fertilisers that 
were used 20, 30, 40 years ago in the ground and what affect they 
have on people so I try to buy fresh and whatever (Julia 65 Deprived) 
Equally,  the  reliance  on  convenience  foods  and  the  prevalence  of  processed 
foods  in  the  modern  diet  were  thought  to  be  detrimental  to  healthy  living. 
Although this was not always discussed specifically in relation to cancer it does 
tie into the ideas of cancer as a disease of modernity (Herzlich 1973; Salant & 
Gehler 2008). Many participants, especially older women, lamented the loss of 
cooking  skills  among  they  younger  generation.  Often  this  was  described  as  a 
particular problem in areas of deprivation: Chapter 9    142 
 “…… With diet, I know what people who think they’ve got no money 
do. You see them , they go in the shops, and I see them they buy pies 
and all sorts of things and they could make cheaper healthier meals 
for less money if they got taught. Now I got cookery at school and its 
still with me and I still cook my mince and my stew the way that my 
cookery teacher taught me and I worked in the kitchen with my mum 
because I was the eldest and I think they should be getting back to 
basics and making pasta and making things go further and things like 
that and I think that a lot of people don’t eat things because they 
don’t know how to get it and they don’t know how to cook it but I 
don’t honestly know if a diet would stop people taking more cancers. 
I think some part of it could be going back to when they used all the 
different fertilisers but then what would account for when the really 
young taking cancer (Julia 65, Deprived) 
9.5.1.5   Alcohol and Exercise 
Both  moderate  exercise  and  moderate  alcohol  were  typically  located  in  the 
‘healthy’ model’. Although exercise was clearly associated with health, lack of 
exercise was rarely offered as a risk factor and many thought that exercise was 
largely irrelevant. As Murray states:  
I think it plays a very, very small part, if any, in cancer. (Murray 83 
Affluent) 
Interestingly  while  excessive  alcohol  consumption  was  linked  with  unhealthy 
individuals, abstinence was also to be avoided. A number of participants thought 
that  red  wine  especially  was  beneficial  for  health.  The  following  extract 
exemplifies  the  strength  of  mixed  messages  surrounding  alcohol  when  some 
document  the  beneficial  health  effects  of  alcohol  (White  1996;  Chadwick  & 
Goode 1998):  
A  couple  of  weeks  ago  there,  there  was  a  thing  out  about  heart 
disease  or  cancer  or  something,  in  the  papers,  I  mean  nearly 
everything is bad for you I mean you may as well throw in the towel. I 
mean I always remember reading in the paper, Jock Stein the great 
Scotland manager died of a heart attack and people in the papers 
were saying how could that happen to Jock Stein? He didn’t smoke 
and  he  didn’t  drink  and  he  was  an  active  man.  And,  there  was  a 
doctor in the paper, whatever you call these doctors in the paper, 
said, that was probably the thing. He would have been better off if 
he had taken a half a night … (Andrew 57 Affluent) 
Some were aware that made links between alcohol and cancer, specifically head 
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recent colorectal cancer diagnosis to alcohol. This was the exception and few 
raised alcohol unprompted. Though on reflection some supposed that it might be 
a risk factor, as Emily suggests:  
Just same the principle, it’s still putting a toxin in there so yes but 
it’s  not  something  that  I  would  immediately  volunteer  to  be 
attributable to cancer. (Emily 37 Affluent) 
9.5.1.6   Sun Exposure 
Like smoking, sun exposure was an accepted cause. Gary echoed Ness et al’s 
(1999)  claim,  believing  that  the  sun  is  ‘good  for  you’.  Unlike  smoking,  sun 
exposure  was  not  raised  unprompted  by  all  participants.  Rose  provided  the 
example  of  her  brother-in-law  who  had  skin  cancer  and  attributed  this  to 
excessive sun exposure as a child. Others talked about sun safety messages, and 
how these were at one time little known: 
Well I thought the girl with skin cancer eh she never, ever used any 
lotions but I’m going back she’s dead now over twenty years, right. 
And she was in her forties as I say she was about forty-six and we 
didnae know about creams, you know, and she was a sun worshipper. 
She went to, she had a daughter was married to a boy in Tenerife, I 
couldnae remember the place, Tenerife, and they went there for six 
months at a time. (Betty 61 Deprived) 
Yet,  the  understanding  of  safe  sun  ‘use’  was  not  universal,  as  the  following 
extract demonstrates. Lorna provides the narrative a close friend diagnosed with 
malignant melanoma: 
Lorna : Recently she developed this thing on her ear and all I kept 
saying, “That’s changing you better go and see about that” and she 
says  “I’ve  got  skin  cancer  on  my  neck.  …  So  I  don’t  think,  no  she 
disnae abuse herself, she disnae drink, she disnae smoke but there’s a 
big family thing there. 
I: Uh huh, and what about other risk factors for skin cancer like sun is 
she a…. 
Lorna: Oh sun uh huh, no she isnae a sun worshipper, I mean she 
certainly does em she gets very burnt when you go on holiday. (Lorna 
57 Deprived) 
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9.5.2  Environmental Factors 
Participants discussed a wide range of environmental factors that may be linked 
with  cancer.  Most  knew  someone  who  had  previously  worked  in  a  hazardous 
environment and with toxins. Elsie’s husband, who was a smoker, had recently 
completed his cancer treatment yet she attributed his head and neck cancer to 
his habits at work. The following extract demonstrates how information from 
many sources is inducted into explanatory models. It might also be inferred that 
she sought an aetiological explanation other than smoking, which is known to 
attract stigma (Chapple, Zeibland & McPherson 2004): 
I’m  inclined  to  have  wee  thinks  to  make  up  my  mind  I  might  be 
entirely wrong. He was a Commercial Artist and away back, well he 
used to take his paintbrush into his mouth and suck it to get a nice 
point to do the lettering and I thought, I think I’d read something or 
I’d seen it on the television there was a factory I think somewhere 
about Dundee, I think it was clocks they made, and the faces to make 
the face of the clock or the numbers luminous the women there who 
painted the dials had radioactive paint they used and quite a lot of 
these women apparently died of cancer. (Elsie 62 Affluent) 
Many participants cited work hazards. Asbestos was raised a number of times. 
For  example,  Grace  talked  about  her  brother’s  exposure  in  car  plants  and 
subsequent death from asbestosis. Lisa, whose father worked for British Coal, 
talked  about  the  dangers  faced  by  miners  and  provided  the  example  of  her 
father-in-law  who  had  died  of  lung  cancer  and  had  posthumously  received  a 
compensation payment from his employers.  
Nobody that I was in school with, or very few of them have parents 
who are alive now because their fathers all died in their 50s of lung 
cancer, of emphysema of pneumoconiosis because they worked down 
pits and the result of heavy industry (Lisa 45 Affluent) 
Angus, a former fire fighter, highlighted a number  of cases of cancer among 
colleagues. What the extract shows is an uncertainty about exposure risks and 
links to specific cancer sites:  
I’ve lost some workmates and the only common denominator is that 
we were all senior officers in the fire service and when we joined 
breathing apparatus wasn’t used readily it was the exception rather 
than the rule. If you go into a fire you’re breathing in hydrogen sile 
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I just breathed in toxic fumes and they were the same. So probably 
on the work side the people that I’ve lost at work through cancer 
that may have been …  but none of them were lung cancer it was all 
other places but I don’t know how cancer works, you know. (Angus 
54, Affluent) 
My dad [died of bladder cancer] had worked in a laboratory for a lot 
of his life and had to deal with formaldehyde a lot. And the cause of 
cancer particularly applies (Laughs) so that was kind of where that 
one was so I sort of knew or that was believed to be the cause. (Clare 
41, Affluent) 
As well as individuals’ working environment the impact of industrial practices on 
the  wider  population  was  also  raised.  Pollution,  nuclear  plants  and  sites, 
chemical factories and electricity pylons were all introduced into the discussion. 
The following extracts show that respondents were fully aware of the implied 
connections  between  environmental  factors  and  cancer.  Yet,  not  all  were 
convinced of the link:  
I think there is a link with cancer certainly a link between cancer and 
radioactivity,  anybody  who  works  anywhere  near  Hunterston  or 
Sellarfield or even the North of Scotland up the top there as well. 
You probably find there's linkage to cancer, even cluster cancers, if 
you like (Charles 74 Deprived). 
I mean I’ve got another friend who lives in Canada now whose father 
died of bowel cancer many years ago. But she was brought up .. Oh, 
somewhere down in Ayrshire, near the ICI plant and she’s lived in 
Canada for 20 odd years but her dad died of bowel cancer before she 
went to Canada and then her mother, in the last couple of years, I 
mean she was 77, I can’t remember what type of cancer it was to be 
honest and she was saying ‘Oh, I know so many people whose parents 
have  died  of  cancer,  who  come  from  that  area,  I  think  its  got 
something to do with the ICI plant, they must have been polluting the 
atmosphere’. So. I’m not discounting that, there may be some factor 
like that, there may be clusters like that and people do, I mean you’ll 
know, loads and loads of research on these things to see if there are 
patterns and clusters but I mean what I said to Jenny at the time 
was, “You may well have a point but can I also say to you that I know 
an awful lot of people who didn’t live anywhere near an ICI plant and 
whose  parents  didn’t  smoke  and  you  know  have  led  quite  healthy 
lives and who still get cancer”. (Lisa 45 Affluent) 
I was aware there were concerns (about cancer ‘clusters’) but I’m 
also aware that I have enough training and stats to understand that 
you can do a lot of things with stats. I mean take the MMR, I think for 
example absolutely shite, right I mean there have been more damage 
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the first place. And, you know, how the bandwagon developed so that 
I mean Doctors were actually saying “Okay well we’re no going to do 
it”, you know, and f***, I mean, unbelievable. But I mean point at the 
electricity pylon that’s what I was going to say the electricity pylon 
stuff and mobile phones and mobile phone masts and all that. As I 
understand it there is as yet no hard scientific evidence, which says 
either mobile phone use or mobile phone masts do generate cancer 
hotspots……    But  if  you  went  through  them  carefully  the  actual 
proven, well there’s no proven instance or causal relationship I mean 
you can’t get that from just eclectic stats you can’t prove a causal 
relationship.  But  there  are  so  many  reasons  for,  you  know,  for 
clusters of cancer hotspots and I mean the geology of the event is a 
major factor for example or so I understood. That, you know, there 
are types of rock in which, you know, if you’re in constant contact 
and you live in a house built of granite, for example, well granite is 
radioactive. (Colin 61, Affluent) 
The above extracts show that environmental factors were usually synonymous 
with cancer ‘clusters’ or ‘hotspots’. Support for the presence of clusters was 
mixed and Colin provided a rational scientific reason.  
A  number  of  participants  mentioned  the  dangers  of  mobile  phones  and  the 
possible connection with brain tumours. Two participants also reported that they 
had quickly dismissed friends/colleagues warnings that carrying phones in their 
breast pocket because they ‘might give you cancer in your heart’.  
Well, they say that mobile phones give you cancer and some other 
reports say that there is nothing to prove that a mobile phone has 
actually been the cause of a case of cancer. So again it’s what do you 
believe? (Rona 32, Deprived) 
Environmental risks associated with cancer are as likely to be the subject of 
media  coverage  as  many  health  promotion  messages  (Trumbo,  McComas  & 
Kannaovakun 2007). The extracts above demonstrate the salient impact of the 
mainstream press. All of the environmental hazards featured more frequently in 
interviews than behavioural factors like exercise, and to a lesser extent sun-
exposure. Nevertheless, participants were more sceptical about the importance 
of  environmental  risks  and  some  acknowledged  the  ability  to  manipulate 
statistics to produce the desired message. Supposed cancer clusters do have an 
impact.  Guidotti  &  Jacobs  (1993)  found  that  residents  in  a  community  much 
publicised as a cancer cluster changed their health related behaviour.   Chapter 9    147 
9.5.3  Biological Factors 
 
9.5.3.1  Age 
Participants generally recognised the connection between cancer and age, which 
is at odds with findings in other studies that show that age is poorly recognised 
as  a  risk  factor(Wardle  et  al  2001;  Keighley  et  al  2004).  Increased  life 
expectancy was thought in part to explain the rise  in cancer incidence. Yet, 
there was a tendency towards a curious paradox in discussions about cancer and 
age. Many expressed the belief that cancer in the elderly did not represent the 
aggressive disease or the painful death normally associated with cancer: 
I wonder the younger you are I think the speedier the tumour grows 
(Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
Older people were thought more likely to live with cancer for longer periods of 
time, and cancer was unlikely to kill them. One participant, Barry, reported that 
a family-friend, a nurse, had declared that ‘virtually everybody in their 80's had 
some sort of cancer’. His story then shifted focus slightly as he told of an elderly 
friend, who was 93, that he regularly went swimming with. He had noticed what 
he thought were suspicious moles on his friend’s back but had chosen not to 
raise this because of his friend’s age: 
Barry: As I say we go swimming, well his back is covered in brown 
blotches, now he’s 93. Who is worrying at this stage? But I don’t know 
what  they  are,  I  don’t  know  whether  I’ve  seen  them  probably  or 
whatever or nobody has pointed them out to him but what are they? 
I: Does he have someone else at home? 
Barry:  No. 
I:  Because  quite  often  with  skin  some  people  only  get  a  diagnosis 
because  they  have  somebody  else  that  points  out  that  there  is 
something  there,  I  mean  I’m  not  saying  that  you  should  therefore 
suggest that but  
Barry: A younger person you would. (Barry 74, Affluent) 
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My own aunt had actually died, she was diagnosed with breast cancer 
but um, again it sounds a bit odd to say but she was in her mid 80s 
and  she  smoked  very  heavily  all  her  life  so  she  was  kinda  dying 
anyway, you know she had lots of other illnesses and she had been in 
and  out  of  hospital  and  eventually  someone  said  ‘Oh  by  the  way, 
she’s got breast cancer as well’. So it was like, ‘Oh God, not that as 
well’, but em, in a sense, you know somebody said to me at the time, 
you know she’s not gonna die of it at that age, she’ll die of other 
things (Lisa 45, Affluent)  
Cancer  in  older  people  was  more  readily  accepted.  Older  people  were  often 
judged to have ‘had their life’. Some participants used phrases like ’you’ve got 
to die with something’, hinting that among the elderly, cancer was not so tragic 
and more palatable. Betty who had said that her mother had had her life went 
on to say:  
Although it was a terrible death for my mother, her actual death bed 
was excruciating to witness. (Betty 61, Deprived) 
9.5.3.2   Hormones 
A number of women talked about the hormonal causes of breast cancer. One 
talked  about  the  benefits  of  breast-feeding  but  as  this  extract  reveals, 
disconfirming evidence had caused her to re-evaluate her beliefs:  
I’ve  had  four  friends,  sorry,  I  forgot  about  my  other  friend  in 
Edinburgh em, I always thought that if you breast fed you had less 
chance  of  developing  breast  cancer  and  the  three  in  (local 
community) did not breast feed – not because they didn’t want to but 
because they couldn’t and my friend in Edinburgh, she breast fed and 
she developed breast cancer so my theory is sort of out the door in 
that respect (Jessie 68, Affluent)  
9.5.4 Psychological Factors 
9.5.4.1   Stress 
Although Pollock’s (1988) in-depth study of the lay perspectives of stress found 
that participants made few associations between cancer and stress, stress has 
been  linked  with  cancer  in  other  studies,  both  quantitative  and  qualitative 
(Blaxter 1982; Wardle et al 2001;Scanlon et al 2006; Redeker et al 2009) though 
the relationship is often thought to be tenuous. In this study stress was rarely 
cited as a specific risk factor. Phyllis mentioned stress and then dismissed it: Chapter 9    149 
Well you don’t know I mean I think stress too has something to do 
with cancer and yet when you see babies and young people getting it 
you wouldn’t imagine that they would lead stressful lives (Phyllis 58, 
Affluent)  
It  was  however  thought  to  be  a  cause  in  a  handful  of  individual  cases, 
particularly  when  other  potential,  usual  causes  were  thought  lacking.  Clare 
believed  that  perhaps  ‘emotional  issues’  were  responsible  for  her  mother’s 
cancer because she didn’t fit the typical cancer profile: 
My mum’s breast cancer I guess that was more of a surprise, a big 
surprise  because  she  was  a  very  healthy  person,  very  fit  active 
healthy, good diet I mean all the boxes you think you should ticking 
so that was a big shock. But I suppose in retrospect em although my 
sister  and  I  have  looked  at  it  and  thought  there  was  a  lot  of 
emotional issues and wonder whether there wasn’t a  psychological 
element going on there. (Clare 42, Affluent)  
Although  both  Patricia’s  parents  were  smokers,  she  was  certain  that  her 
mother’s cancer had been triggered by a single traumatic event, a mugging and 
the cumulative effect of many years of domestic abuse: 
“…. she was pretty bad wae the last one(beating) she got and it was 
just  efter  that  they  found  oot  she  had  the  cancer.”  (Patricia  62 
Deprived)  
Later in the interview Patricia questions the role of stress in the development of 
her father’s cancer:  
“ Maybe it [stress]  could have, it could have but then my dad didnae 
have the stress, well maybe he had the stress, he’d be stressed he’d 
actually got taken intae a wee room when he was on his own and telt 
my mum had the cancer when he was attending for his heart. And he 
was in shock wae that so in that way maybe although it was a few 
year later before he contracted cancer. I don’t know.” (Patricia 62 
Deprived) 
The  absence  of  stress  or  happy  lives  was  postulated  as  reasons  for  avoiding 
cancer. Murray attributed all cancer to smoking, although both of his parents 
had lived long and escaped cancer. His explanation for this is bound up with 
many things, including a happy life: 
Luck, I think so, I can’t think of anything else, both lived happy and 
fulfilled lives, I think that may have been a factor but I don’t know. Chapter 9    150 
Um, my mother was a very, very active woman, my father much less 
so (Murray 83 Affluent) 
9.5.4.2   Personality 
The apparent centrality of personality factors in cancer narratives and the need 
to  remain  hopeful  and  positive  is  ubiquitous  (Balshem  1991;  Blaxter1982; 
Ehrenreich  2009).  Many  of  the  individual  cancer  stories  retold  in  the  media 
introduce  personality,  generally  in  terms  of  ‘fighting  spirit’  (Seale  2001a, 
2001b). If personality is so important in fighting disease, is it also relevant in 
hosting it in the first place?  Participants typically dismissed this proposition. 
Yet, this did give way to some discussion of pessimists, or worriers possibly being 
more prone to disease. Elsie concluded that a tendency to worry was the only 
common feature in two of her friends with cancer: 
Two  of  them  I  can  think  I  would  say  are  the  type  that  sort  of 
worriers, you know, one is particularly pessimistic (Laughs) I would 
actually say I don’t know whether that’s got anything to do with it or 
not. (Elsie 62, Affluent)  
Much of this is related to notions of morality, and the importance of not ‘lying 
down’ to disease (Blaxter 1982) and perhaps the feeling that it is best not to talk 
about the disease, for fear of ‘inviting it in’. Activity and hard work are thought 
to  be important  protectors  against  disease  (Balshem  1991),  cleanliness  too  is 
important. Barbara, when talking about people ‘that you least expect’ to get 
cancer, reported her shock on hearing of a colleague’s cancer diagnosis because 
she  had  always  been  ‘so  well  turned  out  and  pristine’,  again  hinting  at  the 
importance of morality.  
9.5.4.3  Genetics and familial factors 
The identification of disease specific genes has elevated the gene to the status 
of ‘cultural icon’ (Nelkin & Lindee 1995). The discovery of BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes linked with breast and ovarian cancers has led to a fixation with familial 
element in cancer (Henderson and Kitzinger 1999) Knowledge of cancer genes is 
widespread  and  most  participants  believed  there  to  be  a  familial  risk, 
specifically  for  breast  and  colorectal  cancers.  Grace,  whose  husband  died  of 
colorectal cancer, told that her GP had said that her husband had “inherited 
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screened from the age of 40 onwards. Others were aware of the links with breast 
cancer  and  a  number  of  female  participants  whose  relatives  had  had  breast 
cancer were clear that the risk was associated with a certain type of breast 
cancer  thought  to  appear  in  younger  women.  None  placed  themselves  at  an 
increased risk of cancer because the cases in their families were ‘different’.  
More  generally,  the  participants  extrapolated  the  family  links  to  all  cancers. 
Participants  typically  talked  of  cancer  ‘in  the  family’,  irrespective  of  cancer 
site.  Identifying  diseases  as  family  traits  has  been  explored  and  reported  on 
previously, especially in the west of Scotland (Hunt Emslie & Watt 2001). One 
participant described how her friend, recently diagnosed with skin cancer, felt it 
was inevitable that she would get cancer because of her family experience: 
Her mum died wae cancer, her dad died wae cancer, her mother’s 
four sisters died of cancer, her father’s two brothers died of cancer, 
Her own brother died of cancer at forty-seven and she’s been saying 
for years, she’s had a lot of gastric surgery this girl, and she’s been 
saying for years “It’ll definitely get me I’ll no get away wae it, it will 
definitely get me.” (Lorna 57 Deprived) 
This was not uncommon. A number of participants knew of families with many 
examples  of  cancers  in  different  sites  and  thought  this  must  be  more  than 
coincidence.  In the following extract the Josephine recounts the story of her 
neighbour:  
Josephine: Well there’s a lassie up the next close …  there’s been a 
whole lot of members of her family have died wae cancer and her 
man’s really worried and he’s wanting her tae go and get checked. 
But just like everything else you put your heid in the sand and say 
‘Naw, no me’ but I think she’s feart tae go. 
I: Uh huh, how old is she? 
Josephine: She’s in her fifties. Noo, there’s been one just died wae, 
em,  breast cancer, bowel cancer, eh ….  Hodgkin’s., Aye, so it’s all 
different cancers it’s no just one type of cancer. 
I: But that’s all in her family? 
Josephine : That’s all in her family. 
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Josephine: Aye. Well I would think I’d want tae be checked oot as 
well, know what I mean? 
For some participants the presence of a familial element was thought to be at 
least as important as lifestyle factors in determining cause: 
I  eh  …  (pause)  I  think  there  is  a  very  strong  hereditary  strain  in 
cancer and people who don’t have that-  If someone is suffering from 
cancer and I don’t know them well - my first two questions would 
probably  be  –  is  it  their  lifestyle  or  is in  the  family? (Andrew  57, 
Affluent) 
Equally, cancer was thought to ‘not run’ in families. Some participants pointed 
out that cancer was not in their family. Often this was qualified by suggesting 
that  in  their  family  they  had  an  alternative  ‘problem’  like  ‘the  heart’  or 
cholesterol. Implicit in these statements was that a family could have only one 
serious  illness  although  different  illness  could  appear  on  each  ‘side’  of  the 
family (Hunt, Emslie & Watt 2001; Sanders et al 2007). The following extract 
shows that Gary, despite his father’s prostate cancer, did not see his family as a 
‘cancer’ family: 
As  I  say,  ma  dad  had  prostate  cancer  eh  I  was  thinking  aboot  his 
brothers  dying  nane  of  them  had  cancer.  One  of  them  has  got 
Parkinson’s  just  noo  but  apart  fae  that  ma  Ma’s  side  is  pretty 
healthy. They’ve got Alzheimer’s on their side, you know, ma Ma’s 
got that the noo she’s in a home eh but cancer disnae seem to be the 
one but apparently ma Dad’s family’s got heart trouble, you know. So 
I think I’ve got a choice between heart or (Laughs) Alzheimer’s (Gary 
3, Deprived) 
Not  all  participants  were  convinced  that  cancer  was  hereditary.  Interestingly 
those with close family experiences of cancer did not think that this put them at 
a higher risk than any other individual. There are two possible reasons for this. 
First, it might be that because of their experience they have more knowledge 
about  specific  risk  because  they  have  been  confronted  with  cancer  (Beebe-
Dimmer  2004).  It  might  also  be  that  wish  to  distance  themselves  from 
heightened risk, much like cancer sufferers wish to distance themselves from 
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9.5.4.4   Triggers and the dormant gene 
As well as familial genetic links and hereditary factors, participants introduced 
and understood genes in another way. Aetiology was attributed to genes but this 
was  distinct  from  family  patterns.  Articulated  in  numerous  ways,  many 
participants asserted that cancer was explained by the presence of a faulty or 
cancer gene. This idea is present in many of the studies reviewed in theis thesis 
over many years and appears to be an enduring belief (Cornwell 1984; Calnan 
1987;  Mullen  1994;  Scanlon  et  al  2006;  Goldman  et  al  2008).  For  some 
participants, this was apparent in everyone, while others believed that it could 
be found only in certain individuals. The presence of this faulty gene was not 
associated with familial links. Rather the cancer gene was innate and appeared 
by chance. In order for cancer to then develop the gene needs to be activated. 
Activation requires a trigger and triggers could take many forms.  Psychological 
distress, either as the result of a single event or repeated long-standing abuse, 
could  act  as  a  catalyst.  Physical  events  too  were  implicated  with  a  knock, 
another  illness  or  surgery  being  offered  as  possible  triggers.  Non-activation 
explained the absence of a cancer event. Angus offered the theory of a dormant 
disease  described  cancer  as  a  ticking  time-bomb  and  provided  the  following 
analogy:  
Or is it, I mean, is it just a time release thing, you know, like you can 
use  the  time  release  fertiliser in  your  plants,  your pot plants  you 
stick it in and over time it slowly lets out the fertiliser. Is that in our 
system where the cells work properly on a time release system and 
then when it gets to a certain time it’s just says ‘oh I don’t want to 
work properly anymore’ and then it produces the cancer. (Angus 56, 
Affluent) 
9.6  Cancer: a disease of modernity? 
Participants in this study demonstrate a changing perception of cancer. Often, 
the change had been dramatic. For most this was a temporal change, a natural 
evolution  that  keeps  pace  with  scientific  advances.  For  others  it  was 
experiential, a forced change needed to acknowledge a new reality. Regardless 
of the reasons for the change it is clear that cancer does, at least on the surface 
mean something different now than it once did. Once universally stigmatised, 
cancer assumed a largely ‘folk’ nature. It meant death and few were aware of 
why it happened, what caused it and often who had it. In the early 21
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cancer is a public disease, the subject of much media attention and research. 
Information about cancer is readily available, knowledge of cancer is improving 
constantly and some participants felt sure that most forms of cancer would one 
day be cured.  
Yet, this modern view of cancer extended further. Much like Herzlich’s (1973) 
participants  almost  40  years  previously,  most  thought  cancer  was  now  more 
common;  being  described  as  rife,  epidemic,  and  as  ‘common  as  the  cold’. 
Participants  thought  that  incidence  had  genuinely  increased  rather  than 
believing  that  the  increase  was  an  artefact  of  openness.  Again  echoes  of 
Herzlich’s  work  can  be  found  in  explanatory  models.  Nearly  all  participants 
talked of pesticides, food additives, pollution, mobile phones and phone masts, 
and  electricity  pylons  in  relation  to  aetiology.  All  of  these  are  features  of 
modern  living.  Gary  talked  about  the  now  widespread  use  of  disinfectants, 
rendering immune systems powerless in the face of modern germs, and claimed 
that those in his father’s generation had a stronger immune response. Caroline 
talked  about  the  potential  iatrogenic  effects  of  modern  vaccines.  Such 
discussions merely represented hypothesising but were, in part, buoyed by the 
idea  held  by  many  that,  ‘if  you  look  hard  enough,  everything  causes 
cancer’(Niedereppe & Levy 2007). The ‘everything’ however is synonymous with 
social changes: mobile phones, pollution, pesticides, genetically modified foods, 
convenience foods. The negative impact of modernity on health has been found 
elsewhere (MacFarlane & Kelleher 2002; Salant & Gahler 2008). Moreover, it is 
the  availability  of  knowledge  in  the  information  age  that  heightens  this 
awareness. Cancer then has shifted from a largely folk model of disease where 
little  is  known  about  cause  or  cure  to  more  sophisticated  model  that 
incorporated the dominant bio-medical and scientific model.  
9.7 Narratives and metaphors as a means of obtaining 
understanding  
9.7.1 Use of narrative 
Research in the area of psycho-oncology often seeks to describe and explore the 
patient  and  carer  experiences  of  various  aspects  the  cancer  journey.  It  is 
customary  for  such  experience  to  be  recounted  in  the  form  of  stories  or Chapter 9    155 
narratives  (http://www.healthtalkonline.org).  Narratives  though  are  not  the 
preserve of the patient or carer. As previously noted, participants frequently 
used narratives or more accurately a series of narratives to provide contexts for 
their views and beliefs. Narratives were offered as evidence. Some, depending 
on the proximity to the patient, were retold in great detail others were less 
comprehensive. Yet, each interview holds at least one narrative that is used to 
frame their explanatory model.  
Clare had recently dealt with the death of both her parents and her close friend 
and admitted that she had re-assessed her pre-conceptions. She now believed 
cancer represented a random, unexplainable event, and illustrated this through 
the following story: 
I  think  more  and  more  now  I’m  just  accepting  that  life  is  just  a 
random  set  of  events  and  some  people  ....    I  mean  the  surprising 
thing, I mentioned that neighbour of my parents, Jeff .... he was a 
heavy smoker and he actually always, he was one of those people who 
sort of looked ill, he had a bit of a pallor. Now, even though I can’t 
remember when he was diagnosed with cancer but I know my parents 
knew he had cancer and was fighting it long before either of them 
were diagnosed with having any kind of illness and he outlived both 
of  them  (Laughs).  So  I  think  I  mean  there’s  like,  a  lot  like  that 
because I just think cause, you know, that’s it it’s a completely (sigh) 
random,    strange  disease  that  affects  people  totally  differently. 
Some people can fight it for ages, some people it crashes incredibly 
quickly  and  I  don’t  know  how  you  make  sense  of  that.  (Clare  41 
Affluent) 
9.7.2  Use of metaphor 
Metaphors  are  common  in  cancer  narratives  (Sontag  1978;  Lupton  1994). 
Participants here are no different and many used metaphors when talking about 
cancer.  The  most  liberally  used  metaphors  were  combative,  which  is  not 
surprising given their dominance in the media (Seale 2001a, 2001b, Clarke and 
Everest  2006).  Lisa  explained  why  she  felt  that  military  metaphors  were 
appropriate: 
I think that there is a grain of truth of it being a battle because it 
certainly  is,  you  know  when  you  are  undergoing  treatment  and 
chemotherapy and whatever, there is a, I’m maybe putting myself in 
the  place  of  someone  who  has  actually  suffered  it  but  there  is, Chapter 9    156 
people I know do tend to see it in terms of them against the disease 
and they do sort of see it as a battle (Lisa45 Affluent)  
Josephine recounted a conversation with a friend about a mutual friend’s recent 
cancer recurrence. They referred to cancer in human terms, giving it personality 
characteristics, describing it as devious. Other participants described cancer as 
mean.  Metaphors  were  also  used  to  illustrate  the  affect  that  cancer  had  on 
sufferers.  It  was  common  for  participants to  use  terms  like  ‘eating  away’ or 
wasting away. Some metaphors went further, Peter’s entire explanatory model 
was based on a metaphor: 
I  liken,  and  this  is  just  a  personal,  simplistic  explanation.  I  liken 
cancer to growing plants, I’m quite a keen gardener and some seeds 
germinate,  some  don’t,  some  grow  better  than  others  some  live 
longer than others and some sort of whither away. I see cancer as 
sort of withering away of the cells and we are all gonna die at some 
point  anyway.  Cancer,  is  a  sort  of,  if  you  like,  accelerated  dying. 
(Peter 66, Deprived) 
9.8 Challenges to meaning and understanding 
Far from being poorly understood (Scanlon et al 2006), participants appeared to 
know and understand a great deal about cancer. Though the views expressed in 
the interviews were not always biomedically accurate or expert, they did display 
a thoughtful approach to the formulation of explanatory models. Yet there were 
aspects of the cancer experience that defied such logic. Prominent among these 
were childhood cancers and the role of luck or random events. 
9.8.1  Childhood cancers 
Among  the  most  challenging  aspects  of  understanding  cancer  was  cancer  in 
children.  Participants  often  spoke  about  cancer  in  children  in  an  entirely 
different way to adult cancers. Childhood cancer represented the unthinkable 
and the unexplainable. Few participants were close to a child with cancer and 
one participant, Emily, surmised that not having to confront or think about it 
obviated  the  need  for  explanation.  This  confirms  the  ideas  held  in  the 
psychological  notion  of  ‘availability  heuristics’  (Tversky  &  Kahneman  1981; 
Kapodi  et  al  2003),  which  claim  that  ideas  can  only  be  formed  from  the 
information available. Yet, the lack of experience made it no less frightening Chapter 9    157 
and many participants referred to childhood cancer as particularly ‘mean’ and 
‘cruel’.  
Childhood  cancer  was  most  frequently  linked  with  potential  environmental 
hazards and many participants saw cancer clusters as synonymous with childhood 
cancers. A number did question maternal behaviour and proposed that children 
were exposed in to carcinogens antenatally:  
Well,  you  don’t  know,  what  the  mother’s  been  doing  during  the 
pregnancy,  I  just  wonder  sometimes  if  the  mother  has  been  doing 
things that she shouldn’t do during pregnancy, you know have they 
come in contact with anything, I mean you just don’t know. Because I 
have never questioned anybody and I really don’t know anybody who 
has had a child that’s had cancer, so I really don’t know. (Jim 64, 
Affluent) 
What was striking about childhood cancers was the explicitly raised assertion, 
frequently repeated, that children simply did not deserve cancer. As Jessie’s 
borrowed narrative shows: repeatedly: 
Oh  ..  children  (sighs)  well  ..  I  know  that  my  friend  was  having 
radiotherapy and there was a little one of three and she just thought 
‘what harm has she done anybody?’ I mean children don’t deserve it 
and I don’t know why they get it, I really don’t … (Jessie 68 Affluent) 
The logical corollary of children not deserving cancer is that some people do 
deserve  cancer.  Moral  judgements  were  introduced  into  discussions  about 
children, and this will be returned to in the next section.  
9.8.2 Luck or random events 
All participants alluded to the role of luck, though not all were willing to elevate 
its importance: 
Well I don’t want to use the word luck so it’s got to be genetic; the 
cancer gene isn’t there for it to be started up. (Barry 74 Affluent) 
Luck was often the last explanation offered when all other plausible or logical 
positions had been exhausted. The presence of cancer in those adopting ‘good’ 
behaviours  and  the  escape  of  those  engaging  in  bad  behaviours  served  to 
emphasise the significance of luck. Irrespective of the terms used, whether luck, Chapter 9    158 
random events, or fate, there was an overwhelming view that behaviours can go 
some  way  to  reducing  risk  but  there  is  nothing  that  can  guarantee  that  any 
individual will or can escape cancer: 
I  don’t  think  that  if  you  are  healthy  that  you  necessarily  escape 
things. I don’t think that there is a rule you know because you’re 
healthy  you  don’t  get  anything  bad  happening  to  you,  I  think 
ultimately,  its  just  the  luck  of  the  draw,  I  suppose.  (Rona  31 
Deprived) 
9.9  Morality 
The stigma surrounding cancer, apparent in many of the participants’ formative 
years, was attributed to fear of the unknown. Cancer equalled death, which only 
strengthened the taboo. Today the openness around cancer and its causes has 
led  to  a  shift  in  the  source  of  shame.  Health  promotion  messages  place  the 
responsibility firmly with individuals (Chapple, Zeibland & McPherson 2004). The 
pervasiveness and profile of such messages leave few able to discount the risks 
or claim a lack of awareness when opting to engage in risky behaviours. This was 
not true a generation ago when the ill effects of risky behaviours, like smoking, 
were not fully realised. The emphasis on individual responsibility renders those 
that ignore advice behaviourally immoral. Peter captures cancer’s socio-cultural 
status: 
I don’t have any hang ups at all about cancer I don’t see it as a stigma 
the way some people do. It’s not something you get by misbehaving 
or doing something wrong. Your lifestyle may contribute to it, and 
then again may not and people say that smoking causes cancer but 
people get lung cancer who have never smoked in their life and how 
do you explain that? There are all sorts of ailments and all sorts of 
things can be attributed as a cause of cancer but its not anything to 
feel  eh,  that  you’ve  done  something  wrong.  Yet,  a  lot  of  people 
won’t talk about it, won’t discuss it and it can hit anybody and it 
doesn’t matter whether you are rich poor, young or old or whether 
you live a healthy lifestyle or don’t. I suppose more people who don’t 
live healthy lifestyles are at risk and the statistics would show that if 
you have a low income and a poor diet and you drink too much and 
smoke  too  much  and  live  a  riotous  life, you’re  more  likely  to  get 
cancer.  But  there’s  no  guarantee  that  anyone  will  or  won’t  get 
cancer. (Peter 67 Deprived)  
Moral judgements about behaviour feature strongly in many interviews, often 
explicitly. In the following extract Jessie is searching for possible explanations Chapter 9    159 
for  cancer  events,  and  although  she  referred  directly  to  heart  disease  and 
strokes, her view hints at her broader moral position on behaviour: 
Again, stress of every day life and work, that can cause strokes and 
heart but that’s not to say that these people are leading a bad life. 
They’re not smoking, drinking and going out at night and what have 
you but they’ve got a lot of stress of work and that can cause …. 
People that are not in work that have no worries at all (laughs) they 
seem to be the ones that are getting away with everything they don’t 
have to worry about the heating, the lighting and they’re the ones 
that drink and smoke and what have you. (Jessie 68, Affluent) 
This was not the only reference to worklessness; in the following extract Jim 
draws  comparisons  between  drug-misusers  and  the  working  population  and 
comments on fairness:  
Junkies, they’ve no veins to inject they’re into in here, they’re into 
their legs right down and they’re still injecting they’re still getting 
the treatment and they’re still alive and there’s other folk they’re 
no  doing  any  harm  they’ve  worked  all  their  way  through  life  and 
they’re away, you know. But that’s just, life isn’t it fair. (Jim 64 
Affluent)  
The inference here is that some people do not deserve cancer. Echoes of this 
notion are found in discussions about childhood cancer where the overwhelming 
assertion was that children do not deserve cancer. If children are regarded as 
undeserving, is the corollary of this that some people do deserve cancer? 
9.9.1 Who deserves cancer? 
Participants  did  not  openly  suggest  at  any  point  that  individuals  deserved 
cancer,  although  those  that  were  judged  to  have  behaved  badly  or  ‘abused’ 
themselves were hinted at frequently. Cancer, as has been shown elsewhere in 
this chapter, is understood to be an unfair and fundamentally tragic life event. If 
children are undeserving because of their innocence, are the guilty deserving? 
Who  are  the  guilty?  The  emphasis  on  individual  behaviour  in  aetiology  has 
elevated health choices to the status of moral positions. By engaging in ‘bad’ 
behaviour  individuals  have  rendered  themselves  susceptible  to  cancer  and 
ultimately to blame for their illness. Yet for some this went further than health 
behaviour.  Lisa  described  her  anger  at  her  husband’s  cancer  diagnosis, 
particularly as he had done the ‘right’ things:  Chapter 9    160 
Lisa: I said in relation to (husband), I was bloody mad, ‘Its not fair, 
why did that have to happen to him, he’s a good person, he’s never 
done anything to deserve that so, you know that made me very angry 
I…..You said there, you know you would get quite angry and say that 
he didn’t deserve this, does that suggest that some people do?   
Lisa:  No,  (pause)  no  that’s  it,  I  think  its  not  a  rational  way  to 
think, no you’re quite right (laughs) I suppose it would be a really 
nice world if people that abused children and were really horrible got 
cancer and died, that would be lovely but I mean I know that’s not 
the case, but whether or not some people deserve it.   
I I just mean … earlier on you said, people, they lead good lives and 
yet they get cancer 
Lisa : Yeah, some people do (laughs)   Uh huh there are people who 
do all the wrong things and I don’t necessarily mean morally, I mean 
behaviourally, and seem to get away with it. (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
The discomfort felt when the natural order of life is disrupted is evident in the 
following extract. Jim and Phyllis, a couple interviewed together, talk generally 
about illness and they move quickly from discussing age to behaviour. Both in 
the context of morality:   
Jim: My sister died at eighteen and I was very bitter, very angry, very 
bitter, very anti-church, anti-Christian type 
Phyllis: There’s no answer to that. 
Jim: No,  I  know  there’s  no  but  what I  meant  was  it  changes your 
outlook and your attitude tae things, you know.  You’re saying young 
people go and die of cancer. Why has that young person gone and the 
old granny whose had a good life and still there, you know. 
Phyllis: Or worse than that people who do really bad things.Those 
that are in jail locked up (Jim 64 & Phyllis 57, Affluent) 
9.10 Degree of difference or similarity in accounts of 
meaning and understanding 
What  was  striking  about  the  data  generated  from  the  interviews  was  the 
similarly  in  accounts.  Although  participants  were  of  different  ages,  genders, 
socio-economic  backgrounds,  and  had  different  personal  and  professional 
experiences of cancer their views were typically homogenous. Ordinary views of Chapter 9    161 
cancer, even amongst those with a close experience of cancer, are dominated by 
a combination of media publicity and health education messages. Experiences 
too,  despite  individual  nuances  were  remarkably  similar.  Even  within  single 
accounts participants provided a number of examples that confirmed their view 
of cancer. Angus described his brother who died suddenly of pancreatic cancer, 
and of another brother suddenly diagnosed with mantle cell, and this fixed his 
view that ‘you never know when you have it (cancer)’. Subsequent narratives 
generally served to strengthen his evidence. This model appears again and again. 
As has been shown elsewhere in this chapter experiences provide the storyline 
for  explanatory  models,  and  they  are  compared  with  established  bio-medical 
explanations.  All  of  the  explanations  for  cancer  that  might  have  been 
anticipated  were  explored  during  the  interviews.  Most  were  introduced 
unprompted by the participants. The relative importance of causal factors varied 
among participants but this was not socially patterned.  
Beliefs about, and experience of, health is socially patterned and some of these 
patterns are mirrored in this data. Women were over-represented in the sample 
and they also had more experience on which to draw. As such women tended to 
offer more information and have more complex explanatory models. This may 
simply  reflect  their  experience.  If  a  male  participant  had  a  close  personal 
experience they too had much to offer. Males relied more heavily on scientific 
explanations and most believed that everything could be explained. Males were 
most  likely,  for  example,  to  be  sceptical  about  clusters.  The  youngest 
respondent certainly had given the least thought to cancer, yet the same is true 
of the eldest, probably because neither had little direct experience of cancer.  
9.11 Chapter Summary 
In  this  chapter  a  detailed  description  of  participants’  explanatory  models  of 
cancer have been outlined. The findings show that while the fear and dread 
associated with cancer is paramount, there have been very real changes during 
the second half of last century. Nevertheless, cancer continues to mean fear. 
For most cancer means tragedy, though this is most likely the result of media 
portrayal  rather  than  personal  experience.  All  participants  were  aware  of 
someone who was now ‘living with cancer’. Both smoking and sun exposure were 
recognised universally as risk factors but knowledge of other risk factors was Chapter 9    162 
patchy.  The  role  of  alcohol  and  exercise  in  particular  were  not  recognised. 
Other, what are often called mythic factors, were cited including environmental 
and  social  factors.  Most  participants  were  generally  cautious  about  making 
aetiological  links  between  many  of  these  factors.  There  was,  particularly 
amongst the female participants, a tendency to be nostalgic for a time when life 
was  more  ‘natural’.  Clearly  behavioural  factors  are  often  at  the  heart  of 
explanatory  models,  though  fatalistic  ideas  of  luck  and  randomness  are 
introduced when no other cause can be located. Allied to this is the idea of a 
dormant  gene,  triggered  by  a  series  of  factors.  Essentially  this  represents  a 
quasi-scientific interpretation of luck. The findings show that underlying moral 
judgements are often implicit in conversations about health. 
What does this data tell us about the utility of lay epidemiology and cancer? 
Chapter 10 focuses on how the data generated in interviews relates to the lay 
epidemiology model.  163 
10.  Lay Epidemiology and cancer 
10.1 Introduction: lay epidemiology revisited 
This chapter concentrates solely on lay epidemiology. Chapters 8 and 9 looked 
first at the participants’ experience of cancer, before going on to consider what 
meaning and understanding of cancer they had derived from their experience.  
What  these  chapters  demonstrate  is  that  although  personal  experiences  of 
cancer varied, there are a relatively small number of common, typical narratives 
that  characterise  the  cancer  experience.  The  original  concept  of  lay 
epidemiology referred to a system that drew on information from a variety of 
sources in order to formulate ideas about CHD risk: 
“ …… refers to a scheme in which individuals interpret health risks 
through the routine observation and discussion of cases of illness and 
death in personal networks and in the public area, as well as formal 
and informal evidence arising from other sources, such as television 
and magazines” (Frankel, Davison & Davey-Smith 1991:428) 
The  mechanism  central  to  the  model  is  ‘candidacy’,  which  allows  the 
identification of individuals thought to typify the most or least likely candidates 
for heart disease. Key, is that individuals recognise that candidacy is fallible. 
Fallibility  is  operationalised  through  the  evocation  of  anomalous  deaths  and 
unwarranted survivors. Irrespective of its flaws, candidacy provides the basis for 
an estimation of risk, both in oneself and others. 
This final chapter of findings presents the data generated in interviews, using 
the concepts embedded within lay epidemiology as an analytic framework.  The 
key areas of explanatory models, risk and candidacy will be reflected on.  
10.2 Explanatory models: the need for explanation 
It is accepted that people need to better understand events and often construct 
models to explain the cause of illness (Kleinman 1980). The participants in this 
study were no different, and while they may not reach definitive answers, those 
with close family members affected by cancer describe a process where they 
searched for explanations or meanings. A criticism of qualitative work and of 
content analysis is that it decontextualises narratives and fails to account for the Chapter 10    164 
potential influence of biographical circumstances on findings (Wilkinson 2000). 
‘Proximity’  attempts  to  address  this  potential  shortcoming.  As  already 
described, proximity refers to the level of closeness to people with cancer. Of 
course there is a need to be cautious because perceived ‘closeness’ varies within 
families. For example, Janet described the shock of a paternal aunt dying of oral 
cancer and how the event had forced her to re-evaluate her own behaviour. 
Meanwhile Lorna reported that she felt lucky that cancer did not appear in her 
family but went on to recount details of the cancer deaths of a paternal aunt 
and uncle. Allowing for such caveats, the findings show that those with a closer 
proximity  to  cancer discussed  the  general  subject in a  more  thoughtful  way; 
they tended to be more proactive in seeking information and were more dogged 
in  trying  to  establish  causes.  Blaxter  (1982)  advised  that  any  discussion  of 
disease typically results in a discussion of causality and the subject turned to 
causes  very  quickly  in  most  interviews.  Yet,  proximity  can  refer  not  only  to 
familial ‘closeness’ but also temporal closeness. Grace, whose husband had died 
of colorectal cancer six years before the interview, seemed to be less concerned 
with understanding than other participants in similar but more recent positions.  
If an event is relatively fresh it is possible that participants remember more 
detail.  Instead,  Grace  conveyed  a  general  feeling  rather  than  precise  detail. 
Indeed, Grace’s husband was first diagnosed ten years before his death, so her 
experience could reasonably be termed historical.  
Previous  chapters  demonstrated  that  participants  used  narratives  to  express 
their views and to provide evidence for their positions. This method of discussing 
cases anecdotally was also found by Scanlon et al (2006) in their focus group 
study that considered the experience of cancer amongst the Irish community in 
the UK. Embedded in such narrative accounts within this study were questions 
and ponderings about why the disruptive event, namely cancer, had occurred. 
Understandably,  this  need  was  felt  most  keenly  among  those  with  a  closer 
proximity to cancer. Peter suggested that this goes beyond cancer and may be 
applied to other illness experiences: 
I think people don’t think a great deal about cancer if there is no one 
they know, or in their family or their good friend who has had it or 
has  lost  someone  from  it  or  is  suffering  from  it.  It’s  really  when 
someone they know takes it that they really start to think about it Chapter 10    165 
and that’s true of a whole lot of things, not just cancer (Peter 67 
Deprived) 
What Peter is describing here, only thinking about an illness when confronted 
with it, is not uncommon. Salant & Gehlert (2008) reported that this was the 
reason given by their focus group participants for not considering their risk of 
breast cancer. More generally this is a notion which fits in with health being 
synonymous with an absence of disease and need only be tackled in response to 
an illness event (Blaxter 1990).  
Cancer,  as  illustrated  in  previous  chapters,  continues  to  represent  fear  and 
unpredictability.  Making  better  sense  of  the  event  might  help  to  deal  with 
traumatic episodes. The following extract captures Clare’s search for meaning 
about mother’s case and her need to gather relevant information to bolster her 
explanatory  model.  It  also  shows  that  Clare,  though  not  “actually  really 
researchingit”, does admit that she will now read articles she may previously 
have thought irrelevant to her: 
My mum’s breast cancer, I guess that was more of a surprise, a big 
surprise  because  she  was  a  very  healthy  person,  very  fit  active 
healthy, good diet. I mean, all the boxes you think you should ticking 
so that was a big shock. But I suppose in retrospect em although my 
sister  and  I  have  looked  at  it  and  thought  there  was  a  lot  of 
emotional issues and wonder whether there wasn’t a  psychological 
element going on there. And I suppose em, you know, in terms of just 
in a more general picture I’m quite, I guess I’m quite open about it 
because I think well there are some quite clear physical things that 
are  going  to  make  the  risk  factor,  the  risk  of  getting  it  greater. 
There’s also the genetic line and there’s also I think a psychological 
or  emotional  element  involved  in  it  as  well.  And  I  don’t  know 
whether I’ve come to that view because I’ve experienced more of I, 
em cause my dad’s mother, my grandmother, also died of cancer but 
she was a good age it wasn’t sort of ...  Em (sigh) or and I suppose I 
have  probably,  I  haven’t  like  actually  really  researched  it  despite 
what I have experienced but I guess I’ve read articles, you know, if 
I’ve come across stuff in newspapers and things, I mean now I would 
probably read it. So I guess maybe that’s why I have more a mixed 
view about some of the causes. (Clare 42 Affluent) 
10.3 Developing a personal evidence base 
The  lay  epidemiology  scheme  described  by  Davison  is  mirrored  in  the  data 
generated in this study. A similarly complex model of information gathering and Chapter 10    166 
analysis  was  apparent  and  within  interviews  participants’  talk  often  flitted 
between descriptions of close personal experiences, examples from discussions 
held within wider social networks, established health education messages, and 
information  gleaned  from  the  mass  media.  The  data  presented  show  an 
unquestionable level of sophistication in their explanatory models.  
The above extract from Clare encapsulates the model in action. Her mother’s 
cancer event challenges her previous knowledge about cancer. She is required to 
consider  alternative  explanations,  and  does  so  in  light  of  information  from 
legitimate  sources.  Her  explanatory  model  is  adapted  to  accommodate  new 
experience.  It  is  no  surprise  that  this  formula  has  a  role  in  the  search  for 
explanation.  It  seems  logical  that  individuals  will  consider  their  most  recent 
experience,  compare it  with  the  data  that  they already hold  both  from  past 
experience  and  wider  information  sources,  and  reshape  their  belief  model 
accordingly.  Individuals  construct  their  own  personal  ‘evidence  base’  by 
synthesising  what  they  ‘know’.  Such  a  base  is  not  static;  it  is  adjusted  to 
incorporate new data, both contradictory and confirming. In this respect it is 
comparable to traditional scientific approaches to dealing with evidence.  
10.3.1 Gathering evidence 
Evidence took many forms. As detailed in previous chapters, evidence was not 
confined to close experience, nor did participants rely solely on official sources. 
Instead it was a hybrid. Personal experience, instances from social networks and 
the community, cases reported in the media, information from professionals, 
research (as presented by the media) and health education have all been shown 
to have a role in informing the model. Not all sources were given equal weight:  
You read what you read in the papers and you usually take what you 
read in the papers with a pinch of salt, but it does put the thought 
there like the mobile phone masts and things. But it’s not, I don’t 
drive around and think ‘Oh look at all this pollution that’s causing 
cancer.’ I don’t drive around or, ‘there’s a telephone mast I bet folk 
around there have got’. (Emily 37, Affluent) 
The relative weight of importance given to each source depends on proximity 
and  individual  experience,  which  is  subject  to  change.  Participants  reported 
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all that was required to reshape their explanatory model. As already detailed, 
Clare provides an account of how her mother’s breast cancer event had changed 
her view because she could not ‘tick’ any of the expected ‘boxes’. Similarly, 
Emily discussed her uncle’s unpredictable throat cancer and reported that this 
had  forced  her  to  look  beyond  lifestyle  factors  when  judging  causality.  More 
specifically Jessie tells of her re-evaluation of the protective benefits of breast-
feeding: 
I  always  thought  that  if  you  breast  fed  you  had  less  chance  of 
developing breast cancer and .my friend in Edinburgh, she breast fed 
and she developed breast cancer, so my theory is sort of out the door 
in that respect. (Jessie 68, Affluent) 
What all three of these participants highlight is that information need not be 
received from a close family event to force a re-evaluation. Although for Clare 
her mother’s cancer had prompted the search for alternative explanations and 
cast doubt on her received view. Emily however, talked about her uncle, who 
she also described as being in her wider family. This was partly because he did 
not live locally and more importantly because he was not actually ‘related’ to 
her. He was her uncle by marriage. Finally, Jessie is describing information from 
her  social  network.  These  are  three  distinct  levels  of  relationship  at  varying 
distances but all experiences had significantly altered explanatory models.  
10.3.2  Expert sources of information: the certainty of science 
A  coronary  candidate  is  recognised  both  by  the  lay  epidemiologist,  and  the 
‘expert’ alike. The term lay epidemiologist referred to the means employed, like 
the gathering and ordering of evidence, by ordinary people to arrive at a risk 
estimate for CHD. Among the South Wales cohort there was a clear acceptance 
and  understanding  of  the  current  ‘expert’  risk  factors  for  CHD.  Ultimately 
Davison’s model of lay epidemiology for coronary candidacy is reliant on such an 
understanding amongst the lay public. For Davison and colleagues the challenge 
posed  by  lay  epidemiology  was  in  the  realm  of  health  promotion,  and  in 
particular  the  ‘certainties’  it  promoted.  The  lay  epidemiologist  is  adept  at 
making risk assessments. Moreover, by acknowledging the failure inherent in the 
candidacy model they arrive at a position, according to Davison, that makes it 
easier to prevaricate about behaviour messages. What if the lay view is more at Chapter 10    168 
odds with the scientific view? What if the epidemiology of cancer is less well 
understood? Some participants were slightly sceptical about the knowledge of 
science in the area of cancer. The unpredictable and random nature of cancer 
meant that many participants felt that science could not explain cancer and that 
‘they’, the doctors, were sometimes no surer: 
I think again, I think, maybe I’m completely wrong here, but what I 
can glean from the media and the newspapers is that maybe they are 
getting closer as regards some specific cancers but they are totally in 
the dark about others (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
I  think  bit  by  bit  you  can  find  associations  and  manage  types  or 
whatever  maybe  find  preventative  like  gene  therapy  that  kind  of 
thing but I’m not quite sure whether science will ever be able to take 
away the risk completely (Emily 37, Affluent) 
I think there’s a lot of things that science can’t prove or disprove and 
some  things  aren’t  logical.  I  mean  why  does  homeopathy  and 
acupuncture  and  things  like  that  work  for  some  people  and  not 
others? Is it faith? I’m not a greatly religious person but you can’t 
explain some of the things that happen (Peter, 67 Deprived) 
Colin often expressed his faith in science and in particular his scepticism about 
the  environmental  causes  of  cancer.  Ultimately  though  Colin  questioned  the 
certainty of science: 
I mean, point to the electricity pylon that’s what I was going to say. 
The  electricity  pylon  stuff  and  mobile  phones  and  mobile  phone 
masts and all that. As I understand it there is as yet no hard scientific 
evidence which says either mobile phone use or mobile phone masts 
do  generate  cancer  hotspots……  but  my  understanding  is  that  em 
medical  science  still  does  not  properly  understand  where  cancer 
comes from eh what causes it, you know, what the physical triggers 
are  and  so  on  although,  you  know.  We  know  that  certain 
circumstances will make its instance more likely (Colin 61, Affluent) 
Although this represented a contradiction, it does hint at the cultural position of 
cancer in society. Cancer is represented by uncertainty both at an individual and 
at a population level. Many possible causes, some controversial, are trailed in 
the mass media and although often controversies are easily dismissed, the lack 
of certainty looms large.  Chapter 10    169 
10.4 Comparisons with Coronary Heart Disease  
As Davison’s original theory of lay epidemiology emerged from an ethnographic 
study with Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) as its focus, it was judged appropriate 
to ask participants in this study to compare CHD and cancer. There was universal 
agreement within this study group that CHD was ‘easier’ to explain than cancer. 
Participants  seemed  surer  of  CHD  causality.  Like  Davison’s  cohort,  CHD  was 
perceived to be caused by behaviours, primarily diet, but a strong family link 
was also apparent. The following extracts are typical of those found throughout 
interviews: 
I think heart disease, if you don’t exercise and eat lots of fatty food 
and if there is a predisposition of heart disease in your family then I 
would say possibly the chances are you’ll get that yes, uh huh. (Elsie 
62 Affluent) 
Heart disease again, heart attacks run in some families and not in 
others. Diet is a big contributory factor and lack of exercise, fatty 
foods, eh, eating the wrong types of fatty foods em, I (pause) don’t 
know if I can explain it. Cancer I think is much more complicated and 
there’s more varieties, versions of it. (Peter 67, Deprived)  
Whereas  in  heart  disease,  again  as  I  as  a  total  lay  person,  as  I 
understand it then, you know, the physical causes of heart disease 
are quite clearly understandable and the physical actions or inactions 
that lead up to these things being in place are understandable and 
understood and so in that sense it’s yeah it’s better understood and 
so on. I mean the actual genus of cancer may not be understood but 
the circumstances in which it’s likely to arise pretty well understood I 
think. (Colin 61, Affluent) 
There was also a tendency to believe that heart disease was easier to control or 
protect against:  
I’d be more likely if you asked me if diet and exercise were likely to 
influence your chances of dying from heart disease, I’d be more likely 
to say. Now again, I’m totally unscientific, I don’t have any medical 
knowledge at all but I would say that its easier to affect your life 
chances  from  the  point  of  view  of  heart  disease  than  of  cancer 
because to me it just seems totally random, you know children that 
get  leukaemia  and  things  like  that,  they  don’t  all  live  beside  a 
chemical  plant  so,  I  don’t  know,  I  honestly  don’t  know.  (Lisa  45, 
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These extracts illustrate participants’ confidence in a better understanding of 
CHD. The perception is that CHD is relatively simple and the mechanisms that 
result  in  CHD  are  easily  explained.  The  same  is  not  true  of  cancer.  This 
resonates with Balshem’s (1991) findings, where participants saw heart disease 
as ‘a matter of mechanics gone wrong’ (Balshem 1991:158) while participants 
response to questions about cancer ‘touched on universal mysteries’ (Balshem 
1991:158).  Cancer’s  relative  complexity  was  also  displayed  in  the  pictorial 
images offered by participants in Weiss’ study (1997). Davison suggested that lay 
knowledge and understanding of CHD was good. Typically studies suggest that 
lay knowledge and understanding of cancer is poor (Randhawa & Owens 2004; 
Scanlon et al 2006) both in terms of cause and risk, and when unpicked many 
persistent misconceptions are uncovered (Dein 2004).  
Essentially this provides a significant challenge for those tasked with spreading 
messages about cancer prevention. Davison and colleagues commented on the 
width of the candidacy concept. Any factors, even those at opposite ends of a 
spectrum, for example no physical exercise and over-exercise, could be used 
retrospectively as an explanation for a cardiac event. With the exceptions of 
smoking  and  sun  exposure,  the  risk  factors  associated  with  cancers,  in 
comparison with CHD, are relatively poorly understood. Thus explanations based 
on misconceptions like stress or triggers become more plausible.  
10.5 Assessing risk 
The estimation of risk is at the crux of the lay epidemiology model and this will 
be  returned  to  repeatedly  in  the  remainder  of  this  chapter.  Davison  and 
colleagues  concluded  that  while  it  was  relatively  straightforward  to 
retrospectively decide causes in relation to a CHD event, deciding the future 
probability of an event is more challenging. Davison and colleagues thought this 
applied equally to oneself and others. The entire scheme rests on individuals 
basing judgements about risk on evidence and consequently forming a reasoned 
opinion about relative risk. At the centre of this risk assessment is the creation 
of an ideal type or what Davison referred to as ‘candidacy’. Comparing oneself 
and others to the candidate profile allows future risk assessments to be made. 
Before going on to explore candidacy, participants  assessment of risk will be 
looked at in more detail.  Chapter 10    171 
10.5.1  Population Incidence 
Participants were initially asked about their awareness of the population risk of 
cancer. At least half of the participants believed the risk to be one in three, in 
line  with  current  health  information.  The  interpretation  of  risk  among  some 
participants was noteworthy. Angus was one of four siblings. His elder brother 
had already died of pancreatic cancer and another brother had recently been 
diagnosed  with  a  rare  form  of  colorectal  cancer.  Both  he  and  his  youngest 
brother remained healthy. Angus understood the statistic quite literally:   
Well the (sigh) the one in three, right, I reckon from my generation, 
of my family, according to one in three, I’m safe now. But according 
to my family, my wife, my daughters, one of the four of us in that 
group should have cancer of some type. But that’s what should, if you 
go by the stats (Angus, 57, Affluent) 
In  previous  studies  of  cancer  awareness  the  link  between  age  and  cancer  is 
poorly recognised for certain cancer sites (Paul et al 1999; Keighley et al 2004). 
Some  participants  in  this  study  did  make  such  associations.  Here,  Kathleen 
makes a distinction between ‘lifetime’ risk and absolute risk:  
Well according to billboards and things like that, they say three in 
five. Bowel cancer I think they say one in seven or one in eight or 
sometimes as low as one in six, depending on, you know if you have 
cancer already in your family. So, its not surprising if you stop and 
think about that. I do know quite a lot of people over the last two or 
three years who have had cancer and also your risk gets higher as you 
get older and more of us are living, I don’t feel as if I’ve lived my life 
yet, but more of us are living longer, so we are going to have people 
being diagnosed I suppose, you know in the later, I mean your risk for 
breast  cancer  is  much  greater  once  you’re  over  50,  I  think  it  is 
(Kathleen 68, Affluent). 
Others studies (Humpel and Jones 2004; McMenamin et al 2005; Linsell et al 
2008)  have  found  that  participants  both  under-estimated  and  overestimated 
their risk and both positions were found among participants in this study. Peter, 
for example: 
I would have thought you’ve got a 50/50 chance of having some form 
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The  previous  chapter  revealed  that  most  participants  felt  that  cancer  was 
common and was becoming more so. Nevertheless, many were surprised that 
that overall population risk was as high as one in three. Some perceived this to 
be an extremely high level of risk. This was particularly true in the deprived 
community.  
10.5.2 Personal Risk 
Assessment  of  personal  risk  had  three  distinct,  but  often  overlapping, 
components. Participants thought about the risks associated with their behaviour 
and  family  history  but  also  their  estimation  of  risk  in  light  of  the  perceived 
commonality of cancer.  
Participants  were  not  asked  directly  about  their  behaviour  but  often  the 
discussion  strayed  into  that  area.  Typically  the  conversation  about  behaviour 
centred on diet and exercise. Health education messages about consumption of 
ample  fruit  and  vegetables,  and  drinking  within  sensible  limits,  were  well 
established. Most participants reported that they were ‘good’ most of the time, 
but there was a tendency to think about behaviours in terms of ‘moderation’, as 
Backett (1992a) also found in her Edinburgh cohort. This was strongly bound with 
the  notion  that  denying  oneself  ‘the  odd  treat’  could  ultimately  prove 
detrimental to one’s health. The key to health was a balance. In the following 
extract Peter echoes what Davison found in Wales, that being too fit could be 
equally damaging:  
There’s nothing wrong, I think, in having the odd unhealthy meal and 
who’s to say its unhealthy but not if you were eating it breakfast 
lunch and dinner, seven nights a week. Chinese takeaways or Indian 
takeaways then you’re asking for trouble with weight, with health 
and other things and I think the secret is having a balanced diet but 
no matter what you do you could still. I mean look at the number of 
people that go out jogging and drop dead with heart attacks, yet to 
all intents and purposes they are very fit. Fitness and health are not 
necessarily  the  same  thing.  People  can  be  healthy  and  unfit  and 
people can be fit and unhealthy (Peter 67, Deprived) 
Again Kathleen and Jessie both emphasise the value of moderation: 
I think it should always be said that, well they don’t want you to sit 
in  your house  well, they want you to exercise for everything don’t Chapter 10    173 
they? But you don’t want to sit in your house and be frightened to eat 
this,  that  and  the  next  thing.  I  really  think  its  all  things  in 
moderation. I had an iced-bun last night and I will have another iced-
bun - because it was a pack of two (laughs) but I do eh, use Bertoli 
and I use semi-skimmed milk. In fact, I buy organic. (Kathleen 68, 
Affluent) 
Oh, I’m very careful with my diet, we do have a Chinese carry-out, 
don’t think that we’re goody goody every night, we do have a Chinese 
carry out and we go out for a meal every now and again but at home 
its good basic food and we’ve got biscuits in the house (whispers) but 
we try not to. If someone gives me chocolates, I eat them (laughs) 
because its bad manners not to but I shouldn’t really. Och, a little bit 
of what you fancy, everything in moderation. I just say, everything in 
moderation and if I get it, I get it but if I don’t I’ve worked hard not 
to get it. (Jessie 68, Affluent) 
Many  of  the  participants  reported  that  they  engaged  in  healthy  behaviour 
because that is what they enjoyed. The avoidance of cancer or other diseases 
was not the motivation for their habits. In the following extract Colin highlights 
what he sees as the basic rules, before going on to give his reasons for following 
the rules: 
And, you know, eat a sensible diet and take sensible exercise and 
breathe some decent air once in a while, don’t sit in your car all the 
time  the  normal  basic  rules  and  em  your  likelihood  of  having 
problems is reduced but that’s about as far as it goes isn’t it?  
Later he adds  
But no, I mean I didn’t start off being self conscious about my health, 
I started out by being self conscious about doing things that I enjoy 
doing and just by and large they just happened to be healthy things. 
(Colin 61, Affluent) 
A few participants were less positive about their risks and were aware that their 
current lifestyle was unhealthy and may increase their risk of cancer:  
Well,  certainly  higher  (risk)  than  my  wife’s  and  higher  than  my 
brother’s because of the amount of alcohol, and food, I mean I don’t 
eat enough vegetables – I take a vitamin tablet now and again. I will 
go over the 20 units of alcohol, I’m not saying I’m proud of that but I 
probably have 35 or 40 a week. (Andrew 57, Affluent) 
I mean likes of just noo I’m overweight the noo I’m aboot four, five 
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bit mair than I usually drink. If I go on a diet and start eh eating 
properly  and  daen  a  wee  bit  mair  running,  I  could  easily  go  oot 
running  eh  and  that  will  kind  of  help  me  against  it.  (Gary  37, 
Affluent) 
Smoking was seen as a major risk factor and only a handful of those interviewed 
smoked. Those that did smoke were clearly aware of the damaging effects of 
smoking. Colin, who outlined the basic rules above described his behaviour, in 
terms of smoking, as “stupid” but reported that he had “cut down” and had 
previously attempted to give up. He was keen to bring attention to the healthy 
behaviours he did engage in and his belief that he was “healthier” than most 
people, thus offsetting the overall risk of smoking. Josephine, who also smoked, 
was instead keen to stress that other factors as well as smoking were important:  
Don’t get me wrang, I mean I dae say, aye smoking’s a contributory 
factor but it’s no the be all and end all. (Josephine 61, Deprived) 
All  of  the  smokers  excused  their  continued  smoking  by  discussing  additional 
health problems. Careful monitoring of cholesterol, for example, was seen as a 
more immediate challenge than the threat posed by smoking. Not surprisingly 
smoking was always negative. Some participants talked about family members 
who had smoked and were eager to portray their relatives in a manner that 
removed  smokers’ culpability.  Murray  was  clear that,  as  he put  it,  “avoiding 
carcinogens” was the key to avoiding cancer. Tobacco was foremost among those 
carcinogens. Murray went on to report that both of his parents had smoked but 
placed their behaviour in its historical context, which he felt was important: 
Well my parents would have started smoking I suppose as most people 
do in their late or mid teens which would put it back to the First 
World War and the risks I think were not generally known, not even 
amongst the scientific community at that time. So, you know, I don’t 
think they were foolish (Murray 83, Affluent)  
Murray was fairly vehement in his anti-smoking stance yet towards the close of 
the interview he returns to his mother’s death:  
Well interestingly enough when my mother, although  I don’t know 
why a post mortem was asked for, I didn’t ask for it, it must have 
been my brother but she had a tumour on one lung but on the other 
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probably  wouldn’t have  killed her  and  she  lived  to  be  92  anyway. 
(Murray 83, Affluent) 
Here Murray reveals that his mother did indeed have lung cancer, but he is keen 
to stress that it remained undiscovered and would not have killed her. Murray 
was rare in that he began the interview by stating that he knew no one ‘close’ 
with cancer and that he had little to offer, though evidently his mother had lung 
cancer. That she had not died of lung cancer perhaps negated the need for him 
to incorporate this into his explanatory model.  
Risks were not confined to behavioural choices. As per participants’ explanatory 
model, a series of factors were taken into account when estimating risk. Most 
prominent was a family history. Those with a ‘family history’ of cancer did not 
necessarily always believe that this automatically  elevated their risk.  In the 
following extract Clare discusses her risk: 
No, I don’t I mean I suppose it’s one of those situations where I sort 
of think,  well if you put me in the sort of risk category boxes in 
terms of diet, lifestyle, stress, drinking,  any of those kinds of things. 
Well it’s no to all of those, em family history well yes there has been 
cancers in my family but all of them have been different. 
Later she adds: 
(Sigh)  Well I think it means that there’s no way you could sort of say 
“Well  it’s  likely  I  would  have  breast  cancer  or  bladder  cancer  or 
cancer of the uterus” just because that’s turned up in the family. I 
think  it’s  quite  likely  I  might  have  cancer  just  because  it’s  quite 
likely I might have cancer,  I mean I think that and I don’t think it’s 
not going to happen because I can tick all these boxes in the lifestyle 
thing. (Clare 42, Affluent) 
What  was  important  for  Clare  was  that  the  experience  was  of  ‘different’ 
cancers, and it might be inferred that she might feel differently if there had 
been  multiple  occurrences  of  the  same  cancer  within  her  family.  Yet  the 
occurrence of cancer in her family, despite healthy lifestyles has led her to re-
evaluate her risk. In light of her experience, she now thinks it likely that she 
might get cancer because lifestyle choice provides no guarantee and because 
cancer is common. Angus, who had also experienced more than one cancer in his 
immediate family, initially voiced some concern at the possible genetic link but 
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I don’t know I actually phoned my GP and said  “You know, I’ve got no 
signs, nothing’s happening,  I don’t feel any different. Well that’s 
two brothers died of cancer now and my niece has got cancer, now is 
there a family link? Should I be looking at anything should I take a 
pro-active approach or just wait and see?” And she came back and 
said “Well I’ll refer you to the Genetics Unit” or something. 
He added 
I’m not bothered it’s eh I’m quite sort of I don’t know optimistic, I 
don’t know what you would call it, optimistic, I’m  optimistic that 
it’ll never happen to me. And that’s the mental attitude I’m taking, 
it won’t happen to me because I’m doing all the right things and if it 
does happen to me I’ll fight it and I’ll win. (Angus 54, Affluent) 
Angus believed that his ‘good’ behaviour will supplant any possible familial links. 
Although Clare and Angus adopt different positions they do so in the context of 
more than one case of cancer in their immediate family. Both have considered 
the possibility of genetic links and both have dismissed them, though they arrive 
at their positions for different reasons. They also arrive at different conclusion. 
Other participants, who believed themselves to be in ‘cancer families’, thought 
that their risk was elevated. Kathleen thought of herself as being in a cancer 
family and although the majority of those cancer events were not amongst her 
immediate  relatives,  she  regarded  them  as  so.  Her  family  status  effectively 
cancelled out her ‘good’ behaviours:  
Kathleen: So, I think my risk might be slightly higher, I would have 
said  my risk  was  higher  than  my  friend who  is  going  into  hospital 
today (for colorectal cancer surgery) 
I: You would have said your risk was higher? 
Kathleen:  Yes,  well  the  number  of  people  in  my  family,  in  the 
immediate sides of my family except that I have probably not drunk 
or been as overweight, you know, as her, but looking at in anything 
you might get through your family line I would have said that my risk 
was higher than hers (Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
The majority of cancer within Kathleen’s family had been among her aunts and 
uncles. Pauline also had aunts and uncles who had died of cancer but she did not 
regard  this  as  her  “family”.  This  re-emphasises  the  importance  of  perceived 
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I  suppose  I’ve  got  the  same  risk  as  everybody  else  but  it’s  no 
something I worry about maybe because it’s never been in the family. 
(Pauline, 57 Deprived)  
Assessing one’s own risk in the comparison to someone else was more usual than 
thinking about oneself in the context of absolute risk. Moreover, because risk 
was  often  over  or  underestimated  when  compared  to  the  actual  population 
incidence, personal estimates were vague and ill-defined. Yet, it was unusual for 
participants to report that they felt that they were at an especially high risk of 
cancer.  It  was  more  usual  for  participants  to  state  that  their  risk  was  low. 
Murray, perceived his risk to be low and attributed this directly to his behaviour. 
The  following  extract  is  especially  interesting  because  as  the  earlier  section 
showed Murray’s mother had lung cancer. Though clearly because she did not die 
of lung cancer, this has not entered into his explanatory model:  
Very  low.  Because nobody  in  my  immediate  family  has  or  has  had 
cancer and I think there is a genetic element in there somewhere. 
Also I reduce my risks of not getting cancer by not being a smoker, 
never have smoked (Murray 83, Affluent) 
Participants  were  not  always  rational  or  logical  in  their  reasoning  around 
personal risk assessments. Elsie whose mother and husband both experienced 
cancer talked  about her  strategy  for avoiding  cancer.  Here,  she  hints  at  the 
importance of attitude as well as behaviour: 
I mean my mother was eighty-five when she got it, she only lived 
another two years. But I just think to myself “No that’s not for me” I 
don’t know, I just say “No I’m just going to lead my life and go out 
and do my walking and go to my wee keep-fit class and go and meet 
my friends and I’m not going to get it”. Maybe that’s stupidity on my 
point or naivety. (Elsie 62, Affluent) 
 
10.5.3  Risk of other individuals  
As has been shown in Chapter 9, there was not universal acceptance, with the 
obvious exceptions of smoking and sun exposure, of links between behavioural or 
environmental factors and cancer. Rather, there was a universally recognised 
model of ‘healthy’. Many of the cancer sufferers known to the participants fitted 
that ‘healthy’ typology, which ultimately made the estimation of risk in others 
difficult. There was the easy identification of those who should, according to Chapter 10    178 
their  behaviour,  get  cancer.  Clare  sums  up  the  difficulties  associated  with 
estimating risk in others: 
I think, you know, there are things like that, you know, big killers 
like heart attack and that seems to be, that can seem to be quite 
random as well but then you can look at other people and say oh yeah 
but you’ve got all the factors that’s a high likelihood. So I think I’m 
seeing a lot of diseases as yeah there’s one’s that people who tick a 
lot of the boxes and have the risk factors and another set of people 
who don’t really and yet they can still be affected in some instances 
(Clare 42 Affluent)  
As  Clare  states  the  relationship  between  known  risk  factors  and  disease 
occurrence was often not borne out in experience. As Julia notes when talking 
about a neighbour who was diagnosed with cancer and expresses her surprise at 
the diagnosis because she had always looked “healthy”: 
Because,  she  was  always  so  healthy  looking  and  working  hard  and 
everything  else  and  that  was  their  retrial.  They  had  sold  up  and 
moved to Millport to retire, even although she’s a fair number of 
years younger than me and she took cancer (Julia 65, Deprived) 
As  previously  noted  the  model  of  lay  epidemiology  provides  a  vehicle  for  an 
estimation  of  risk.  Central  to  that  estimation  was  the  identification  of  a 
candidate who is thought most likely to suffer CHD. The following section on 
candidacy will explore the estimation of risk further.  
10.6 Candidacy  
Davison  regarded  candidacy  as  a  critical  ‘cultural  mechanism’.  Coronary 
candidacy  broadly  captured  the  public’s  view  of  the  kind  of  people  who  are 
likely to experience or escape heart disease. Participants in this study rarely 
talked about cancer in such terms. Although it was plain that there were a series 
of factors that contribute to candidacy for cancer they were generally resistant 
to the idea that there was a ‘type of person’ who got cancer. In thinking this 
through, Gary made a direct comparison between CHD and cancer: 
You’re talking about diet and lack of exercise and everything. A lot of 
people are stressed and say “They’re gonnae kill themselves, they’re 
gonnae  have  a  heart  attack”  but  you  don’t  hear  people  say  “He’s 
eventually gonnae get cancer.” (Gary 37, Deprived) Chapter 10    179 
Gary’s statement is easily recognisable and encapsulates the universal language 
used  when  talking  about  disease.  Within  it  there  is  recognition  that  we  talk 
about heart disease and cancer in different ways and neatly illustrates many of 
the points made by those who consider the cultural position of disease (Sontag 
1978; Lupton 1994; Weiss 1997).  
This crucial difference between cancer and heart disease is also highlighted by 
Lisa:  
Do you know, its funny that, its not something I have ever thought 
but just doing a kind of quick inventory of all the people I’ve known 
who have had cancer, you know I can’t think of one single person, I 
would say, well yeah that was coming, no I can’t. No. I’ve known, as I 
say, I’ve known people who have maybe had a heart attack and died 
and I’ve thought “ Oh God yeah, I mean he was 48, two stone over 
weight  and  smoked  60  a  day  and  you  know  was  in  an  extremely 
stressful job as a lawyer” and you know when he dropped dead in the 
office you thought  hm, yeah, no surprise but not as regards cancer. 
(Lisa45, Affluent) 
Lisa,  in  her  description  of  the  CHD  sufferer,  includes  all  the  characteristics 
included in the coronary candidacy model described by Davison. Features of CHD 
candidacy are common in everyday illness narratives and Lisa demonstrates this 
by making direct comparisons with cancer. As both Gary and Lisa testify, the 
easy evocations of CHD candidacy tend not to apply to cancer, either universally 
or by participants in this study. Though Davison does allude to the problematic 
nature  of  the  term  candidate,  in  so  far  as  one  is  essentially  being  ask  to 
nominate oneself (or someone else) for a serious disease, coronary candidacy, 
especially in others is well-established.   
The reluctance of participants in this study to ‘single’ people out and ascribe 
candidacy points to the status of cancer in our society. The dreaded nature of 
cancer is well documented. Cancer was once stigmatised primarily because of a 
widespread  lack  of  understanding  of  cause  and  almost  certain  death  (Sontag 
1978,  Patterson  1987).  Although  stigma  remains  it  has  shifted  focus  slightly 
because of the emphasis on individual responsibility in disease prevention and 
avoidance.  Nowhere  is  this  more  evident  than  with  smoking.  The  attitude 
towards smokers displayed by some of the participants in this study resonates 
with other studies looking at smoking and personal responsibility (Muzzin et al Chapter 10    180 
1994,  Chapple,  Ziebland  &  McPherson  2004).  Yet,  there  continues  to  be  a 
significant  segment  in  the  cancer  puzzle  unaccounted  for  which  furthers 
misunderstanding and fear (Comaroff & Maguire 1982). The uncertainty and fear 
that shrouds cancer was sufficient to discourage some participants from making 
candidacy judgements:  
I don’t think you kind of single out so many people and say “Right I 
don’t think she’ll get cancer because” or “I think they two will have 
cancer” I widnae kind of single people out to say I think they would 
get it. (Karen 25, Deprived) 
Karen describes what Davison referred to as prospective candidacy. As previously 
noted, Davison conceded that retrospective candidacy, where candidacy is used 
as  an  account  for  past  events,  had  more  salience.  The  same  was  true  for 
participants in this study. It could be argued that using retrospective candidacy, 
as a mechanism to explain past illness events, seems obvious. It appears logical 
to deliberate known risk behaviour and judge whether they fitted the relevant 
disease  candidacy  type.  So  cancer  candidacy  was  accepted  for  smokers,  sun 
worshippers, those with unhealthy lifestyles and those exposed to environmental 
hazards.  In  the  following  extract  Lisa  discusses  the  candidacy  profile  of  an 
elderly  aunt  who  had  breast  cancer.  Eventually,  Lisa  concludes  that  breast 
cancer was not responsible for her aunt’s death but given her age and behaviour, 
judged her to be a likely candidate for breast cancer.  
My own aunt had actually died, she was diagnosed with breast cancer 
but um, again it sounds a bit odd to say but she was in her mid 80s 
and  she  smoked  very  heavily  all  her  life  so  she  was  kinda  dying 
anyway, you know she had lots of other illnesses and she had been in 
and  out  of  hospital  and  eventually  someone  said  “Oh  by  the  way, 
she’s got breast cancer as well”. So it was like, oh God, not that as 
well but em, in a sense, you know somebody said to me at the time, 
you know she’s not gonna die of it at that age, she’ll die of other 
things because it’s hormone driven, which again, I didn’t know. (Lisa 
45, Affluent)  
Similarly, Kathleen discusses her close friend recently diagnosed with colorectal 
cancer.  Elsewhere  in  her  interview  Kathleen  tells  that  she  had  sought 
information about colorectal cancer for her friend and in the following extract 
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She’s overweight, she has always been a bit overweight, she drank, I 
think  always  quite  a  lot,  and  em  but  had  stopped  smoking  maybe 
about 30 years ago but had done things maybe like the Atkins diets 
sometimes  and  all  that  fatty  stuff  you  know,  which  I  don’t  think 
really is a help to anybody. (Kathleen, 68, Affluent) 
What is interesting about Kathleen’s description of her friend’s candidacy for 
colorectal cancer is that when previously asked about her own risk, Kathleen had 
stated that she had thought her risk higher than her friend’s. She based this on 
her own family history. Kathleen had not previously recognised her friend as a 
candidate. But in the event of cancer and with the  presence of risk factors, 
Kathleen had retrospectively applied candidacy.  
Betty  also  talks  about  a  friend’s  behaviour.  Here  Betty  is  retrospectively 
applying  candidacy,  which  is  framed  by  newly  available  information.  In  this 
context prospective candidacy would not have been possible because, as Betty 
states, the links between sun-exposure and skin cancer were not widely known. 
Betty  is  however  able  to  make  a  judgement  of  candidacy  in  light  of  new 
evidence.  
Well I thought the girl with skin cancer eh she never, ever used any 
lotions but I’m going back, she’s dead now over twenty years, right  
… And she was in her forties as I say she was about forty-six and we 
didnae know about creams, you know, and she was a sun worshipper. 
She went to, she had a daughter was married to a boy in Tenerife, I 
couldnae remember the place, Tenerife, and they went there for six 
months  at  a  time.  Eh,  so  as  I  say,  I  felt  she  could  have  done 
something, she could have stayed out of the sun. (Betty 61, Deprived) 
Only once did a participant express surprise at someone having escaped cancer. 
Josephine’s  husband  had  died  of  CHD  but  she  had  been  sure  that  he  would 
develop colorectal cancer: 
I always thought he would take it, you know, wae the history of his 
mother and faither having it and him being overweight. (Josephine 
61, Deprived) 
Candidacy  judgements  are  not  confined  to  those  whose  behaviours  one  has 
knowledge of. In the following extract Grace discusses the case of John Wayne, 
who  also  died  of  cancer.  Though  Grace  is  unlikely  to  be  aware  of  his  risky Chapter 10    182 
behaviours,  she  made  a  link  with  widely  known  and  supposed  environmental 
risks:  
John  Wayne  died  of cancer of  the  throat  and  em  he  was  down  in 
Nevada or something where they’d been testing the nuclear, he was 
doing a film down there and quite a few of the people who were in 
the  desert  filming  spaghetti  westerns  and  things  like  that  died  of 
cancer where they were doing the nuclear tests. (Grace 63, Affluent) 
Although  judgements  of  candidacy  were  not  always  obvious  or  transparent, 
smokers were almost universal in being seen as cancer candidates. Before going 
on to explore candidacy, it is worth focusing on the importance of smoking and 
its significance for candidacy.  
10.6.1 Smoking – a special risk factor 
While  certain  behaviours,  like  the  all-encompassing  unhealthy  lifestyle,  were 
linked with cancer, smoking was afforded a special status.  When recounting a 
cancer  narrative,  the  sufferer’s  smoking  status  was  always  disclosed  at  the 
outset.  Davison  noted  the  importance  of  weight  or  physical  build  for  CHD 
candidacy and smoking assumed a similar role for cancer. Although it is useful to 
draw parallels between weight for CHD and smoking for cancer, the two differ in 
an  important  way.  Physical  stature  or  weight  presents  an  immediate  visual 
predictor  of  candidacy.  In  the current  climate,  particularly  where  smoking is 
prohibited in many social settings, an individual’s smoking status is not so widely 
known. Therefore, it was not uncommon for participants to seek confirmatory 
details of a sufferer’s smoking status from a spouse or partner not participating 
in the interview. Thus smoking, or non-smoking, was almost always at the centre 
of the explanatory model. If the individual was judged to be a ‘heavy’ smoker, 
the search for additional explanatory variables ceased. Though most participants 
did not articulate connections between smoking and  all cancers, others were 
clear of the importance of smoking in any model of cancer candidacy: 
No, I don’t think there’s a type (to get cancer), if one excludes the 
60-a-day  smoker  type,  I  don’t  think  there’s  a  type.  (Murray  83, 
Deprived) 
As has already been noted, smokers have been found to experience stigma in 
response to a lung cancer diagnosis (Chapple, Ziebland & McPherson 2004).The Chapter 10    183 
stigma  attached  to  smokers  and  the  consequential  judgement  on  personal 
culpability  was  also  seen  in  this  study.  Some  participants  were  eager  to 
downplay the importance of smoking in their otherwise healthy relatives’ cancer 
diagnosis  or  assumed  that  stopping  smoking  prior  to  diagnosis  removed  any 
potentially harmful effects. The following extract details Jessie’s response when 
asked to comment on retrospective candidacy:  
I: Is there anyone that you have known who has had cancer that you 
might have thought, well, yes I can see why they would get cancer? 
Jessie: No, not amongst my friends or relatives. My mother maybe yes 
because of her smoking but I sort of put it aside because she was 
always a very healthy lady (Jessie 68, Affluent)  
Earlier in the interview Jessie had talked about smokers in the context of her 
own risk: 
So I eh, eat fruit and vegetables and wholemeal bread because I want 
to try and avoid it but if I can’t, I can’t and that’s it. You know. I 
don’t  know  about  normal  people,  I  mean  you  go  out  and  you  see 
people smoking away like (laughs) chimneys and if you don’t die of … 
I mean I attend [hospital] and if they don’t die of lung cancer they’ll 
die  of  pneumonia  because  they  are  out  there  in  the  cold  in  their 
dressing gowns smoking (Jessie 68, Affluent) 
Jessie  makes  no  attempt  to  hide  her  disapproval  of  smoking.  By  highlighting 
smoking  outside  the  hospital  she  hints  at  issues  of  personal  culpability  and 
displays  the  significance  of  moral  judgements  when  arriving  at  explanatory 
models of disease. Elsie was similarly keen to absolve her husband of culpability, 
as the following extract shows: 
I’m  inclined  to  have  wee  thinks  to  make  up  my  mind,  I  might  be 
entirely wrong. He was a Commercial Artist and away back, well he 
used to take his paintbrush into his mouth and suck it to get a nice 
point to do the lettering and I thought, I think I’d read something or 
I’d seen it on the television there was a factory I think somewhere 
about Dundee, I think it was clocks they made, and the faces to make 
the face of the clock or the numbers luminous the women there who 
painted the dials had radioactive paint they used and quite a lot of 
these women apparently died of cancer. And I said to him, it wasn’t 
till after, it was quite a long time after, I said “ Do you know what I 
think?” and he said “I never thought about that” and he said “Right 
enough the water was mucky and you just put your paintbrush in and Chapter 10    184 
you went like this and you got the paint”. So maybe that is quite 
entirely wrong. 
I: Can you think of any other cause? 
Elsie: No. Well, he smoked. 
I: Right. 
Elsie:  He  doesn’t  smoke  now  and  he’d  actually  stopped  the  year 
before the cancer was detected, he did smoke so caused by smoking 
yes, smoking, uh huh, yes, uh huh. 
Elsie presents a narrative that she is comfortable with and is acceptable to her. 
She  had  established  that  her  husband’s  environmental  exposure  at  work  had 
been important in the aetiology of his cancer, albeit that it stemmed from his 
own  individual  way  of  working.  She  had  decided  to  dismiss  smoking  but 
introduced it nevertheless. Smoking could be ignored because he stopped prior 
to his diagnosis, though arguably he had retired many years before giving up 
smoking.  
10.6.2  Explanatory hierarchy 
If smoking was not implicated as a cause, participants searched for additional 
variables that could reasonably be entered into the explanatory model. Much 
like  Davison  originally  found,  participants  in  this  study  question  a  series  of 
possible explanatory factors that are entered into a model to provide a profile of 
the individual. This may then explain why they got cancer when they did, in 
essence  what  set  them  apart.  Once  the  smoking  status  of  the  sufferer  is 
established,  the  search  moves  to  other  plausible  risk  factors.  Rather  than 
specific behaviours, with the exception of sun-exposure and skin cancer, it is a 
more holistic enquiry about general health. This included a health history and 
family connections. The current weight, diet and alcohol consumption of the 
individual  also  acted  as  possible  reasons  for  the  occurrence  of  cancer.  The 
relative importance of each element for the explanatory model was individually 
tailored. This is a striking difference with candidacy for CHD. CHD is a single 
disease with a limited range of risk factors, which are well established among 
the lay public. Cancer is more complex, so while candidacy for lung cancer, for Chapter 10    185 
instance,  may  be  well-established,  participants  in  this  study  struggled  to 
explain, and arrive at, candidacy for other cancers:  
I  must  admit  in  my  naivety,  I  don’t  know  what  causes  prostate 
cancer, cancer of the colon, all these, I don’t know what’s causing 
them. (Andrew 57, Affluent) 
How do you take breast cancer? You can have someone who doesnae, 
smoke,  doesnae  drink,  doesnae  do  anything  and  yet  they  can  take 
breast cancer, men and women. (Julia 65, Deprived) 
The explanatory hierarchy, with smoking at the apex, allows for some cancer 
events to be easily accounted for. Other cancer events are more challenging. 
Given that causal links are not well-established for all cancer sites, candidacy is 
limited and restricted to those areas where links are clear. Other behavioural 
characteristics by themselves could not predict cancer candidacy.  
10.6.3 The scope and limitations of candidacy: anomalous deaths 
and unwarranted survivors 
According to Davison the explanatory model for CHD is ‘wide’. Anyone can be a 
candidate.  Davison  provides  examples  of  individuals,  equally  at  risk,  but  at 
opposite ends of a spectrum: those who engage in no exercise or those who do 
too much, high powered executives prone to stress and manual labourers subject 
to over-work. This suggests that a wide range of behaviours can contribute to 
heart disease. Cancer was not described in similar terms in this study. If cancer 
sufferers  did  not  smoke  and  led  ‘healthy’  lives,  the  event  was  largely 
unexplainable, so in that respect candidacy was relatively narrow. It was typical 
for participants to identify sufferers that did not meet any candidacy criteria: 
Oh God no, she didn’t smoke, doesn’t drink, eats well, exemplary 
lifestyle so to speak, and eh not conducive to cancer of the colon. 
(Andrew 57, Affluent) 
We did have a dear friend who nobody looked after themselves better 
than this lady and she took cancer and she died. (Phyllis 58, Affluent) 
I’ve a friend and to me she lived a very, you know, she ate well, she 
didn’t smoke she just drank moderately had quite a lot of exercise 
she was out doors and she died of cancer (Elsie 62 Affluent) Chapter 10    186 
What these extracts capture is an important feature of ‘candidacy’. According to 
Davison, individuals recognised that while those that engage in risky behaviours 
can  be  event  free,  equally  those  who  ‘do  all  the  right  things’  continue  to 
experience  illness  events.  This  serves  to  reinforce  the  fallible  nature  of 
candidacy. Although many participants offered examples of people that ‘ticked 
all the right boxes’ for cancer, the majority of the stories were of individuals 
who did not fit their previously conceived model. Therefore it is the fallibility of 
candidacy that is the overwhelming experience of cancer for participants in this 
study. Davison identified such cases as ‘anomalous deaths’ and many anomalies 
are found in participants’ narratives. In the following extract, Angus provides 
the example of two of his brothers, one of whom he viewed as the epitome of a 
‘candidate’: 
James  was  an  ideal  candidate,  eh  heavy  smoker,  heavy  drinker, 
didn’t really eat healthily, fish suppers, pies that sort of thing, fry 
ups.  Joe’s  like  me  he’s  totally  the  opposite,  don’t  smoke,  drink 
occasionally … red wine, fresh fruit, vegetables every day, wholemeal 
bread all that sort of thing, you know, exercise, kept fit and yet he’s 
got this version of cancer. (Angus 57, Affluent) 
Here, both candidacy and the fallibility of candidacy are captured succinctly. All 
of the extracts point to anomalous cases that went beyond simply avoiding risky 
behaviours. They were described as extremely ‘health-conscious’, as bucking a 
trend, as always having been healthy before anyone knew it was important to do 
so.  Essentially,  they  appeared  to  be  the  absolute  opposites  of  typical 
candidates. The appearance of cancer in this ultra-healthy group challenged the 
received  wisdom  of  causes  of  cancer.  The  following  series  of  extracts 
demonstrates the disparity between what participants now know and what they 
once thought:  
I mean he’s always been the fittest guy you ever met, you know, he 
was in the first fifteen in rugger at school and university and, you 
know, a runner and I mean I climb mountains  he (leukaemia sufferer) 
does fell walking or fell running or whatever, you know. I mean he 
runs up the bloody things (laughs) but no he’s always been really, 
really fit. (Colin 61, Affluent) 
My husband has always had a really healthy diet from before I think 
these things were generally accepted. I mean he, all his life, he has 
eaten, and I mean he came from a family where they had a kind of 
healthy diet because he lived in the country, didn’t have a lot of Chapter 10    187 
money, um his father smoked quite heavily but his mother didn’t. 
But, they ate, they grew a lot of their own vegetables and didn’t 
probably  eat  a  lot  of  red  meat,  because they  didn’t,  you  know  it 
would be a kind of Sunday dinner kind of treat for them, so um, and 
eh, so relatively healthy. I mean not sort of sports fanatics but he’s 
always  been  slim,  he’s  never  been  over-weight,  he  eats  a  lot  of 
brown bread and all the right kind of fibre, he eats a lot of fruit and 
vegetables, you know he ate brown bread long before it was kind of 
fashionable to do it, um, and doesn’t really drink that much. So, you 
know, um if anything that’s kind of going against the survey and I 
suppose that’s reduced his chances so much, I mean I don’t know very 
much about, um I mean, you probably know a lot more about, you 
know being genetically disposed towards certain cancers, um, but no, 
it’s a complete mystery with him. I mean he, as I say, he’d sort of 
followed all the rules and did all the right things and still got cancer, 
which I think in a sense, to me kind of fosters maybe a wee bit more 
of a fatalistic attitude towards myself. (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
One of these people that was extremely healthy she was vegetarian, 
you  know,  she  ate  all  the  right  foods,  she  exercised,  they  were 
Liberal Democrats they used to go all round Falmouth in Cornwall 
delivering leaflets and you couldn’t have met a woman who was more 
healthy  and  health  conscious  and  always  had  been.  Really  you 
couldn’t  have  met  a  more  health  conscious  woman  than  auntie. 
(Janet 47, Affluent) 
She didn’t drink you see that’s forty year ago we’re talking about 
right enough. My auntie Bessie didnae drink, she didnae smoke it was 
just her and her husband and the one son. She’d worked all her days 
till she got married and then had her son and after she had that, 
after she’d had her son she concentrated on her house, her home, her 
home, her husband and her son. (Rose 61, Deprived) 
I found oot like that lassie that didnae drink, didnae smoke got it I 
thought she’s the last person I would have thought that would have 
took it because at that time they were saying the smoking causes it. 
And I knew that lassie didnae drink, she didnae smoke neither she did 
and she didnae go intae a pub where people smoked either so I knew 
nothing like that and I thought she’s the last person I would ever 
have thought would have caught that. (Patricia 62, Deprived) 
I’d an uncle who died of throat cancer last year at 50, em so that was 
a shock and he was a non-smoker, never smoked in his life and very 
fit, healthy man. Didn’t work in a smoky environment. That was a 
shock, that was a real shock and that was a kind of turning point for 
me, where I thought well actually that can affect anyone as opposed 
to lifestyle. Both my in-laws smoked so I suppose you kind of thought 
well your risk is much higher but this uncle of mine was one of the 
fittest, healthiest, body-conscious men I’ve ever known in my life. 
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The  narratives  borrowed  for  these  examples  all  leave  previous  health  status 
unquestionable. All these cancer sufferers were healthy and fit and yet despite 
this the cancer event occurred. The extracts also show participants’ surprise and 
how  in  some  cases  they  have  changed  their  views.  The  extract  from  Lisa 
indicates that her very recent experience of cancer via her husband has forced 
her  to  reappraise  her  entire  cancer  belief  system,  and  concludes  that  her 
attitude is now fatalistic.  
10.6.4  Challenges to candidacy: triggers 
The extracts above demonstrate that such cases forced participants to reassess 
their  explanatory  models  and  pursue  other  possible  aetiological  explanations. 
Reworked models included genetics, secondary events and trauma, both physical 
and  psychological.  As  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter,  many  participants, 
particularly those that lived in the deprived community, suggested the presence 
of a ‘faulty’ or cancer gene as a possible explanation. Rose is unable to provide 
a definitive cause but does introduce the idea of a set of dormant cells early in 
her interview: 
No, I widnae say I would know what causes it. I’ve heard different 
theories of cancerous cells in your body that was one of the things I 
was, I don’t know who told me that but somebody somewhere said 
that to me, that we all carry cancerous cells. Whether that’s true or 
not and if you’ve got a weakness it attacks them, I was told that. 
(Rose 61 Deprived) 
It  is  interesting  that  Rose,  like  many  of  the  other  participants,  is  unable  to 
locate the source of this information. Although a number of different terms are 
used and the way in which, what Angus described as a ‘ticking time-bomb’ is set 
off varies, the idea is fundamentally the same. As Gary explains: 
Like  certain  people  might  have  the,  like  again,  I’m  talking  in 
laymen’s terms, it’s like a gene where it might no be it might be 
faulty or might be waiting tae be whit dae you call this word noo like 
activated sort of thing, you know, and that might happen. (Gary 37, 
Deprived) 
Clearly then the circumstances necessary for activation varied. Again this was a 
retrospective  activity  and  as  such  tailored  to  unique  personal  situations. 
Nevertheless,  participants  applied  a  typical  series  of  common  ‘triggers’. Chapter 10    189 
Trauma, either physical, in the form of accidents or psychological in the form of 
stress, was thought to be a trigger or activator for a subsequent cancer event. 
During the interview Patricia made a link between cancer and accidents: 
But every one of them, except maybe my young cousin, I know had 
been in an accident of some kind as I said my mum had that beaten 
up. And my dad had actually fell and broke his leg and then it was 
just healing when they found oot he had the cancer. All the other 
ones, they’ve had an accident. (Patricia 61, Deprived). 
For some participants the gene was apparent in everyone but for others it was 
only apparent in some individuals. Such an idea gives fuel to the idea of cancer 
families and also helps account for unwarranted survivors, namely those who 
behave badly but ‘get away with it’ regardless: 
I know and that’s when I kind of think is there something in the body 
that  maybe  I  don’t  know,  that  maybe  triggers  cancer  or  I  think 
everybody’s open to it no matter how healthy you are or whatever. 
(Karen 25, Deprived) 
I think everybody probably has, but I think some folk have a bigger 
chance because of, maybe their background or their genes if you like. 
Well maybe the background they come from, I mean if their father 
had  married  someone  else  or  their  mother  had  married  somebody 
else, it may have been a different medical outcome but then there 
are  people,  you  know  the  lifestyle,  there  are  people  who  have  a 
healthy  life  style  and  can  develop  it.  But  maybe  they  would have 
developed it sooner, if they hadn’t had that, you know. (Kathleen 68, 
Affluent) 
I think, I think maist people has got that in them and it just takes a 
certain something, maybe something that’s no healing right, maybe 
you’ve  had  an  accident  and  it’s  no  healing  right,  things  like  that 
maybe. (Lorna, 57, Deprived) 
I think it’s genetic I do, I’ve got this strange idea in my head that 
really,  really  it’s  there  in  everybody  but  it’s  just  something,  you 
know, it is there and it’ll kick in something will just trigger it off at 
some point.( Pauline, 57 Deprived) 
So  although  cancer  candidacy  in  one  respect  is  narrow,  the  faulty  gene 
supposition renders it even ‘wider’ than in Davison’s original scheme. The idea 
that cancer is ‘in you’ lying dormant, has been reported many times(Cornwell 
1984;  Calnan  1987;  Mullen  1994;  Scanlon  2006).  While  Davison  demonstrated 
that almost any characteristic could suggest CHD candidacy, the participants in Chapter 10    190 
this study describe an explanatory model that is fundamentally a quasi-scientific 
presentation of ‘luck’. If triggers can take many forms, including behaviour, the 
appearance  of  cancer  is  entirely  random.  Participants  possess  a  customised 
model that can explain any case, even the most unlikely. Such a model provides 
a legitimate reason for each event encountered. The idea of trigger is akin to 
the links between cancer and secondary events that was uncovered by Blaxter 
(1982). The extracts also demonstrate that those in deprived communities were 
more  likely  to  introduce  the  idea  of  dormant  genes  or  cells  and  triggers  in 
aetiological explanations of cancer. A degree of fatalism is attached to the idea 
that dormant cells and triggers explain cancer. Often it is assumed that working 
class fatalism is a particular barrier to health promotion and the engagement 
with good lifestyle choice (Balshem 1991). 
The corollary to the anomalous case is the unwarranted survivor, which equally 
challenges established explanatory frameworks. Unwarranted survivors are those 
who  ‘do  all  the  wrong  things  and  get  away  with  it’.  While  anomalous  cases 
formed  a  significant  part  of  many  of  the  participants’  stories  about  cancer, 
unwarranted  survivors  did  not  feature  so  strongly.  Most  participants,  when 
asked, could provide an example of someone that they believed had failed to 
‘look  after  themselves’  but  had  managed  to  escape  cancer  or  other  serious 
disease. A number of participants thought that this was extremely common:   
I’m just saying that any illness as you rightly said are going along two 
or three stones overweight, smoking and they get off scot-free, good 
luck to them I don't grudge them that (Eileen 72, Affluent) 
Most  of  them  (clientele  in  social  club)  were  walking  adverts  for 
cancer (Laughs) most of them are still going. (Emily 37, Affluent) 
(Laughs) I can think of one particular person who to me has not had a 
healthy,  mind  you  he’s  in  his  sixties  and  he’s  not  had  cancer.  He 
smoked, drank a lot, still does as far as I know, and eh I don’t think 
he really bothered too much about food didn’t eat very well and he 
seems alright. (Elsie 62, Affluent) 
 
74  and  he’s  smoked  fae  he  was  a  teenager,  in  fact  pre-teens  he 
smoked. I think he smoked when he was 12  my Dad’s a kinda walking 
miracle cause he’s like, fried foods, and he’s got angina. (Gary 37, 
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The extracts show that often the description of unwarranted survivors took on a 
humorous tone. While Davison found that candidacy for CHD was often related 
with humour, in this study humour was reserved for unwarranted survivors in 
discussions about cancer. The idea that cancer is not something to be joked 
about once more symbolises the fearful attitude towards cancer prevalent in 
modern society.  
Participants  could  not  explain  unwarranted  survivors.  No  justification  beyond 
‘luck’  was  offered.  Health  education  messages  were  not  discredited  by  the 
existence  of  such  individuals  and  many  participants  were  cynical  about  the 
significance placed on them:   
That’s just,  you’ve won the lottery, you know. You’ve been lucky, 
we have all read in the papers people who say, I’ve been a heavy 
smoker all my life, I’m perfectly alright and this sort of thing and 
therefore all this stuff about smoking and lung cancer is nonsense 
because  I’ve  beaten  it,  well  these  people  have  just  been  lucky  it 
seems  to  me.  Doubtless  there  are  causal  factors,  of  which  I  am 
unaware, which would explain why they have been lucky but I think 
the ordinary man or woman on the street would think, well, old Joe 
has been pretty lucky, hasn’t he, like men who went through the first 
world  war  in  the  trenches  and  emerged  totally  unscathed  at  the 
other end. (Murray 83, Affluent) 
It’s  crap,  it’s  crap  and  okay  there  are  survivors  and  there  are 
exceptions. Well I mean it’s not a rule that if you smoke you die of 
cancer I mean so there will be people who can say ‘I’m ninety-five 
and I’ve smoked forty capstan full strength a day for the last eighty 
years and look at me’. But that’s not an argument of anything is it? 
(Colin 61 Affluent) 
This  insight,  that,  what  Davison  termed  Uncle  Normans  (Davison,  Frankel  & 
Davey  Smith  1989),  are  simply  epidemiological  aberrations,  has  been  found 
elsewhere. Emslie reported similar findings in their west of Scotland study on 
heart disease (Emslie Hunt & Watt 2001a, 2001b; Hunt, Emslie & Watt 2001). 
Their participants were aware that such aberrations should have little impact on 
the perceived importance of healthy behaviours  
10.7 Individual vs. population risk 
The above extracts show that some participants were sure that while for some 
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wider  population.  Such  an  understanding  was  not  widespread  among 
participants. A number of participants, while not dismissing the significance of 
tobacco, believed that “it must be more than cigarettes”. It was customary for 
participants to fix on the cases known to them and extrapolate to the wider 
population. Julia failed to account for her sister’s oesophageal cancer in the 
context of known risk factors and presumed that the information was ‘wrong’, 
rather than accepting flaws in bio-medical explanations: 
I don’t honestly know if lifestyle or, likes of my young sister smoked, 
she smoked from when she was about 11 but she didn’t take cancer in 
her lungs she took it in her oesophagus which they say is drink related 
and I’ve got another young sister who is a recovered alcoholic and 
smokes  like  a  chimney,  she’s  fine,  she’s  well,    so  how  do  you 
associate it? (Julia 65, Deprived) 
10.8 What evidence is important? Formulating a model of 
candidacy   
Previous chapters and sections within this chapter have shown that a wealth of 
information is integrated into participants’ models of cancer beliefs. Further, 
the manner in which participants develop an ever-changing personal evidence 
base  is  sophisticated  and  personally  logical.  Clearly  there  are  similarities 
between the data generated from this study and the  lay epidemiology model 
first described by Davison. Yet the basic scheme that refers to the way in which 
information is gathered and processed, is merely one component of Davison’s 
theory. Deeper within the theory lie a series of related and essential elements, 
principal  among  them  is  candidacy.  Coronary  candidacy,  while  no  doubt  a 
sophisticated amalgam of information, does as Davison conceded, incorporate 
many of the risk factors found in epidemiological models. When arriving at a 
judgement  of  coronary  candidacy  personal  behaviour  was  first  considered. 
Invariably an estimate was made based on physical stature. Other factors like 
family history, employment and temperament were also sought. Rarely however 
do lay epidemiologists have to look beyond well established risk factors to arrive 
at a candidacy judgement. Cancer candidacy is at once more simple and more 
complex.  Evidence  of  smoking  status  was  essential  but  many  of  established 
epidemiological risk factors are poorly recognised. Smokers were identified as 
the only true candidates. It was rare for participants in this study to highlight 
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few unhealthy non-smokers were identified. As has already been highlighted a 
handful of participants were appreciative of additional risk factors like diet and 
exercise and these were drawn on to arrive at a tailored candidacy model. Yet, 
obesity for example, which is an established risk factor for cancer and CHD, 
seems only to feature in coronary candidacy.  
10.9 Personal responsibility and risk elimination in the 
face of luck 
Though the influence of luck in cancer events was frequently stressed, this did 
not  engender  feelings  of  abandon  with  regard  to  health  behaviours.  As  the 
following extracts show: 
My feelings now are that a lot of it is probably luck, if you like, you 
know, almost predisposed that you’re going to get it or you’re not 
going to but I think there are factors that can, you know, put you at a 
higher or a lower risk, if that makes sense. I think you can kind of, 
there  are  things  you  can  do  preventive,  but  that’s  not  a  hundred 
percent  guarantee  that  you’re  not  going  to  have  the  disease 
basically. (Emily 37, Affluent) 
I think, you know, it must be a combination there’s a lot of genetic 
links as well and they say that if you have a genetic link of breast 
cancer  in  your  family  then  don’t  smoke,  don’t  make  it  worse  for 
yourself, you know. Em, don’t drink too much alcohol, you know, if 
there’s bowel cancer in the family cut down on red meat that kind of 
thing. So I suppose you’ve just got to be aware and cut down on your 
risks as much as possible. Look at your diet and look at your lifestyle, 
look at exercise. (Janet 47, Affluent) 
What the extracts from Emily and Janet show is that they simultaneously provide 
luck with an important role in their explanatory model but also imply that luck 
can be  manipulated. Emily’s  idea  that individuals  are  pre-disposed  to cancer 
echoes  Calnan’s  (1987)  finding  among  women  in  his  sample.  Like  Calnan’s 
cohort,  Emily  lives  in  the  affluent  community  and  Calnan  believed  that 
predisposition was distinct from ‘its in us all’, which he found was common in 
women from social class IV and V. Arguably however the ideas are the same but 
articulated  differently.  When  discussing  the  importance  of  luck  and  fatalism, 
Davison reported that participants in his study did not greet this with absolute 
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understanding that not everything could be controlled (Davison, Frankel & Davey 
Smith 1992).  
The above extracts, and Davison’s findings, hint at the almost universal notion 
that  disease  risk  cannot  be  eliminated.  This  is  contrary  to  what  Davison 
suggested regarding the common currency of prevention of CHD. For participants 
in  this  study,  following  a  healthy  lifestyle  offered  no  immunity  to  cancer;  it 
simply  served  to  reduce  one’s  risk.  This  idea  was  found  repeatedly  within 
interviews:  
You can protect yourself, doesn’t mean that you won’t get it, but you 
can try and do what you can to, to minimise the risks. (Kathleen 68, 
Affluent) 
Em, I think you can take steps to reduce your risks but I don’t think 
that  you  can,  it’s  a  difficult  one  …  because  I  don’t  have  cancer  I 
would probably say that you could prevent it but I think if I was put 
in that uncle’s position I would be saying “Well I did everything, I did 
the text book of what to do to not have cancer and I’ve still got it.” 
(Emily 37, Affluent) 
In the following extract, Lisa, whose husband had recently been diagnosed with 
cancer, describes a family conversation the previous evening, outlining how she 
communicates risk to her young children: 
Funnily enough we were talking about this last night because there 
was a news item about um, the usual kind of thing diet and exercise. 
.....weight, not just obesity, but even a very minor level of being 
overweight can affect your chances, you know and fatty food so they 
were basically talking about diet and exercise and you should be as 
thin as you possibly can .....So yes, we were talking about this last 
night when we were eating our dinner because I was saying to the 
boys,  I  mean  I  have always  been  very  open  and  honest  with  them 
about cancer, I mean we don’t shy away from the topic at all and I 
was saying given your genetic disposition, I mean we don’t know how 
much of a link there is genetically but if there is there’s nothing you 
can do about that, you can’t change that, your genetic makeup but 
what you can do is influence it by diet and exercise, you know. So, 
you should try and do whatever you can in your lifestyle to try and 
reduce your chances. (Lisa 45,affluent) 
Gary made a distinction between behavioural risks for some cancers and other 
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So I think, my personal opinion is, the way I think aboot in my heid 
obviously. Is that there is certain types of cancer which you can avoid 
but there’s other types of cancer that it disnae matter how you live 
your life you’re gonnae get it, you know. Just because of the way 
maybe and I keep saying genetically, you know, I’m using the word 
genetically  and  I  don’t  know  much  aboot  it,  you  know.  (Gary  37, 
Deprived) 
Estimating one’s own risk of cancer appeared to be removed from the reality of 
actually considering getting the disease. It was difficult to engage participants in 
such  a  conversation  and  some  participants  seemed  superstitious  at  the  mere 
thought of it. For example one participant’s mother who was present at the 
interview but did not contribute simply said: 
My  granny  used  to  say  “if  you  fear  it  you’ll  get  it”.  (Marjory  78, 
Deprived) 
Yet many also approached it with bravado, ‘what will be’ attitude: 
C’est la vie, if I get it, I get it (Jessie 63, Affluent) 
Well, I think if it’s coming, it’s coming (Pauline 57, Deprived) 
Here the ideas around ‘what’s for you won’t go by you’ were touched on. This 
was  a  fatalistic  view  that  if  cancer  was  in  your  ‘destiny’  it  could  not  be 
controlled. A number of participants did say ‘it won’t happen to me’, ‘that’s 
something that happens to other people’ and one, Angus, claimed that if he got 
it he would fight it and win. Yet Angus was wedded to the notion that there is a 
faulty cancer gene that requires activation, suggesting that he acknowledges the 
role of luck and uncertainty in the progress of cancer. Nevertheless, he was also 
clear that he was doing everything he could to reduce his risk, given his family 
experience, and he employed militaristic metaphors to emphasise his ability to 
defy luck.  
10.10  Fatalism 
Although Davison’s original paper on lay epidemiology did not discuss fatalism, it 
was introduced in additional papers that drew on the same data. Participants, 
both in this, and Davison’s study, discussed disease risk in fatalistic terms. Often 
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in some communities (Pill and Stott 1982, 1985, 1987). However, the assumption 
that fatalism is associated with apathy is misplaced. In this study the discussion 
of  fatalism,  or  more  properly  the  randomness  of  disease,  is  realistic  and 
confirms the distribution of disease described by epidemiology. Many of those in 
a high-risk group will remain disease free and vice versa. Therefore to settle on 
the notion of the importance of the unexplainable is not fatalistic or irrational 
but instead based on observation.  Moreover, participants in this study often 
discussed  the  perils  of  being  pessimistic  or  ignoring  advice,  as  the  following 
extracts illustrate: 
That’s  when  I  said  before  the  fourth  one  (risk  factor)  would  be 
random,  you  know  just  accept  it,  you  know  a  bad  thing  is  to  be 
fatalistic, because if you’re fatalistic, its not good for you long term, 
you know, people who are fatalistic don’t survive as long as people 
who are positive but I’m quite fatalistic in the randomness of illness. 
(Andrew 57, Affluent) 
Well, if your name is on the bomb its going to get you so there’s no 
point going down to the shelter, I suppose it’s a form of fatalism, 
yes, I suppose it is. That shouldn’t mean that one shouldn’t take all 
sensible precautions against it of course. (Murray 83, Affluent) 
10.11  Chapter Summary 
Fundamentally,  lay  epidemiology  refers  to  the  method  of  collecting  and 
processing information to arrive at an explanatory model of disease. Davison and 
colleagues  reported  information  from  many  layers  of  social  relationships  and 
interactions were utilised. Data from this study confirms that a similar method is 
employed in relation to cancer. Cancer events are experienced within families, 
are discussed in social groups, are presented by the media, albeit within limited 
narratives. Throughout the interviews in this study all of these sources are cited 
naturally  and  clearly  all  of  the  layers  have  a  role.  According  to  Davison  the 
information  is  digested  and  provides  the  means  to  make  risk  assessments  by 
arriving  at  coronary  candidacy.  Candidacy,  Davison  described  as  a  cultural 
mechanism  and  data  presented  from  the  ethnographic  study  in  South  Wales 
continues to reflect what is easily recognisable as the everyday way that CHD is 
discussed. Such everyday discussions mirrored mainstream epidemiology. Data 
from  this  study  shows  that  though  there  may  be  a  similar  everyday  talk 
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were  smokers,  who  were  easily  marked  as  candidates.  The  success  of  the 
coronary candidacy idea is aided by a widespread recognition and acceptance of 
risk factors for CHD. With the exception of smoking, and to a lesser extent sun 
exposure, cancer does not benefit from equal levels of understanding. As such 
candidacy is a more elusive concept. The reasons for this are many. First, in 
comparison to CHD, cancer is perceived to be a more complex disease. Allied to 
this  is  that  the  lay  public  link  a  set  of  well-established  risk  factors  to  CHD. 
Smoking excepted, cancer risks are less well appreciated and are often, at least 
in the public’s mind, subject to change. Finally, cancer, unlike CHD is a feared 
disease. Davison highlighted the different perceptions of CHD and cancer: 
“ … it should be noted that sudden heart stoppage is something of a 
preferred  form  of  death.  ‘Dropping  dead’  from  a  heart  attack  is 
widely  seen  as  a  quick,  natural  and  relatively  painless  death  (in 
comparison  with  cancers,  respiratory  disorders  and  traumatic 
accidents” (Davison, Frankel & Davey Smith 1991:10) 198 
11.  Discussion: Reflections on Research 
Questions 
11.1 Introduction  
This  chapter  will  first  offer  some  reflections  on  the  study  as  a  whole  and 
consider the main strengths and weaknesses of the study. The discussion will 
then turn to the specific research questions detailed in Chapter 4, before going 
on to reflect on other important study findings. 
11.2 Reflections on the study  
This study set out to uncover and explore ordinary views of cancer. Though it did 
not seek to be generalisable, inherent in its aim was discovering a typical view 
of cancer, if one existed. The suitability of the sample population was therefore 
vital and many of the strengths and weaknesses of the study are to be found in 
the  study  sample.  It  is  a  merit  of  the  study  that  it  attempted  to  access  an 
‘ordinary’ view of cancer. The extent to which any patient population can truly 
be  regarded  as  ‘lay’ has  been  reviewed  by  Shaw  (2002),  who  suggested  that 
patients become experts over the course of their illness. Indeed, modern health 
policy  encourages  the  development  of  the  ‘expert  patient’  (Department  of 
Health 2001). Although sampling randomly from a general practice population, 
which excluded cancer patients, might have generated a useful sample and with 
hindsight  would  have  eased  the  sampling  process,  it  was  felt  that  it  may 
compromise  the  ‘lay’  aspect  of  the  study.  Distance  from  mainstream  health 
professionals  and  healthcare  providers,  was  important.  Moreover,  the  study 
aimed  to access  community  views,  if  these  were  present.  A  general practice 
sample,  though  located  in  a  geographical  community  would  not  guarantee 
people with a sense of community. By sampling through community groups like 
churches,  tenants  associations,  community  councils  and  leisure  based  groups, 
study  participants  had  social  networks  that  included  others  from  their  local 
communities. Groups with a health focus were deliberately avoided, again to 
distance  the  study  from  ‘healthcare’  and  those  with  a  particular  interest  in 
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Sampling  via  community  groups  however  was  challenging,  particularly  in  the 
deprived community. A wide range of organisations were contacted in both areas 
but few agreed to participate. As outlined in Chapter 6 on methodological design 
the  original  target  was  to  carry  out  40  interviews,  20  in  each  community. 
Unfortunately this was not met after extensive efforts to bolster numbers. A 
total of 31 interviews were undertaken.  
 In an age where a wealth of health information is available to the general public 
and is constantly increasing, achieving a genuinely lay viewpoint is unlikely, or 
arguably undesirable. If study participants were truly blank slates they would 
have had little to offer. Often the patient perspective is assumed to be the lay 
view. Few studies aim to report an ‘ordinary’, but crucially, non-patient view. 
Many  of  those  interviewed  did  possess  what  they  described  as  a  ‘close’ 
experience of cancer through that of a relative or  friend and such proximity 
could  potentially  place  them  in  an  expert  position.  However,  given  the  high 
incidence of cancer, recruiting a sample that had no such proximity, might be 
problematic. Indeed, it could be argued that this does reflect an ordinary or 
typical view. Any entirely self-selected sample is bound to attract those with an 
interest,  irrespective of  subject  matter.  It  is  worth  noting  however  that  one 
volunteer withdrew because on reflection she judged it best ‘not to talk about 
cancer’,  not  because  it  was  upsetting  but  for  more  superstitious  reasons. 
Admittedly, some may find cancer a distressing topic for a range of reasons. 
Other features of the sample are also worthy of mention. Although the ages of 
the sample ranged from 25 to 83, most of those interviewed were in the 55–70 
age-group. While this allowed participants to offer insights into the changes they 
had witnessed in cancer outcomes over half a century, the study might have 
benefitted from the views of younger participants who may have normalised the 
more  recent  positive  advances  in  cancer  treatment  and  outcomes.  Although 
small, the sample included both men and women.  
Participants  were  accessed  via  community  groups  in  two  communities  in 
Glasgow,  one  affluent,  one  deprived.  Due  to  the  difficulties  associated  with 
sampling, interviews were undertaken almost consecutively, first in the affluent 
community and then the deprived. As an iterative method of interviewing was 
followed some of the issues raised in the earlier interviews were fed back only 
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of the slight nuances between the two communities were simply an artefact of 
the interview process.  
11.3 Reflections on the research questions 
11.3.1 What are typical views of cancer?   
Although participants’ experiences of cancer varied widely, a number of typical 
views of cancer were expressed. Most commonly cancer was seen as something 
to be feared, a view which has been widely reported (Sontag 1978;; Herzlich & 
Pierret 1987; Patterson 1987; Scanlon et al 2006). Many of the study participants 
were able, because of their age, to reflect on how views of cancer had changed. 
While  cancer  was  once  the  stigmatised  ‘Big  C’,  rarely  discussed  and  poorly 
understood,  it  now  represented  the  possibility  of  a  more  hopeful  outlook. 
Medical advances have precipitated a shift in metaphor. As both Lupton (1994) 
and  later  Ehrenriech  (2009)  have  demonstrated  the  ‘hope’  and  ‘positivity’ 
narratives now dominate the culture of cancer in an attempt to counteract the 
ever-present fear. This contradiction is reflected in these interviews. The data 
generated in interviews illustrate a largely superficial hope because cancer was 
represented by a handful of typical, less positive narratives. Principally, cancer 
equals  tragedy.  For  some  this  held  true  even  if  the  eventual  outcome  was 
positive. Often, though not always, tragedy was reserved for the young rather 
than old and most participants could give pertinent examples of tragic events as 
evidence.  Cancer  in  older  adults  was  viewed  with  more  ambivalence.  This 
echoes findings in Emslie, Hunt and Watt’s (2001a) work where similar views 
were expressed about CHD in the elderly. In their study CHD was thought to be a 
relatively quick and painless death, and viewed by some as the ‘way I’d like to 
go’. This is not reflected in discussions about cancer, where the two key disease 
experiences  were  either  a  long,  drawn  out  suffering,  or  a  quick  and  sudden 
shock. Cancer has two important facets that set it apart from the typical view of 
CHD.  First,  cancer  is  not  immediate  even  if  it  results  in  a  relatively  ‘quick’ 
death. Sufferers must confront their diagnosis. Second, cancer is believed to be 
painful. Although CHD is undoubtedly painful, it is immediate and assumed to be 
over  in  minutes.  While  shock  could  equally  attend  an  unpredicted  coronary 
event relatives are assured that their loved one was spared ‘suffering’. A further 
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illness trajectories described for cancer serve to emphasise the unpredictable 
nature of the illness. In the ‘quick’ narrative a seemingly healthy person falls 
prey to cancer quickly, leading many to assume that they ‘had’ cancer ‘without 
knowing it’. Therefore it can strike at any point with symptoms arriving only 
‘near  the  end’.  This  adds  to  the  supposition  that  cancer  is  ever-present  in 
everyone  simply  waiting  for  an  appropriate  trigger.  In  the  ‘long-drawn  out’ 
narrative individuals are often reported to have lasted longer than predicted, so 
again cancer has even defied the professionals. Linked to this was the dread 
associated  with  recurrence.  Many  participants  knew  of  cases  where  patients 
were  apparently  cured  only  for  a  ‘quick’  recurrence  to  ensue.  While  it  was 
widely  accepted  that  ‘cures’  were  possible,  this  was  thought  unlikely  in  the 
event  of  a  recurrence.  Yet  there  was  no  sense  of  the  recurrence  being 
predicted. Even in positive stories the unpredictableness of cancer is discussed. 
Surviving  in  spite  of  bleak  prognoses  was  equally  random.  Participants  often 
stressed  the  uncertainty  that  came  with  cancer.  Arguably  this  was  a  novel 
experience for those that had grown-up in a climate where cancer meant certain 
death.  The  uncertainty  produced  by  advances  in  treatments  resonates  with 
Comaroff et al’s (1982) work on childhood cancer. They demonstrated that it is 
the lack of certainty that is most challenging for  families and that the hope 
narrative, a consequence of improvements in survival, augmented rather than 
ameliorated  distress.  They  claimed  that  those  questions  that  remain 
unanswered, however small in the context of advances, are more frightening by 
virtue of their unfathomableness.   
As well as being unpredictable cancer is also assumed to be common, with an 
ever-increasing  incidence.  This  perception  reflects  epidemiological  reality.  As 
many as three in five of us will suffer some form of cancer and incidence is 
increasing. However, much of the epidemiological reality can be attributed to a 
growing ageing population. As already noted cancer is assumed to be tragic but 
only in young people, and it was rarely described by participants as a disease of 
older people. One participant believed that cancer was as common as the  cold, 
another referred to it as an epidemic. Both metaphors portray the widespread 
fear  of  cancer.  Epidemic,  in  particular,  conjures  images  of  a  disease  out  of 
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These  typical  cancer  stories  are  told  in  common  cancer  talk.  Many  of  the 
familiar metaphors associated with the disease appear liberally throughout the 
interviews. In particular military metaphors were used frequently. More striking 
was the way in which cancer patients were discussed. The particular importance 
of maintaining a positive outlook throughout was raised repeatedly. This cancer 
language also incorporates expert jargon about treatments and outcomes. While 
Armstrong & Murphy (2008) reported that their participants deftly intertwined 
lay  and  expert  terms  throughout  their  interviews,  theirs  was  a  patient 
population.  Participants  in  this  study,  like  those  in  Emslie,  Hunt  and  Watt’s 
(2001a)  study,  used  lay  and  expert  terms  interchangeably  when  discussing 
disease.  
As well as typical views about how cancer presented and progressed, there were 
also typical views about cancer aetiology. Participants were clear that cancer 
was  a  disease  with  many  different  causes.  Behavioural  risk  factors  were 
invariably the first to be mentioned, specifically smoking. Smoking was the only 
behaviour  discussed  in  all  interviews.  Beyond  that,  understanding  about  risk 
factors was haphazard. Only a handful of participants could be regarded as very 
well  informed  about  the  various  behavioural  risk  factors  linked  with  cancer. 
Instead  most  possessed  a  view  of  what  constituted  healthy  or  unhealthy 
lifestyles, and presumed that unhealthy behaviours were linked with cancer.  
This applied more to diet and alcohol consumption and less to physical activity. 
Balance was central to the maintenance of a healthy lifestyle and many stressed 
that  excess,  either  of  good  or  bad  behaviours,  was  unhealthy.  None  of  the 
participants were wedded to the idea that behaviour alone, with the exception 
of  smoking,  could  explain  cancer  causality.  Many  of  the  widely  reported 
controversial risk factors like pollution, power lines, chemicals and pesticides 
and mobile phones were introduced. All were regarded sceptically and cancer 
clusters  were  largely  dismissed.  Yet,  despite  scepticism  of  individual  agents 
there was the sense that cancer was a ‘modern’ disease and though none of 
these  elements  alone  could  offer  aetiological  explanations,  together,  these 
modern phenomena could be at least partly responsible. Invoking modernity as a 
catch-all explanation is found in many studies of health beliefs in diverse social 
groups (Herzlich 1973; MacFarlane & Kelleher 2002; Scanlon et al 2006; Salant & 
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What  is  interesting  is  that  participants  held  a  contradictory  view  of  history. 
Initially they talked about the Big C and the stigma associated with cancer which 
referred  back  to  a  time  when  cancer  was  rarely  talked  about  even  within 
families.  Cancer  was  feared  because  it  was  poorly  understood,  and  crucially 
people were unsure of its cause. It was evident in the interviews that changing 
attitudes  towards  cancer  were  welcomed  and  none  of  the  participants  were 
wistful  for  a  return  to  such  times.  Yet  the  advent  of  openness  and  freely 
available  information  brings  uncertainty.  There  are  more  cases  available  to 
discuss, many more reported risk factors but few definite causal explanations. 
Many  of  these  apparent  risk  factors  are  features  of  modern  living,  so  many 
participants were wistful for the return to a purer life, where cancer had fewer 
opportunities to develop. Instead of isolating individual risk factors participants 
talked about risk more holistically. Often this was expressed as an unhealthy 
lifestyle,  but  often  this  extended  to  an  unhealthy  way  of  life.  This  confirms 
Herzlich’s  (1973)  early  work  where  city-dwellers  assumed  that  life  in  the 
countryside was more health-giving and Salant & Gehler (2008) conclusion that 
participants were nostalgic for a time that was thought to be risk free. What 
these studies have in common, including this one, is the identification of modern 
dangers,  which  went  beyond  unhealthy  behaviours  and  extended  to  stress, 
pesticides,  convenience  foods,  and  pollution.  The  perceived  risks  associated 
with  all  of  these  dangers,  not  individually,  but  in  totality,  leads  to  the  link 
between  cancer  and  modernity.  Essentially  the  benefits  associated  with 
modernity - scientific advances, and improvements in survival - must be offset 
against its inherent dangers.  
 
This study did uncover typical views about cancer.  Despite medical advances 
cancer continues to induce fear, principally because it remains uncertain and 
unpredictable.  From  this  perspective  it  inhabits  very  different  ground  when 
compared to CHD. CHD has been found to be linked with a ‘good’ death and 
cancer is in direct opposition to this. Much of the uncertainty associated with 
cancer generally is a result of continued uncertainty about causality. Smoking is 
the exception which was rarely doubted as an important factor. Other risks were 
less well understood but there was a tendency to resort to a more holistic view 
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11.3.2  How important are personal, social, cultural, biomedical 
and environmental factors in the formulation of beliefs 
about cancer and cancer risk?  
The  data  generated  in  this  study  shows  that  information  is  gathered  from  a 
variety of sources, including personal and social networks, health education and 
the media. Personal experience is clearly important. This is axiomatic. Direct 
experience provides evidence for stories and participants in this sample used 
stories to illustrate their expressed beliefs. Proximity to cancer was highlighted 
as an important marker for the levels of detail offered by participants’ cancer 
narratives.  Equally  though,  distant  proximity  provided  narratives  from  wider 
social networks that could have lasting impressions on beliefs about cancer and 
explanatory models. Much of the literature on health beliefs suggests that health 
is only confronted when problems arise but people naturally talk about others’ 
events and problems. This talk also provides material to feed into explanatory 
models and participants frequently describe this process. Moreover, they show 
that  the  models  are  dynamic  and  updated  in  light  of  new  evidence.  Social 
networks though, like the media have a tendency to focus on the newsworthy 
and the tragic, and it is this type of narrative that remains in the memory. These 
are also the stories that are likely to be passed on, making the lay observer akin 
to a tabloid journalist, rather than an epidemiologist, in this context.  
It is clear from this study that cancer has a strong cultural resonance. Just as 
Davison  found  that  talk  about  CHD  was  easily  recognisable  and  familiar,  the 
same  is  true  of  cancer.  Arguably  though  the  two  are  represented  by  quite 
different cultures and this has consequences for the way in which each disease is 
understood.  Personal,  social  and  cultural  tragedies  are  talked  about  amongst 
families, work groups and in the media. One need only think about the case of 
Jade Goody to see how cancer can be dealt with in the media and irrespective of 
the  effect  of  that  episode  on  attitudes  to  cervical  screening  and  uptake 
(Metcalfe, Price & Powell 2010) it was likely to provide cervical cancer with the 
more publicity than any health promotion activity. Although Jade Goody’s death 
happened after the interview process in this study, it was evident that media 
stories  had  a  far  reaching  impact.  For  participants  in  this  sample,  passive 
smoking was synonymous with Roy Castle, so much so that stories similar to his, 
of working in smoky environments, privided explanations for familial cancers. Chapter 11    205 
There can be no doubt that the media have a key role in shaping and sustaining 
the cultural position of cancer. A useful example is the understanding of the role 
of  genetics  in  cancer.  Henderson  and  Kitzinger  (1999)  attributed  the  over-
estimation of the genetic element in breast cancer by women in their study to 
the way in which the media covered the subject. Coverage can distort the image 
of the ‘everyday’ experience of cancer. As was shown in Chapter 3, while once 
the American Cancer Society attempted to persuade the US public that cancer 
was not a disease associated with old age they have in essence become victims 
of the success of this campaign. Many awareness studies highlight the failure of 
the public to make links between cancer and ageing (Breslow et al 1997; Paul et 
al 1999; McCaffrey, Wardle and Waller 2003; Keighleyet al 2004). Many different 
narratives were offered in these interviews, and most referred to older people, 
yet age was rarely mentioned as an important risk factor.  
Biomedicine  provides  the  backdrop  for  the  understanding  of  cancer.  Germs, 
cells, and the biology of cancer are well recognised. As well as an understanding 
of  the  biology  of  cancer,  biomedicine  also  plays  another  key  role.  The 
association between cancer and genes was important and this was understood in 
two  distinct  ways.  First  the  idea  of  heredity  was  common  and  there  was 
widespread recognition about the links between breast, ovarian and colorectal 
cancer and familial genes. Although previous studies have pointed to the over-
estimation of genetic factors and familial risk amongst women, this was not the 
case here. A number of women in this study were clear that there were different 
types  of  breast  cancer  and  their  risk  was  not  heightened  by  virtue  of  their 
familial experience. However there was a belief, expressed by many in this study 
that cancer families could be identified. This echoes other work in the west of 
Scotland and the UK that reported the identification of disease specific families 
(Emslie, Hunt & Watt 2001a; Scanlon et al 2006). In this study, this was more 
likely  to  occur  among  those  who  thought  they  did  not  have  cancer  in  their 
‘family’.  The  explanations  for  this  are  likely  to  be  twofold.  First,  those  in 
‘cancer  families’  were  more  likely  to  have  paid  close  attention  to  their  risk 
estimation in light of this information and so were simply better informed about 
the  reality  of  genetics.  Second,  placing  oneself  at  risk  was  challenging  and 
having  no  cancer  in  the  family  provided  much  needed  distance.  Genetic 
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which participants expressed the view that cancer takes the form of a faulty 
gene that can be activated by varied factors was unexpected. The language used 
differed by participant but they were essentially referring to the same concept. 
It is worth noting that some participants believed that not everyone was born 
with the gene. Regardless, the presence of a dormant gene that can ‘trigger’ 
cancer at any point provides a convenient catch-all aetiological explanation. It is 
essentially  a  quasi-scientific  reworking  of  luck.  Many  studies  have  previously 
found versions of what is essentially the same aetiological explanation (Cornwell 
1984; Calnan 1987; Mullen 1994; Scanlon 2006  
The way in which ordinary views of causality and risk are expressed is important. 
Rather  than  talking  about  risk  factors  in  a  biomedical  manner,  participants 
tended to discuss all risk factors in terms of ‘causes’. For example, it was not 
uncommon to say ‘everything causes cancer’, or ‘mobile phones cause cancer’. 
Although this distinction may seem semantic it is important in the context of lay 
epidemiology. Risks are based on probability, while cause is definite. According 
to lay epidemiology, risk estimation is based on observation, and the implication 
of that is that the lay public are likely to remain unsure about the validity of 
risks that have not, for them, made the transition, via observation, to cause. So 
it is clear that most people will unreservedly accept the risks associated with 
smoking because most people will have known someone who smoked and died of 
a  smoking  related  cancer.  It  is  easy  therefore  to  establish  cause,  and 
consequently accept risk.  
 
11.3.3  Does lay epidemiology offer an aid to our understanding of 
beliefs about cancer and cancer risk?  
At  its  most  basic  level  the  lay  epidemiology  model  describes  the  way  that 
individuals gather and reorder information to arrive at their own explanatory 
model,  and  estimate  risk.  Clearly  participants  in  this  study  dealt  with 
information in much the same way as described by Davison and colleagues with 
reference  to  CHD.  Throughout  the  interviews  participants  talked  about  the 
development of their explanatory models. Those events in the family had most 
resonance but some explicitly talked about seeking out information in response 
to family events. Others talked at length about the examples of individuals in 
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were  included  in  one  story.  So  both  proximity  and  distant  proximity  were 
important which confirms the method of data synthesis described in the original 
lay epidemiology model.  
Davison  is  not  explicit  about  the  fixedness  of  beliefs  about  CHD.  Coronary 
candidacy is so successful because of a universal acceptance of CHD risk factors 
that have remained unchanged. Information about cancer, partly because of its 
multisite and multi-causal nature, gives the impression of being ever changing. 
This flux is reflected in ordinary explanatory models. Participants in this study 
describe models that adapt to incorporate new material and evidence. Indeed, 
because cancer is a multi-site and multi-causal disease it demands more from its 
explanatory model. Each individual model, while holding typical information, is 
nuanced to reflect personal experience. Though this is likely to be true of CHD 
the  potential  for  a  convoluted  model  is  enhanced  with  cancer.  It  could  be 
argued that just as Davison’s model demonstrated the sophistication of ordinary 
views,  the  findings  from  this  study  highlight  both  the  sophistication  and 
complexity demanded of the lay epidemiologist when arriving at an explanatory 
model of cancer. 
How beliefs are formed and developed is only one element of lay epidemiology. 
Candidacy,  anomalous  deaths  and  unwarranted  survivals  are  vital  to  the 
operation of the model. These will now be looked at in turn. 
 
11.3.3.1   Is there any notion of candidacy in relation to cancer? 
Davison  described  candidacy  as  the  ‘cultural  mechanism’  that  allowed 
estimations of risk to be operationalised. As such, the candidacy model relied on 
CHD having a strong and familiar culture. It clearly does. Many studies (Preston 
1997; Wiles 1998;Emslie, Hunt & Watt 2001a; Frich et al 2007; Weiner 2009) 
have shown that a strong recognisable candidate apparent in beliefs about CHD. 
Emslie, Hunt and Watt (2001b) demonstrated that women were missing from the 
model, and Ruston and Clayton showed that women underestimated their risk 
because  they  assumed  that  only  men  were  coronary  candidates.  All  of  this 
confirms  what  Weiner  (2009)  described  as  the  ‘tenacity’  of  the  coronary 
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Cancer too has, as this study reflects, a strong cultural base and a common talk. 
Yet it is precisely this culture that may impede the identification of a cancer 
candidate.  There  are  areas  where  candidacy  is  strong.  Smokers  were  cancer 
candidates. Much like the discussion of CHD sufferers’ physical stature, smoking 
status was central to any discussion of cancer candidacy, though smoking does 
not provide an immediate visual cue. Leaving smokers aside, are there other 
cancer candidates? 
 
Within the original lay epidemiology model, although the coronary candidate was 
easily  recognisable,  Davison  identified  four  different  types  of  candidacy. 
Candidacy could be either retrospective or prospective and could be applied to 
oneself  and  to  others.  The  strongest  and  most  successful  application  was 
retrospective candidacy applied to others. A similar pattern emerges for cancer. 
Davison  described  candidacy  as  a  ‘wide’  concept  which  was  applied  by 
scrutinising well-known risks and arriving at the most appropriate explanation. 
Such a discreet risk profile is not so well-known or recognised for cancer, so with 
the  exception  of  smokers,  endless  possibilities  combine  to  make  the  cancer 
candidate. In their study of candidacy and cholesterol, Clarke, Crotty, & Pearson 
(1997)  found  that  their  participants  recognised  a  series  of  candidacy  profiles 
that  included  an  array  of  risk  factors  but  the  cohort  failed  to  settle  on  one 
universal profile. Physical stature was included in all profiles. Smoking status 
was likewise consistent in the cancer candidacy profile, but unlike Davison or 
Clarke, Crotty & Pearson cancer candidacy profiles were not reached.  
Using the candidacy model to assess the future risk of cancer was challenging for 
participants in this study. There are a number of possible reasons for this. First, 
cancer risk profiles are not familiar enough, with the exception of smoking. More 
importantly, as one participant stated ‘you just don’t talk about cancer in that 
way’. Again this is testament to the different cultural understandings of cancer 
and CHD in our society. Davison acknowledged that the term ‘candidacy’ itself 
may  be  problematic.  Candidate  is  associated  with  elections,  and  to  bestow 
candidacy on someone or oneself is to ‘put forward’, so essentially candidacy 
refers to nomination. You are proverbially throwing  your hat (or in this case 
someone else’s) in the ring. As Emslie, Hunt and Watt (2001a) demonstrated in 
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painless CHD event was their preferred ‘way to go’, no such parallel is drawn 
with cancer. Participants in this study were not comfortable ‘singling out’ those 
that might get cancer. Cancer is not a disease that you would wish for yourself 
or anyone else. Though, as already stated smokers were readily identified as 
candidates, as were those who were ‘sun worshippers’. Arguably, the risks of 
both  behaviours are so  well  documented that  by  continuing to  participate  in 
them  smokers  or  sun  worshippers  are  nominating  themselves.  Personal 
culpability  is  easily  introduced  into  the  candidacy  model.  It  has  long  been 
established that the public separate disease into those in which sufferers are 
thought  largely  blameless  and  those  which  could  be  avoided  if  certain 
behavioural regimes were adhered to. Blaxter (1979) and later Cornwell (1984) 
found  that  some  cancers  were  judged  blameless,  with  the  exception  of  lung 
cancer, where blame was apportioned to the sufferer. Davison suggested that it 
was  ‘common  currency’  that  CHD  was  preventable  through  ‘good’  behaviour. 
Smoking was strongly believed to be a basis for candidacy, and although some in 
this study were keen to emphasise distance between smoking and cancer, no one 
denied  the  very  clear  links.  Nevertheless,  participants  in  this  study  seemed 
uncomfortable  predicting  the  probability  of  future  illness  in  those  who  in 
essence got ill ‘though no fault of their own’. The corollary of this position is 
that candidacy raises fewer challenges when sufferers, or likely sufferers, are 
thought wholly responsible. The idea of highlighting someone as a candidate for 
a dread disease, particularly one that they are believed to have no control over, 
feels  unethical.  Indeed,  perhaps  reticence  is  experienced  when  making  such 
judgements because candidacy could apply equally to the judge as well as the 
judged.  Candidacy  may  not  therefore  be  an  entirely  useful  concept  when 
considering beliefs about all cancers.  
11.3.3.2  To what extent are anomalous deaths and unwarranted 
survivals employed?  
Candidacy’s failure to be as salient for cancer as CHD has obvious implications 
for anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivals. Given that smoking was seen as 
the  primary  risk  factor,  then  most  cancer  deaths  among  non-smokers  were 
anomalous.  Indeed,  even  among  some  of  the  smokers,  death  was  judged 
anomalous  because  the  individual  was  thought  to  be  otherwise  ‘healthy’. 
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a wide spectrum of behaviours, for instance, too much, or too little exercise, 
were  taken  into  account.  Chapter  10  suggests  that  candidacy  for  cancer  is 
similarly  wide,  especially  if  faulty  genes  that  merely  require  triggers  for 
activation are present. In this respect, everyone is at risk of, or a candidate for, 
cancer.  Yet  most  stories  were  presented  as  anomalies.  Therefore,  the 
difficulties associated with establishing candidacy for cancer serve to increase 
the profile and number of anomalous deaths. Moral judgements were implicit in 
many  of  these  narratives.  These  were  ‘healthy’  people  who  did  not  deserve 
cancer, rather than cancer candidates. Only true candidates, by virtue of their 
behaviour were deserving of that label.  
Much less common in this study was the evocation of ‘unwarranted survivals’. In 
Davison’s  study  this  typical  ‘Uncle  Norman’  stereotype  was  introduced  in 
humorous  tones,  and  on  the  few  occasions  they  were  talked  about  in  these 
interviews a similar humour and fondness was employed. However, this was an 
area of difference between the affluent and deprived community. Some in the 
affluent community, when talking about unwarranted survivors, stressed their 
uniqueness  would  not  be  borne  out  in  statistics,  others  were  generally 
disparaging. They discussed such individuals in terms of ‘lucky fools’.  
11.3.4 Do lay explanations view cancer as a homogenous disease 
or multi-site and multi-causal? 
Much of the health beliefs literature reviewed in Chapter 2 found that cancer, in 
generic terms, was a feared disease. Rarely did this specify a cancer site. This 
study  set  out  to  explore  whether  cancer  was  typically  thought  of  as  one 
homogenous disease. Most participants talked about cancer as a generic disease, 
though  admittedly  it  was  first  introduced  into  interviews  as  a  homogenous 
disease. Early in narratives the catch-all label of cancer was offered and only on 
probing was the site, if it was known, disclosed. There were notable exceptions. 
One was breast cancer which was always given its full title, and it is likely that 
this reflects the media attention received by breast cancer (Gottlieb 2001). The 
other was non-smoking related lung cancer, which reflects the desire to distance 
the lung cancer sufferer from personal responsibility. The stigma attached to 
lung cancer has been previously observed (Chapple, Ziebland & McPherson 2004) 
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cancer was rarely discussed. Biologically, cancer was seen as the one disease 
that affected different parts of the body, though a handful of participants made 
distinctions  between  leukaemia  and  other  cancers.  Cancer  was  seen  as 
multicausal, even if these causes were poorly understood. Smoking was typically 
associated with all cancer sites. Often links between site and cause were made 
during the course of the interview and this was typically a commonsense view, 
for example, many assumed that diet and gastrointestinal cancers were linked. 
Proximity  to  cancer  was  influential  here.  Participants  that  had  sought  out 
information on specific cancer sites had an understanding of appropriate risk 
factors but this related directly to experience. This concurs with the idea of 
availability heuristics (Sanders et al 2007) because people draw on their direct 
experience to evidence their views.  
11.3.5 Are there differences between beliefs in deprived and 
affluent communities?  
Only subtle differences were found between those living in deprived and affluent 
communities. Views and experiences were similar across communities and often 
the key difference was the way in which thoughts were articulated. Proximity to 
cancer  was  the  most  important  factor  in  levels  of  awareness,  which  were 
individually  framed.  Generally  those  in  affluent  communities  had  closer 
proximity  to  cancer  and  from  that  perspective  appeared  to  have  greater 
awareness.  However,  if  a  participant  from  a  deprived  community  had  close 
proximity,  their  level  of  awareness  was  similar  to  that  of  a  participant  with 
similar  proximity  in  the  affluent  community  and  vice  versa.  It  was  the  case 
though that those in the deprived communities were more likely to question the 
absolute  risks  associated  with  smoking,  but  more  of  them  smoked  or  had 
smoked. Similarly those in deprived communities were more likely to suggest 
that cancer may have been caused by a faulty gene that required a trigger to 
activate it. However those in deprived communities were no more fatalistic as a 
consequence. In affluent communities the randomness associated with cancer 
was more likely to be introduced than the faulty gene theory. Arguably these 
concepts have a similar root. Both provide an explanation for the unexplainable 
but are expressed in different ways and far from being irrational, the trigger 
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Given that risk behaviours are socially patterned (Wardle et al 2003), it may 
have  been  fair  to  suppose  poorer  overall  awareness  in  the  deprived 
communities.  This  was  not  the  case.  Awareness  was  highest  among  those 
participants that had experienced a close and anomalous cancer. None of the 
participants in the deprived community fitted this profile. Moreover, because 
the  cancer  disease  experience  is  similarly  socially  patterned  (Coleman  et  al 
2004; Faggiano et al 1997; Shack et al 2007) and lay epidemiology claimed that 
community events were important, more differences might have been expected. 
If  epidemiological  patterns  are  used  as  a  guide  then  those  in  affluent 
communities should have fewer observable cancer events on which to draw, and 
those  observable  events  should  have  better  outcomes  than those  in deprived 
communities.  This  epidemiological  reality  was  not  reflected  in  the  interview 
findings. 
11.4 Further reflections 
11.4.1 Explanatory models 
This study provides a clear insight into the way that people talk about disease. 
The idea that people seek explanatory models for illness (Kleinman 1980) and 
draw on a repertoire of beliefs to inform that model (Chrisman 1989) is not new. 
Yet, these studies focused on the reactions of patients and how they made sense 
of an illness. What this study adds is that ordinary, non-patient views of health 
are  formulated  in  the  same  way  and narratives  of  others  –  whether  close  or 
distant  –  are  borrowed  to  fill  that  repertoire.  Granted,  Davison’s  lay 
epidemiology  described  the  process  of  information  gathering  from  numerous 
sources which are then combined to form an explanatory model. The original 
description suggested a static model. It may be that our understandings of the 
risks connected with CHD do not change and so the explanatory model is fixed. 
More is demanded when arriving at an explanatory model of cancer. It is likely 
that explanatory models will hold only until the next case is observed. Each new 
case is fed into a dynamic explanatory framework. The findings of this study 
capture  the  elaborate  and  highly  developed  nature  of  explanatory  models  of 
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11.4.2 Prevention paradox & fatalism 
Lay epidemiology went beyond a description of the formulation of beliefs and 
the mechanism for risk estimation. Davison was clear that the concept could 
explain some of the shortcomings of health promotion. Davison demonstrated 
that  the  participants  in  the  south  Wales  study  had  adopted  many  of  the 
messages about CHD risk put forward by mainstream health promotion. Health 
promotion implements strategies at a population level. The population approach 
adopted by health promotion requires everyone to make behavioural changes in 
order  to  achieve  even  a  slight  benefit.  However,  in  so  doing, risk  thresholds 
become  lower  and  consequently  many  more  people  are  now  ‘high  risk’.  The 
distribution of CHD events will continue to fall out with the high risk group, so 
more among the high risk group will survive. Such observations lead, according 
to  Davison,  to  rational  questions  about  the  extent  to  which  behaviours  are 
genuinely ‘risky’. Although candidates will succumb to CHD and non-candidates 
will not, the reverse is also true and it is this recognition that challenges health 
promotion. From the same data, Davison introduced the ideas of ‘fatalism’ and 
contended that fatalism, in all its forms, provides a reasonable explanation for 
an  anomalous  CHD  event.  Nowhere  did  Davison  hint  that  fatalism  challenged 
candidacy.  Rather  it  appears  that  fatalism  is  as  influential  as  candidacy  in 
explaining CHD events: 
“Accounting  for  the  randomness  and  scatter  that  exist  around  the 
epidemiological  trends  is  not  a  central  issue  for  public  health 
professionals.  Rather,  they  deal  with  the  trends  themselves  and 
concern  themselves  with  taking  action  directed  at  amending  a 
probabilistic  future.  Popular  health  culture  on  the  other  hand, 
cannot  turn  its  back  on  any  illness  or  death.  Those  which  violate 
general principles must also be explained. It is within this context 
that an ethnography of fatalism is important, as it seeks to throw 
light on the cultural structures within which common, but apparently 
anomalous, events can be accommodated.” (Davsion, Frankel & Davey 
Smith1992:101) 
It seems then that for Davison candidacy holds steady, even when challenged by 
anomalies. Hunt and Emslie (2001) countered that those anomalies, particularly 
within  the  family,  ‘deconstruct’  candidacy.  Family  events  will  be  most 
influential and have the power to transform, rather than confirm, candidacy. 
The findings of this study show that these positions are not mutually exclusive. 
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than just an event that is fed back into an overall explanatory model of cancer. 
However, the event need not necessarily challenge candidacy. For example, if a 
case was described as anomalous by virtue of an apparently ‘healthy’ lifestyle of 
the  sufferer,  a  re-evaluation  of  what  constituted  ‘unhealthy’  does  not 
necessarily follow. Rather, as Davison stated, this anomaly emphasised the hand 
of  fate.  Certainly,  knowing  smokers  who  did  not  have  cancer  and  cancer 
sufferers  that  had  never  smoked  did  not  lead  participants  in  this  study  to 
deconstruct  the  candidacy  of  smokers.  Hunt  and  Emslie  also  suggest  that 
uniquely rich information, which cannot be gathered from distant or fictional 
sources, is only available in the family setting. This insight, they contended, 
provides family members with the ability to be lay anthropologists rather than 
epidemiologists: 
“The emphasis is not on isolating risk factors, but on contextualising, 
qualifying  or  even  rejecting  previously  accepted  risk  factors  or 
aetiological  theories  in  the  face  of  contrary  personal  experience. 
(Hunt & Emslie 2001:445) 
Yet Davison made provision for this in two key ways. First, by stressing that the 
lay  public  see  the  fallibility  of  candidacy  and  second,  by  stressing  the 
importance of fate. Although candidacy is not as powerful for cancer as it is for 
CHD  both  the  fallibility  of  mainstream  explanations  and  fate  were  often 
introduced in relation to known cases in this study.  
Like  Davison,  Hunt  and  Emslie  made  a  plea  for  health  promotion  to  take 
cognisance  of  lay  theories  of  health  behaviour  and  consider  motivations  for 
behavioural change. The problems associated with the prevention paradox for 
health promotion were outlined by Davison many times and are echoed by Hunt 
and Emslie. Yet, Davison conceded when discussing fatalism that throughout the 
course of the ethnography in Wales he rarely found a participant that thought 
adopting healthy lifestyles were rendered hopeless because of fatalism. This is 
echoed in this study. Many of the participants, often as a result of anomalous 
family  situations,  had  re-evaluated  their  beliefs  and  arrived  at  fatalistic 
explanations for cancer. There was widespread agreement that risk could not be 
eradicated but it could potentially be reduced by adopting healthier lifestyles.  Chapter 11    215 
11.4.3 Morality 
This study adds to the body of work that demonstrates health is a profoundly 
moral construct. The studies included in Chapter 2, primarily those of Blaxter 
(1982) and Cornwell (1984), showed that inherent in discussions about health 
and causality were moral judgements. Both found that their participants were 
loath to attach culpability to individuals but also found that it was important to 
remain strong in response to disease. These studies were carried out at a time 
before the move to the ‘prevention’ model and the subsequent concentration on 
personal disease avoidance took hold (Davison, Frankel & Davey Smith 1992). 
This present study was conducted in a climate where personal responsibility for 
disease  avoidance  is  an  accepted  cultural  norm.  Was  this  ideological  shift 
evident in the interviews? Undoubtedly many of those interviewed were keen to 
demonstrate not only that they were aware of what constituted healthy choice 
but  also  that  they  made  the  right  choices.  This  echoes  earlier  findings  by 
Crawford (1984). By outlining their good behaviour they were inhabiting what 
they see as an appropriate moral position.  
Many  were  reluctant  to  label  ‘cancer  candidates’  with  the  expectation  of 
smokers, perhaps because they felt that it was morally unacceptable. Yet while 
explicit  candidacy  models  were  shied  away  from  most  participants  had  little 
difficulty separating good from bad behaviours, and sometimes implicit in these 
conversations  was  the  moral  status  of  those  engaging  in  such  behaviours. 
Sometimes the judgements were explicit. Often the idea of ‘deserving’ or more 
pertinently  ‘not  deserving’  cancer  came  up.  This  is  recognisable  as  everyday  
cancer talk. In this study children were thought not to deserve cancer, and few 
could  explain  causality  in  children.  The  potential  culpability  of  mothers  was 
introduced,  however.  So  although  Clow  (2001)  rejected  the  strength  of  the 
stigma related to cancer some of the participants in this study made critical and 
quick judgements about culpability.  
11.4.4 Smoking 
Smoking had a special significance in this study. It was the most widely accepted 
cause of cancer, and smokers were clearly identified as candidates. However it 
was  clear  that  the  absolute  risks  of  smoking  depicted  in  health  promotion Chapter 11    216 
materials introduced questions in the minds of some participants. If some people 
can smoke and remain disease free, why not all? The difficulty of course is the 
certainty with which the message is portrayed, as Davison pointed out. Changing 
attitudes to smoking are evident throughout the interviews and, particularly in 
the affluent area, participants were eager to excuse the smoking of relatives or 
emphasise  their  ‘trade-off’  with  good  behaviours.  Backett  (1992a)  similarly 
concluded that good and bad behaviours are balanced or off set to provide a 
holistic model of a healthy lifestyle. As well as smokers themselves, relatives of 
smokers were equally keen to make allowances for their loved ones and on a 
number of occasions deny the role of smoking in causality.   
 
11.4.5  Age 
Participants were asked to consider whether the cancer patients they knew had 
anything in common. Generally, they concluded that they did not but in reality 
what  they  often  had  in  common  was  age.  Many  participants  displayed  an 
interesting attitude to cancer and age. Although many assumed that age was a 
risk factor for cancer, this was expressed as a commonsense view rather than 
knowledge gathered from ‘expert’ sources. Instead cancer was viewed almost as 
a by-product of ageing and it was not uncommon for participants to state that 
‘you have to die of something’. The typical narratives of tragedy and suffering 
did not apply to cancer in the elderly. Suffering was not thought to be as severe 
when  the  person  is  older  and  the  disease  is  not  likely  to  be  as  aggressive. 
Participants believed that this was because cells were thought to be ‘healthier’ 
in  young  people  and  therefore  multiplied  more  quickly  The  ageing  process, 
characterised  by  the  body  slowing  down,  is  also  applied  to  biology.  Indeed 
cancer was not viewed as quite the killer in the elderly. Nevertheless, despite 
the  relative indifference towards  cancer  in  the  elderly,  it  was  often  thought 
unwise to inform older people of cancer diagnoses. This may be a hangover from 
the stigma once attached to cancer.  
 
11.5 Chapter Summary  
This chapter reflected on the study’s original research questions and offered 
some additional reflections on other notable findings.  The next, and final, 
chapter will summarise the main findings from the study and reach some Chapter 11    217 
conclusions before going on to suggest how these findings might usefully be 
developed in a future research agenda.218 
 
12.  Summary & Conclusions  
The aim of this study was to explore the utility of the lay epidemiology model 
when  reflecting  on ordinary  beliefs  about  cancer.  Originally  the  concept  was 
developed  by  Davison  and  colleagues  using  data  from  an  ethnographic  study 
carried out in South Wales in the late 1980s. The communities involved in the 
study had recently been subject to a series of health educating activities that 
sought to highlight the risk factors associated with coronary heart disease (CHD). 
What  emerged  form  the  ethnography  was  a  clear  recognition  of  a  ‘coronary 
candidate’ that was, according to Davison, a cultural mechanism that allowed an 
estimation of CHD risk. Candidacy however was fallible and this was illustrated 
by the identification of both anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivals.  In 
the face of uncertain aetiology participants in South Wales turned to fatalistic 
explanations like luck to account for irregular events. This rational and logical 
estimation of risk, it was suggested, might help explain the failure for the public 
to  wholeheartedly  embrace  lifestyle  change.  Davison  evoked  Geoffrey  Rose’s 
prevention  paradox  which  questioned  the  wisdom  of  adopting  a  population 
strategy  to  health  promotion.  The  approach,  while  yielding  benefits  at  a 
population  level,  will  mean  little  for  the  individual.  Indeed,  in  changing  the 
boundaries of risk the numbers thought to be high risk increased but CHD events 
continue to occur more frequently out with the high risk group. Consequently, 
the  lay  public  observe  increased  numbers  of  both  anomalous  deaths  and 
unwarranted survivals.  
At its most fundamental, lay epidemiology describes a method of information 
gathering that incorporates evidence from wide sources. The immediate family, 
wider family, social networks, the general public, and the media all contribute 
to the development of an explanatory model of CHD. The same is true of cancer. 
Participants in this study arrived at an explanatory model of cancer by drawing 
together  a  varied  set  of  narratives  that  gave  them  an  individually  tailored 
evidence base. A model that is ever-changing to incorporate new evidence is 
described. 
Central to Davison’s notion of lay epidemiology was the ‘coronary candidate’ 
that allowed an estimation of risk. Candidacy could be applied prospectively, Chapter 12    219 
but  was  more  successful  retrospectively.  The  examples  Davison  offers  to 
illustrate  coronary  candidacy  are  powerful  and  are  familiar  evocations  of 
everyday CHD talk. Cancer talk was equally familiar and discussed via a few 
typical  narratives.  These  narratives  are  no  less  culturally  embedded  but  the 
culture  is  dramatically  different.  The  review  of  literature  in  this  thesis  has 
shown that CHD inhabits a unique cultural position. It is a disease that attracts 
little fear or dread in the public psyche and has been identified as representing 
a good, and crucially, quick death (Emslie, Hunt & Watt 2001a). Cancer is the 
antithesis of CHD. The findings from this study confirm the literature that has 
focused on the culture of cancer and shows that it is a disease commonly linked 
with uncertainty, tragedy and fear (Sontag 1978; Patterson 1987; Scanlon et al 
2006).  These  cultural  differences  have  significant  implications  for  the 
applicability of lay epidemiology to cancer.  
The dreaded nature of cancer meant that often participants in this study were 
reluctant  to  attach  cancer  candidacy  labels.  Smokers  were  the  notable 
exceptions to this. Like physical stature in Davison’s study, smoking status was 
the first factor to be offered as explanation and the only risk factor that acted 
as a possible predictor of future candidacy. Other than smoking, risk factors for 
cancer  were  not  universally  recognised.  Coronary  candidacy  is  successful 
because the risk factors for CHD are well understood by the lay public. The same 
is not true for cancer and so candidacy is bound to be undermined. Without 
clarity  around  risk  factors  the  scope  for  observing  anomalous  deaths  is 
broadened, and ultimately this challenges candidacy. 
As well as being culturally different, cancer and CHD are very different diseases. 
The ease with which the lay public recognise the mechanistic biomedical origins 
of CHD was documented by Davison and others (Emslie, Hunt & Watt 2001a). 
Cancer is multisite and multi-causal. This study set out to establish whether the 
lay public thought of cancer as a homogenous disease. Cancer is talked about in 
generic  terms,  though  site-specific  details  were  provided  in  more  in-depth 
narratives. Cancer though is looked upon as one disease that affects different 
parts  of  the  body,  rather  than  as  an  umbrella  term  for  a  group  of  diseases. 
Participants’ interpretation did not capture the complexity of cancer. The lack 
of simplicity contributes to the weakness of cancer candidacy Chapter 12    220 
It might be argued that such stark biomedical differences between cancer and 
CHD indicate that any attempt to explore lay epidemiology in the context of 
cancer, and especially generic cancer,  was fruitless from the outset. While a 
study of lung cancer candidacy would undoubtedly have found clear links with 
smoking, any other cancer, taken in isolation might have had similar struggles. 
One of the few studies that took Davison’s original model as its starting point 
considered lay epidemiology in the context of breast cancer, and concluded that 
a firm concept of breast cancer candidacy was equally illusive (Salant & Gehler 
2008).  
Davison  supposed  that  the  lay  epidemiological  method  of  arriving  at  risk,  by 
utilising  observed  population  data,  tested  health  promotion.  Others  however 
have  emphasised  the  differences  between  lay  and  mainstream  epidemiology 
Hunt  &  Emslie  (2001)  proposed  that  events  in  the  family  will  have  most 
resonance  and  make  more  of  a  contribution  to  explanatory  framework.  They 
likened  the  information  gathering  and  processing  procedure  to  that  of  a 
qualitative  researcher,  who  gains  in-depth  and  more  meaningful  data.    The 
findings from this study support both Davison and Hunt and Emslie’s positions. 
Cancer is marked by tragedy and uncertainty. If such an event was apparent in a 
family, this was indeed central to the explanatory model. If, however, the only 
available data related to the cancer of an elderly relative – neither unexpected 
nor tragic – explanatory models were supplemented with distant anomalous and 
tragic cases. Tragic and unusual cases of cancer were more likely to be recalled 
and  retold.  So  while  the  lay  view  of  cancer  may  be  formed  by  drawing  on 
elements  of  epidemiology  and  qualitative  research,  they  also  utilise  methods 
employed in the mass media. They tell stories that are worth telling. It should 
be  stressed  that  the  lack  of  certainty  around  risk  factors  for  cancer,  leaves 
plenty of space for tragedy and anomaly to emerge.   
12.1 What does this study add? 
This  study  adds  to  the  scarce  body  of  literature  that  considers  lay  views  of 
cancer amongst the ordinary public. Dein (2004) highlighted that there was a 
dearth  of  such  material  in  the  UK.  A  more  recent  example  by  Scanlon  et  al 
(2006) that considered the cancer beliefs among the Irish population and the 
indigenous white population in the UK reports similar findings. In addition this Chapter 12    221 
study augments the health beliefs literature and is unique in considering the 
applicability  of  lay  epidemiology  to  cancer.  It  shows  that  cancer  means 
something quite different to CHD and this difference suggests that the concept 
of candidacy is of limited use. However in arriving at that conclusion the study 
confirmed  findings  from  other  studies that  show  that  risk  factors  for cancer, 
with  the  exception  of  smoking,  are  not  universally  recognised.  This  too 
challenges any notion of candidacy. Although Davison proposed that coronary 
candidacy posed problems for health educators, this study shows that the failure 
of candidacy is equally problematic for health promotion.  
12.2 Future Research 
As well as drawing on observation of known cases, candidacy models, for both 
CHD and cancer do encompass known risk factors. Although coronary candidacy 
was  originally  presented  with  negative  undertones,  and  used  to  explain  the 
shortcomings of health promotion, it may be beneficial to consider the potential 
of candidacy. As Davison outlined, lay beliefs incorporate scientific explanations 
for CHD and this study found that participants make clear links between smoking 
and  cancer  and  indeed  smokers  were  marked  as  the  only  cancer  candidates. 
Despite  Davison’s  criticism  of  the  simplicity  of  health  promotion,  such 
straightforward  messages  therefore  appear  to  be  effective  in  establishing 
candidacy,  though  guaranteeing  subsequent  changes  in  behaviour  is  more 
challenging. It is possible that candidacy could be encouraged, particularly in 
areas  where  risk  is  poorly  understood,  for  example  in  relation  to  the  risks 
between alcohol and cancer. Arguably, introducing ideas of personal culpability 
and moral responsibility may prove problematic. It may be more helpful to focus 
on areas separate from behaviour or individual actions, and re-establishing age 
as a risk factor for cancer may be an area where candidacy could be positively 
utilised.  
Candidacy has more recently been used in the context of access to health care 
(Dixon-Woods  et  al  2006).  In  a  review  of  available  evidence,  the  authors 
concluded that vulnerable groups often fail to see themselves as warrantable 
candidates for health care. The uptake of preventative care could be improved 
if candidacy was better established. Though Dixon-Woods explicitly states that 
this candidacy model is distinct from Davison’s coronary candidate, there are Chapter 12    222 
similarities in the concepts. Taken together the models may prove a useful tool 
for health educators. Davison’s concept of coronary candidacy relied heavily on 
the cultural understanding of CHD and this study also showed the importance 
and  strength  of  cancer’s  cultural  resonance.  There  is  a  need  to  better 
understand  the  socio-cultural  position  of  illness  to  better  understand  the 
perception of risk. A discussion of candidacy within high risk groups that focus on 
specific  risk  behaviours  could  form  the  basis  of  future  health  promotion 
activities. Obesity, for instance, is an area that might benefit from a greater 
understanding of risk perceptions which may in turn illuminate the reasons for 
the success or failure of interventions to tackle obesity.    Arguably both models 
need further exploration, but there is scope to harness the notion of candidacy 
and use it to promote salutogenic behaviours.  
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Appendix 2 Community Organisations  
New Kilpatrick Parish Church, Manse Rd, 
Bearsden 
Milngavie & Bearsden Camera Club 
Bearsden North Church, Thorn Rd, Bearsden  Antonine Probus Club 
All Saints Scottish Episcopal Church, Drymen 
Rd, Bearsden 
Probus Club of Allander 
St  Andrew’s RC Church, Roman Rd, 
Bearsden 
Bearsden Literary Society 
Bearsden Baptist Church, Roman Rd, 
Bearsden 
Milngavie Library Reading Group 
St Serf’s Scottish Episcopal Church, 
Shettleston Rd 
Rotary Club of Allander 
Sandyhills Parish Church, Ballieston Rd  Bearsden and Milngavie Philatelic 
Society 
St Paul’s Church , Shettleston Rd  Bearsden and Milngavie Ramblers 
St Joseph’s Church, Fullarton Ave  Bearsden East Community Council 
Carmyle Church of Scotland, Carmyle Ave  Bearsden North Community Council 
Bearsden Art Club  Bearsden West Community Council 
Bearsden and Milngavie Bridge Club  Milngavie Community Council  
Antonine Bridge Club  Local Councillors, Glasgow City 
Council 
Allander Indoor Bowling Club  Local Councillors, East 
Dunbartonashire Council 
Bearsden Bowling Club  East End Community Health 
Partnership 
Milngavie Bowling Club  Milngavie Family History Society 
Bearsden Chess Club  Kelvin Choir 
Bearsden Choir  Milngavie Flower Club 
Bearsden Flower Club  Bearsden Horticultural Society 
Bearsden Golf Club   Milngavie Golf Club 
Bearsden and Milngavie Local History Study 
Group 
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Appendix 3: Volunteer Poster 
 
 
Volunteers wanted 
 
 
I am a postgraduate student and am asking for your help in a student project. 
Cancer is a common disease and many of us will know someone who has or who 
has had cancer. I am interested in hearing about the general public’s views and 
beliefs about the disease how their life experience shapes these views.  
Taking part will involve an interview with me at a time and place convenient to 
you. You do not have to answer any questions you are uncomfortable with and 
can ask to stop the interview at any time.  
I would be extremely grateful if you agree to take part. If you are interested 
please contact me and we can talk a little more about the study. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this 
 
Sara Macdonald, General Practice & Primary Care, University of Glasgow, 1 
Horselethill Rd, Glasgow G12 9LX 
TEL: 0141 330 8325 
EMAIL: smd26h@clinmed.gla.ac.uk227 
 
Appendix 4: Letter to community groups 
 
October 2007 
 
Dear  
 
 
I obtained your contact details from the East Dumbartonshire Council website/ 
East End Community Health Partnership and  I am emailing you in your capacity 
as  xxxx  of the xxxxx.  
  
I am undertaking my PhD at the University of Glasgow and want to talk to people 
about their views about cancer.  I am looking to speak to people who have not 
had cancer themselves.  I wonder if this is something your members may be 
interested in?  If it would be helpful for me to come to speak to your group, 
please let me know and I will arrange to do that. I have attached a little more 
information but if you need anything further I'd be happy to discuss the study.  
  
Thank you very much 
Yours sincerely 
  
 
 
Sara Macdonald 
Research Fellow  
  
Tel: 0141 330 8325 
  
email: smd26h@clinmed.gla.ac.uk228 
Appendix 5 Participant Information 
 Sheet 
 
An exploration of lay beliefs about cancer 
 
 
‘You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it 
will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear 
or if you would like more information.  Take time to decide whether or not you 
wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study  is  being  carried  out  as  a  student  project  by  the  researcher  Sara 
Macdonald. She is interested in what the general public think about cancer. In 
particular she would like to know what you believe causes cancer, who is at 
risk of getting cancer and if some people are more likely to get the disease 
than  others.  She  is  also  interested  in  experiences that  might  have  affected 
your views.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen at random. The researcher visited a number of groups 
and clubs in your area.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you decide to take 
part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
The  information  from  the  interview  will  be  used  as  part  of  a  postgraduate 
student project. All the information is anonymous and no information will be 
identifiable to yourself.  
 
What do I have to do? 
We are asking you to take part in an interview with our researcher.  She will 
ask you some questions about what you think about cancer, what you believe 
causes the disease and who is at risk. The interview will be taped if you agree 
to it.  This is so we can remember what you have said.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no disadvantages to taking part, other than the time it will 
take you to complete the interview.  We estimate this to be about an 
hour.  You will be able to stop the interview at any time, and ask us to 
destroy the tape.   
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You  will  receive  no  direct  benefit  from  taking  part  in  this  study.  The 
information collected during this study will help us to understand more about 
people’s beliefs about cancer.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 229 
The  information  collected  during  this  study  will  be  written  up  as  a  student 
project.  We may also prepare it for publication in academic journals.   
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The study is being organised by Sara Macdonald as part of her postgraduate 
study. Sara  is based in the Section of General Practice at the University of 
Glasgow. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The project has been reviewed by the University of Glasgow Faculty of 
Medicine Ethics Committee. 
 
Contact for Further Information 
Further information can be obtained from: 
 
Ms Sara Macdonald, Section of General Practice and Primary Care, Division of 
Community Based Sciences, University of Glasgow, 1 Horselethill Road 
Glasgow G12 9LX, telephone 0141 330 8330 or email: 
s.macdonald@clinmed.gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to read this information 
sheet 
 230 
Appendix 6 Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Study title: An exploration of lay beliefs about cancer  
 
Name of Researcher: Sara Macdonald 
                                              
Please initial box  
 
1.  I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
study. . 
 
2.  I understand that this interview will be audio-taped. Information from the 
diary and interviews will be treated with confidentiality and none of the 
information in my interview will be traceable back to me. 
 
3.  I  understand  that  all  personal  identifying  data  will  held  securely  for  a 
period of up to ten years. 
 
4.  I  understand  that  my  participation  is  voluntary  and  that  I  am  free  to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my medical care 
or legal rights being affected.  
 
5.  I  understand  that  data  collected  during  the  study  will  be  used  by 
researchers involved in the study and anonymised data may be archived 
and used in future research. 
 
6.  I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
 
 
Researcher    Date    Signature 
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Appendix 7 Topic Guide 
 
 
 
An exploration of lay epidemiology 
and cancer 
 
 
TOPIC GUIDE FOR INTERVIEWS WITH GROUP 
MEMBERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prompts: 
Have you known many people who have or have had cancer? 
 
Can you tell me a little about them? 
 
Could you tell me what sort of cancer that is/was? 
 
Were you surprised that they got cancer? 
 
Do the people you know with cancer have anything in common? 
 
What do you think are the main causes of cancer? 
 
Could you tell me how much of at risk the average person is of cancer? 
 
What  about  people  who  do  all  the  right  things  and  get  cancer  –  can  you 
explain that? 
 
What about people who adopt unhealthy behaviours, like smoking but don’t 
get cancer, can you explain that? 
 
What about childhood cancer – can you explain that? 
 
What about famous people? 
 
Has the way you think about cancer changed over time?, If so, why might that 
be? 
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Appendix 8: Coding Frame 
Coding frame: version 1  
Explanations  
 
Lay epidemiology  Risk  Narratives  
Aetiology  
Smoking; Genetics 
Working conditions 
Environmental 
Clusters; 
Personality; Socio-
economic 
inequality 
Anomalous deaths 
 
Personal risk 
Population risk 
Cancer Journey 
Healthy/Unhealthy 
lifestyle 
Unwarranted 
survivors 
 
Behaviours 
  
Dealing with 
cancer 
Disputed/ 
questioned 
explanations 
Candidacy  
Predictive/ 
retrospective 
   
Myths       
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Coding Frame _ Final Version 
Explanations  
 
Lay epidemiology  Risk  Meaning  & 
understanding 
Proximity 
(closeness of 
personal 
experience) 
Individual 
Narratives  
Layered aetiology 
Smoking; Genetics 
Working conditions 
Environmental 
Clusters; 
Personality; Socio-
economic 
inequality 
Anomalous deaths 
Disconfirming  events 
Children 
Personal risk 
Individual risk 
(people known to 
them) 
Family risk 
Community risk 
Population risk 
Death  
Survival 
Fatalism 
Big C 
 
 
Spouse 
Parent 
Inner circle 
Outer circle 
Celebrity 
Dealing with cancer 
Healthy/Unhealthy 
lifestyle 
Unwarranted 
survivors 
 
Behaviours 
good 
bad 
   - moral 
judgements  
Shifts in meaning  
time 
personal 
experience 
Impact of proximity  Imagery/descriptions 
combative 
human trait 
Disputed/ 
questioned 
explanations 
Candidacy  
Predictive/ 
retrospective 
Hierarchy of risk  Prevalence 
 
  Borrowed narratives 
  Community 
Perspective – 
Affluence/Deprivation 
Protective 
behaviours  
Homogeneity  
 - Family of 
conditions 
   
Triggers      Metaphors     
Randomness      Comparison with 
CHD 
   
Can science 
explain? 
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Appendix 9  Nvivo Node Report 
NVivo revision 2.0.163  Licensee: Sara Macdonald 
 
Project: PhD  User: Administrator  Date: 26/11/2010 - 14:28:43   
NODE LISTING 
 
  Nodes in Set:  All Tree Nodes 
  Created:  27/05/2008 - 13:31:03 
  Modified:  27/05/2008 - 13:31:03 
  Number of Nodes:  132 
  1  (1) /explanations 
  2  (1 1) /explanations/smoking 
  3  (1 1 1) /explanations/smoking/passive smoking 
  4  (1 2) /explanations/other behavioural 
  5  (1 2 1) /explanations/other behavioural/alcohol 
  6  (1 2 2) /explanations/other behavioural/sun 
  7  (1 2 3) /explanations/other behavioural/stress 
  8  (1 2 7) /explanations/other behavioural/obesity~diet 
  9  (1 2 9) /explanations/other behavioural/personality 
  10  (1 3) /explanations/environmental 
  11  (1 3 2) /explanations/environmental/work hazards 
  12  (1 3 4) /explanations/environmental/pollution 
  13  (1 3 8) /explanations/environmental/food additives 
  14  (1 3 16) /explanations/environmental/mobile phones 
  15  (1 3 18) /explanations/environmental/electricity pylons 
  16  (1 4) /explanations/biological 
  17  (1 4 3) /explanations/biological/genetics 
  18  (1 4 3 4) /explanations/biological/genetics/ticking time bomb 
  19  (1 4 6) /explanations/biological/hormones 
  20  (1 5) /explanations/familial 
  21  (1 6) /explanations/secondary event 
  22  (1 7) /explanations/moral position 
  23  (1 8) /explanations/psychology 
  24  (1 9) /explanations/need for explantion 
  25  (1 10) /explanations/lifestyle 
  26  (1 11) /explanations/link b~w cause & site 
  27  (1 12) /explanations/all cause 
  28  (1 13) /explanations/we all have it 
  29  (1 13 1) /explanations/we all have it/trigger 
  30  (1 13 16) /explanations/we all have it/triggered 
  31  (1 17) /explanations/luck~random 
  32  (1 19) /explanations/explanatory model 
  33  (1 30) /explanations/age 
  34  (2) /meaning & understanding 
  35  (2 1) /meaning & understanding/unpredictable 
  36  (2 1 2) /meaning & understanding/unpredictable/you never know ~ 
  37  (2 1 6) /meaning & understanding/unpredictable/asymptomatic 
  38  (2 2) /meaning & understanding/positive 
  39  (2 2 4) /meaning & understanding/positive/benefit of catching it early 
  40  (2 2 5) /meaning & understanding/positive/curable 
  41  (2 2 15) /meaning & understanding/positive/survival 
  42  (2 3) /meaning & understanding/comparison with TB 
  43  (2 4) /meaning & understanding/screening 
  44  (2 6) /meaning & understanding/tragedy 
  45  (2 13) /meaning & understanding/its common 
  46  (2 14) /meaning & understanding/relative danger of site 
  47  (2 16) /meaning & understanding/The Big C 
  48  (2 16 1) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/spread 
  49  (2 16 2) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/aggressive 
  50  (2 16 3) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/its too late 237 
  51  (2 16 6) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/cancer = death 
  52  (2 16 7) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/fear 
  53  (2 16 8) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/pain 
  54  (2 16 9) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/horrible death 
  55  (2 16 10) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/wasting away 
  56  (2 17) /meaning & understanding/what is cancer like~ 
  57  (2 17 1) /meaning & understanding/what is cancer like~/images 
  58  (2 17 20) /meaning & understanding/what is cancer like~/analogies 
  59  (2 17 20 1) /meaning & understanding/what is cancer like~/analogies/combative 
language 
  60  (2 34) /meaning & understanding/clusters 
  61  (2 35) /meaning & understanding/childhood cancer 
  62  (2 36) /meaning & understanding/comparison with CHD 
  63  (5) /attitude to NHS 
  64  (7) /knowledge 
  65  (7 1) /knowledge/weaving lay~expert descriptions 
  66  (7 2) /knowledge/sources of information 
  67  (7 13) /knowledge/not expert 
  68  (7 37) /knowledge/media 
  69  (9) /Risk 
  70  (9 1) /Risk/personal risk 
  71  (9 2) /Risk/experienced already 
  72  (9 3) /Risk/can't eliminate risk 
  73  (9 4) /Risk/candidacy 
  74  (9 5) /Risk/annomolous case 
  75  (9 6) /Risk/unwarranted survivor 
  76  (9 7) /Risk/population view 
  77  (9 23) /Risk/it won't happen to me 
  78  (10) /behaviours 
  79  (10 1) /behaviours/'bad' 
  80  (10 1 6) /behaviours/'bad'/ignores advice 
  81  (10 2) /behaviours/'good behaviours' 
  82  (10 3) /behaviours/personal accounts 
  83  (10 4) /behaviours/others 
  84  (10 5) /behaviours/moderation 
  85  (10 6) /behaviours/hypochondriacs 
  86  (10 27) /behaviours/upbringing 
  87  (11) /experience of cancer 
  88  (11 1) /experience of cancer/delay 
  89  (11 2) /experience of cancer/impact of cancer 
  90  (11 3) /experience of cancer/individual cases 
  91  (11 3 1) /experience of cancer/individual cases/siblings 
  92  (11 3 2) /experience of cancer/individual cases/extended family 
  93  (11 3 3) /experience of cancer/individual cases/spouse~partner 
  94  (11 3 4) /experience of cancer/individual cases/friends 
  95  (11 3 5) /experience of cancer/individual cases/acquaintances 
  96  (11 3 6) /experience of cancer/individual cases/parents~in-laws 
  97  (11 3 7) /experience of cancer/individual cases/proximity 
  98  (11 3 8) /experience of cancer/individual cases/narrative 
  99  (11 3 9) /experience of cancer/individual cases/age of sufferer 
  100  (11 3 28) /experience of cancer/individual cases/celebrity 2 
  101  (11 4) /experience of cancer/recurrence 
  102  (11 5) /experience of cancer/dealing with disease 
  103  (11 6) /experience of cancer/perception shift 
  104  (11 6 1) /experience of cancer/perception shift/time 
  105  (11 6 2) /experience of cancer/perception shift/experience 
  106  (11 8) /experience of cancer/professionals 
  107  (11 9) /experience of cancer/symptoms 
  108  (11 9 4) /experience of cancer/symptoms/fear the worst 
  109  (11 10) /experience of cancer/speed 
  110  (11 28) /experience of cancer/cancer sites 
  111  (11 31) /experience of cancer/shock 
  112  (11 38) /experience of cancer/was it cancer~ 
  113  (12) /aesthetics of 'health' 238 
  114  (14) /positive stories 
  115  (15) /science 
  116  (15 1) /science/research 
  117  (15 2) /science/does science know~ 
  118  (15 17) /science/contradictory evidence 
  119  (15 20) /science/medical advances 
  120  (16) /health education 
  121  (18) /affects everyone 
  122  (25) /deprivation~affluence 
  123  (25 1) /deprivation~affluence/bearsden 
  124  (25 26) /deprivation~affluence/poor get everything 
  125  (26) /healthy living 
  126  (26 1) /healthy living/happiness~contentment 
  127  (26 22) /healthy living/positive attitude 
  128  (26 24) /healthy living/do the right things 
  129  (26 33) /healthy living/attitude to life 
  130  (29) /parent's health 
  131  (32) /fatalism 
  132  (39) /community 239 
Appendix 10 Proximity Vignettes 
Affluent Participants 
The first interviewee was Lisa, (45) year old professional. Lisa’s husband had 
been diagnosed with colorectal cancer two years previously. He had recovered 
well despite a long diagnostic delay. He had experienced a recurrence but that 
too  was  successfully  managed.  Just  months  before  her  husband’s  illness,  her 
mother-in-law had been diagnosed with and, died very quickly of lung cancer. 
She was a non-smoker. It was this event that prompted her rethink of what she 
thought she knew about cancer, and this need was only emphasised following 
her  husband’s  diagnosis.  Her  only  previous  experience  of  cancer  had  been 
amongst elderly relatives or her wider social network, and neither her mother-
in-law nor husband fitted her preconceived cancer profile. Lisa was extremely 
thoughtful during the interview but she remained angry at the lengthy diagnostic 
delay. This was the first time she had discussed her story outside of her family 
and friends and admitted that she enjoyed the process.  
Engaging with Murray (83) was quite different. He began by stating that he had 
no close experience of cancer. He was adamant that tobacco was the main and 
possibly  only  carcinogen  worth  discussing.  He  was  wedded  to  scientific 
explanations  and  was  reluctant  to  engage  in  speculation  on  any  level.  If  he 
didn’t know the ‘facts’ he was not prepared to comment. Later he went on to 
admit that both his parents had smoked and that upon his mother’s post-mortem 
at the age of 92, a lung cancer “that would never of killed her” was discovered.  
Kathleen (68) decided to take part in the study because she had an interest in 
health things. She had experience of a number of family members, mostly aunts 
and uncles who had died of cancer when she was in her 20s and 30s. Her father, 
she believed had died of ‘some form of cancer’ but that, she admitted, had 
never  been  confirmed.  Her  closest  friend  was,  on  the  day  of  the  interview, 
receiving  surgery  for  colorectal  cancer.  Kathleen  was  extremely  calm  and 
described how she had sought out information, primarily from the internet, on 
her friend’s behalf. She was very well-informed, though she was not pessimistic.  
Andrew (57) knew little about cancer. He had no ‘close’ experience of cancer, 
though  he  was  aware  that  his  sister-in-law  had  cancer.  The  site  had  to  be 
confirmed  from  a  discussion  with  his  wife,  who  he  looked  to  often  for 
information. His wife did not participate in the interview. He had no awareness 
of  risk  factors  beyond  smoking  and  he  admitted  that  only  recently  had  he 
become aware of the many different cancer sites. This was precipitated by the 
diagnosis of oral cancer in a close friend and he had previously not known it 
possible to get oral cancer.  
Jessie’s (63) motivation for participating in the interview was, like Murray’s, a 
sense of duty. She is interested in cancer and as a retired nurse who volunteers 
in a hospice had much to say about cancer generally. Her mother had died of 
gastric cancer in her 80s and she had been her main carer. The fear and stigma 
surrounding  cancer  was  evident  throughout  Jessie’s  interview.  She  had  never 240 
disclosed her mother’s diagnosis to her and had removed mirrors from her house 
in order that her mother did not witness her demise.  
Both Elsie’s (62) mother and husband had cancer, and though her mother died, 
her husband had recently received the ‘all-clear’. She attributed his head and 
neck  cancer  to  his  work  as  an  illustrator  and  had  arrived  at  this  conclusion 
because she had seen a documentary about the carcinogenic properties of paint. 
She was hesitant about the role of her husband’s smoking in his cancer. Often 
she  said  that  she  didn’t  like  to  think  about  cancer  and  that  she  had  simply 
decided ‘that’s not for me’. On hearing of her husband’s diagnosis she said she 
decided  that  they  would  ‘act  like  he  had  flu’  but  simultaneously  she  began 
observing his everyday household chores in order that she could undertake such 
tasks ‘if  need’s be’. 
Jim (64) and Phyllis (58), a married couple, were interviewed together. Jim had 
little experience of cancer but Phyllis’ mother had survived cancer three twice. 
A close friend had recently died of colorectal cancer and this was regarded as an 
anomalous death. She was asymptomatic and had died very quickly They had 
settled on passive smoking as the root of her cancer because of her work in a 
bar. They also attributed Phyllis’s mother’s cancer to smoking but knew of many 
people who had smoked and remained healthy into older age. Jim in particular 
was moralistic about disease. His sister, who was 18, had died when he was a 
teenager and he questioned why drug addicts manage to remain disease free.  
Colin (61) had a limited experience of cancer. His first experience was that of 
his grandfather, who died when he was 14 and this had remained with him. His 
brother recently died suddenly of pancreatic cancer. The cancer was diagnosed 
following an emergency admission to hospital As they were not in touch he found 
out afterwards and had no knowledge of his brother’s illness experience. He was 
sure that his brother would have ignored symptoms and wondered what would 
have happened had he gone to his GP early. Colin had a close friend who had 
been diagnosed with leukaemia more than 20 years before and had defied the 
odds.  
Janet  (46)  was  a  nurse  and  had  previously  worked  in  neurology.  She  had 
experience of nursing patients with primary brain tumours and attributed these 
to smoking. Her grandmother had died of breast cancer, as had a close school 
friend. She didn’t question why either of these events had happened, she simply 
assumed  that  breast  cancer  was  common.  The  cancer  event  that  had  most 
impact on her was that of her aunt, who had died of oral cancer. Her aunt was 
healthy; the diagnosis ‘came out of the blue’ and she died very quickly. Janet 
described  this  as  especially  tragic  because  her  uncle  committed  suicide  soon 
after her aunt’s death.  
Grace’s  (62)  husband  had  died  of  colorectal  cancer  seven  years  before  the 
interview. He was first diagnosed 10 years before that, though Grace was clear 
that he had ignored his symptoms for many months. She had been his main carer 
and because he died many years post-diagnosis, she described the illness as long 
and drawn out. She assumed that her husband’s cancer was caused by smoking. 
Her brother died of asbestosis.  241 
Angus (56) was the only participant to use the word candidate in relation to 
cancer. He described his older brother, who had died of pancreatic, cancer as an 
‘ideal candidate’ because of his unhealthy lifestyle. His brother had died very 
quickly  –  three  days  after  first  presenting  to  his  GP.  Angus  was  one  of  four 
brothers and weeks before the interview another brother had been diagnosed 
with mantle-cell carcinoma. Despite a poor prognosis, Angus was sure that they 
would be able to ‘beat’ his brother’s disease. Angus interpreted risk statistics 
quite literally and so believed that from his family group of four brothers, two 
had cancer, so he was likely to avoid it.  
Emily (37) was an allied health professional. Both her parents-in-law had cancer. 
Her mother-in-law died in her early 50’s, but her father-in-law was now cancer 
free in spite of an initially poor prognosis. Both had smoked so ‘they knew the 
risks’. Although she was keen to down-play the genetic links in cancer, it was 
clear that she was concerned for her husband and children. Her husband had 
originally agreed to take part but eventually declined. He found it a difficult 
area to talk about. Emily had changed her view of cancer because her uncle (her 
maternal aunt’s husband) had died of throat cancer and met none of the risk 
criteria.  
Clare (42), in the four years before the interview had lost her mother, father 
and best friend to cancer. Her grandmother had also died of uterine cancer. 
With the exception of her father, who had worked with chemicals, she could not 
explain  any  of  these  events.  She  was  extremely  candid  about  her  mother’s 
psychological health which she had settled on as the only possible risk factor. 
Her experience had led her to conclude that cancer was simply random and little 
could be done to avoid it.  
Jenny (38) was also an allied health professional. She chose to meet in her place 
of work and refused permission to record the interview. Although she said she 
had known people with cancer, she would not disclose the level of relationship. 
Any insight she offered was from a purely professional perspective.  
Both Barbara’s (64) parents had died of cancer but because they were elderly 
she had somehow discounted it as cancer. It was not her parent’s cancers that 
she  offered  most  narrative  about.  Rather  she  fixed  on  the  case  of  a  work 
colleague who had died of breast cancer in her 30s. It was this experience that 
had formed Barbara’s view of cancer and had been completely unexpected and 
very  much  an  anomalous  case.  Barbra’s  main  reason  for  judging  this  as 
anomalous  was  that her  colleague  was  ‘meticulous’,  ‘precise’ and  she didn’t 
think such people got cancer.  
Eileen  and  Barry,  also  a  married  couple  opted  to  be  interviewed  separately. 
Eileen had a number of cases to draw on – her brother, her sister-in-law, others 
in  her  social  network.  All  of  these  people,  as  far  as  she  was  aware  had  led 
‘healthy,  good  lives’,  with  the  exception  of  her  brother.  He  had,  what  she 
described as, a chequered past, which could explain his cancer. She was not 
uncomfortable talking about this and ended the interview fairly quickly. Barry 
(74) confirmed the cases that Eileen had introduced but was less clear that his 
brother-in-law was responsible for his cancer because of his behaviour. Barry 
also knew of a number of men within his social circle that had prostate cancer. 242 
He was sure that age was a risk factor and thought that everyone old ‘had some 
kind of cancer’. His knowledge of other risk factors was reasonably poor though 
he supposed that diet and exercise were important.  
Deprived participants 
Both Betty’s (61) mother and mother-in-law had cancer and she had been their 
main  carer.  Her  mother  had  gastric  cancer  and  had  experienced  a  long  pre-
diagnostic delay and then a fairly quick death. It was a difficult time and very 
painful  for  Betty.  She  blamed  her  mother’s  smoking  for  her  cancer,  and  she 
smoked up until she died aged 70. Her mother-in-law was 83 when she died and 
she  had  also  died  very  quickly  following  her  diagnosis.  Betty  said  that  her 
mother-in-law  was  terrified  of  cancer  and  felt  it  better  not  to  disclose  her 
diagnosis. This experience had not been as traumatic as her mother’s. Betty was 
also aware of many other cancer stories from her family – including her brother 
who had been diagnosed with throat cancer but was a non-smoker – and her 
wider social network.  
Charles’ wife (74) was undergoing treatment for endometrial cancer at the time 
of  the  interview.  Her  prognosis  was  good  and  was  at  the  mid-point  of  her 
chemotherapy treatment. He also had many friends who had had cancer and 
could not arrive at an explanation, apart from smoking. His wife’s diagnosis was 
so recent that he hadn’t considered why she might have had cancer. She was a 
non-smoker.  
Gary (37) and Caroline (37), a married couple chose to be interviewed together. 
Caroline then offered little. Initially they thought they knew few people with 
cancer though Gary’s father had survived prostate cancer 12 years before. Gary 
talked about his father as an unwarranted survivor. As the interview progressed 
they remembered many more neighbours, friends, and school friends who had all 
died of cancer. Gary talked about his cousin who had died of breast cancer. She 
had had  a difficult  home  life  and had  ‘given  up’  following  the  diagnosis.  He 
believed that if she hadn’t had such an attitude she may have survived.  
Karen  (25)  was  the  youngest  participant  and  had  very  little  experience  of 
cancer. Her uncle had died of gastric cancer when she was a child but knew few 
of the details because of her age. He was in his 30s. She also had a school-friend 
who had died of cancer – though she was not clear of the site and said that she 
had been attending the doctor because she had a sore leg. Her friend died aged 
19.  
Patricia (62) had many examples of cancer from family and fiends on which to 
draw. Both her parents had died of cancer and both were in their 70s. Although 
both  her  parents  smoked  and  had  lung  cancer  she  had  searched  for  other 
explanations.  Her  father  was  violent  and  her  mother  the  victim  of  domestic 
abuse,  and  she  thought  this  had  contributed  to  her  mother’s  cancer.  She 
believed that ultimately her mother’s cancer had been triggered by a mugging, 
which had shaken her and a few weeks later she received a diagnosis of cancer. 
Patricia was privy to information from an elaborate social circle and despite the 
presence  of  risk  factors  in  sufferers’  behaviour  Patricia  saw  all  these  cancer 
deaths as anomalous.  243 
Pauline’s  (57)  mother  was  present  during  the  interview  but  remained  silent 
almost throughout. Near the end of the interview she simply said ’my granny 
Jessie said, if you fear it you’ll get it’. Pauline began the interview by saying 
that she felt lucky that cancer was not in her family but then went on to offer 
narratives  of  a  paternal  aunt  and  then  uncle  who  had  both  died  of  cancer. 
Pauline’s close friend was from a cancer family, where parents and many siblings 
had cancer. Her friend was fearful that she would be unable to escape cancer, 
and she had recently been diagnosed with melanoma, thus confirming Pauline’s 
belief that cancer is apparent in families.  
Rose’s (61) first experience of cancer was that of a maternal aunt that had died 
of breast cancer, leaving a young family. Her memory was of her mother caring 
for her aunt and nursing her at home. Beyond her aunt, she could remember a 
neighbour  of  her  mother’s  who  also  had  breast cancer and  also  left a  young 
family. Rose also believed that illnesses ‘ran’ in families and in her family they 
had problems with cholesterol.  
Josephine (61) had a number of close experiences of cancer. Both her parents-
in-law had died of colorectal cancer and she was surprised that her husband had 
not because of the familial link. Her friend’s husband had recently died ‘quickly’ 
of oesophageal cancer and another friend who they assumed had come through 
colorectal cancer had just discovered that she had a recurrence. Josephine was 
continually struck by the unpredictable nature of cancer and was aware of many 
narratives that provided evidence of this.  
Lorna (57) had many cases of cancer ‘in her family’ and was one of the few 
participants who knew a child that had died of leukaemia. All these different 
cancers, among these different people had led Lorna to conclude that cancer is 
in all of us and requires a trigger.  
Rona (31), Peter (67) and Julia (65) were all members of one family and chose to 
be interviewed individually. It was interesting hearing about the same cancer 
stories but from three different perspectives. Julia’s sister had died recently of 
oesophageal  cancer  and  this  had  been  traumatic  for  the  family  but  Julia,  in 
particular. At the time of diagnosis, alcohol was identified as a risk factor but 
Julia was adamant that her sister was a moderate drinker. Julia’s father had also 
died  of  a  brain  tumour  that  had  gone  undiagnosed  for  some  time.  Julia  had 
clearly been searching for causal explanations and had eventually arrived at the 
idea of dormant genes. Both Julia and Peter used the same gardening metaphor 
to describe cancer. Peter’s mother was thought to have died of cancer but that 
was  never  confirmed. 244 
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